The effects of underwriters on the flotation costs of SEOs and the likelihood of investor participation in equity offerings by Kong, Zeyu
Kong, Zeyu (2015) The effects of underwriters on the 
flotation costs of SEOs and the likelihood of investor 
participation in equity offerings. PhD thesis, University of 
Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29099/1/PhDThesis.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
THE EFFECTS OF 
UNDERWRITERS ON THE 
FLOTATION COSTS OF SEOs 
AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN 
EQUITY OFFERINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zeyu Kong, MSc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to University of Nottingham for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
December 2014
 I 
 
Abstract 
Underwriting is a key factor in equity offerings and many scholars have sought 
to shed light on the role that underwriters play in the investment banking 
industry. My thesis extends existing studies by investigating how underwriters 
affect the flotation costs of SEOs and the likelihood of investor participation in 
equity offerings.  
 
With the repeal of the US Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, the barrier between 
commercial banking and investment banking was broken down and 
commercial banks could also participate in securities underwriting. Given that 
flotation costs reflect the market perception of a share issue, it is crucial to 
understand the perceptions that commercial bank co-managers convey to the 
market.  
 
Theoretically, there are two conflicting views on this. The first is that 
commercial bank underwriters can obtain more private information through 
their banking arm than can investment bank underwriters or the market 
participants, and they can use this private information to better certify the 
quality of SEOs. As a result, a lower flotation cost should be detected. By 
contrast, though the second view is also based on the assumption that 
commercial bank underwriters probably have more private information, it 
suggests that the flotation cost will be higher if the market suspects the 
commercial bank underwriters may misuse this information. Most previous 
studies did not consider that the effects of commercial bank underwriters on 
SEO floatation costs may vary in the different situation. In other words, 
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current studies cannot conclude that commercial bank co-managers will 
always lower SEO flotation costs, in any circumstance. The first empirical 
chapter of my thesis will fill this gap.  
 
My study utilizes quantitative data collection and analysis following 
mainstream research in this field. The SEO samples are obtained from the 
SDC database embedded in Thomson One. The accounting information for all 
samples comes from the Compustat database. To measure volatility and stock 
return, the CRSP database is used. To implement my study, I also manually 
collected data on two variables: announcement date and 
commercial/investment bank classification. Announcement dates are taken 
from the EDGAR database of the SEC, while commercial/investment bank 
classifications are taken from the Merger & Acquisition database of Thomson 
One, Section 20 Subsidiaries list, Section 4(k)(4)(E) Securities Subsidiaries 
OLVW :LNLSHGLD DQG EDQNV¶ RIILFLDO ZHEVLWHV *LYHQ WKDW P\ VWXG\ LQYROYHV D
detailed investigation of the influence of commercial banks on SEO flotation 
costs, I further divide commercial bank underwriters according to their 
SUHYLRXV EHKDYLRU DV ZHOO DV FXUUHQW PRWLYDWLRQ DV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH LVVXHUV¶
leverage ratios. Considering the increasing popularity of overnight SEO deals 
(where an offer happens less than two days after the announcement date) after 
2007, I also include an overnight dummy as a control variable. My basic 
objective in this part of the thesis is to find an operational measure that will 
identify commercial bank underwriters that act opportunistically (in their 
self-interest) in the market. 
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The empirical results support my hypothesis that the market perception of 
SEOs underwritten by a commercial bank varies in different circumstances. 
Commercial bank co-managers can increase SEO flotation costs if their 
behaviour and motivation convey the impression of opportunism to the 
market. 
 
My second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on the effects of 
underwriter±investor relationships on investor participation in equity offerings. 
It is widely accepted that investment banking is a relationship-based rather 
than transaction-based business. Several studies have shed light on the benefits 
of a good underwriter±investor relationship for investors or issuers. 
Nevertheless, due to technical difficulties, few studies have investigated how 
the underwriter-investor relationship affects investor participation. Studies in 
this field suffer either from having narrow samples or from lacking good 
measures of relationships. The research reported in my second empirical 
chapter fills the gap by employing a sample that includes all IPOs and SEOs 
during 1990±2011 and using the underwriter±investor measure proposed by 
Huang and Zhang (2011).  
 
Given the wide acceptance that investment banking is a relationship-based 
business, I hypothesize that underwriter±investor relationships will increase 
the likelihood of investor participation in equity offerings and this function 
should be separated from the market function. My hypothesis differs from that 
of Huang and Zhang (2011), who consider underwriter±investor relationships 
to be a component of the market function of underwriters and investigate the 
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effects of the underwriter±investor relationship in a sample of traditional 
book-built SEOs. 
 
Underwriter±investor relationships are identified by the number or the 
proportion of the deals undertaken by a particular underwriter±investor pair 
during a given time window. Whether an investor participated in a deal is 
GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH FKDQJH LQ WKH LQYHVWRU¶V VKDUHKROGLQJ LQ WKH LVVXHU EHIRUH
and immediately after the deal. The resHDUFK VDPSOH FRPSULVHG µHOLJLEOH
LQYHVWRUV¶ which is defined as investors that participated in at least 0.5% of all 
offerings during the year of the current deal and participated in at least 10 
offerings during the 5 years prior to the current deal.  
 
The results suggest that: firstly, underwriter±investor networks increase the 
likelihood of investor participation and such influence is separate from the 
market function of underwriters; secondly, the underwriter±investor networks 
are effective not only in pure IPOs and pure SEOs but also interactively; and 
finally, the relationships built by lead managers are effective, as are those built 
by co-managers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research Questions 
Efficient and cheap access to funds remains a key topic in corporate finance. 
The common ways for a company to raise capital include taking loans from a 
commercial bank, issuing corporate bonds in the debt markets and issuing 
shares in the stock markets. The normal methods for a firm to raise capital in 
the stock market are via an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO). An IPO is the first public offering of shares of a company; all 
subsequent offerings are called SEOs.  
 
According to Bortolotti et al. (2008), SEOs have become much more popular 
in capital markets during the last two decades. Those authors reported that the 
total number of global SEO issues in 1991 was 1,099, at a total volume of 
$91,904 million (in the equivalent of 2004 US dollars), and that in 2004 the 
number of issues had risen to 3,223, at a total volume of $320,714 million. 
Due to the increasing popularity of SEOs, they have become the subject of 
scholarly interest.  
 
Among academic studies, the topic that draws the most attention is SEO 
underpricing. Several theoretical pricing models and empirical pricing models 
have been proposed. There are many explanations for SEO underpricing, 
including information asymmetry, uncertainty about firm value, price pressure, 
short-selling and manipulative trading, price clustering and investment 
banking power, and NASDAQ-listed firms.  
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With the repeal of the US Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, the barrier between 
commercial banking and investment banking was broken down and 
commercial banks could also participate in securities underwriting. Many 
studies have since focused on the effects of this on offer underpricing by 
investigating the differences between investment banks and commercial banks 
in underwriting. Commercial banks generally have better access to company 
information and so commercial bank underwriters may reduce SEO 
underpricing if they play a certification role (Booth and Smith, 1986). 
However, if commercial banks use their private information to shift risk from 
themselves to the market, the underpricing would be expected to increase (Puri, 
1999)(PSLULFDOVWXGLHVPDLQO\VXSSRUWFRPPHUFLDOEDQNV¶FHUWLILFDWLRQUROH 
 
Besides underpricing, relationships among institutional investors and 
underwriters in the equity primary market have long interested financial 
HFRQRPLVWV 6RPH VWXGLHV SRLQW RXW WKDW DQ XQGHUZULWHU¶V QHWZRUN RI UHJXODU
investors benefits issuers by maximizing the proceeds of an issue (Sherman 
and Titman, 2002; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 
1990). Based on this idea, Sherman (2000) attributed the growing popularity 
of book building in IPO underwriting to the formation of regular institutional 
investor clienteles of underwriters. Loughran and Ritter (2002) note that 
underwriters favored regular buy-side investors by allocating highly 
underpriced IPOs to them. This phenomenon is supported by Reuter (2006). 
Binay et al. (2007) find that regular investors benefit more than casual 
investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. They 
also suggest that the underwriter±investor relationship is more important in the 
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distribution of IPOs with strong demand, the IPOs of less liquid firms and 
deals by less reputable underwriters. Huang et al. (2008) confirm investment 
EDQNV¶ QHWZRUN IXQFWLRQ DQG VKRZ WKDW WKHLU QHWZRUNLQJ DELOLWLHV FDQ DWWUDFW
more investors. 
 
Despite the importance of underwriter±investor relationships, little empirical 
evidence has been provided on the willingness of regular investors to 
participate in equity issues with their familiar underwriters. Deeper study of 
this question could help us to better understand the increasing popularity of 
accelerated SEO offerings, as well as mergers and acquisitions in investment 
banking. 
 
This Ph.D. study on the effects of underwriters on flotation costs of SEOs and 
likelihood of investor participation endeavours to contribute to the literature 
by addressing the following research questions: 
1. Do commercial bank co-managers always reduce the flotation costs of 
SEOs? That is, do they always work to the benefit of the issuers by reducing 
the floatation costs? Whether or not commercial bank co-managers will 
increase floatation costs in some specific conditions. Here, floatation costs in 
my research include announcement return, underwriting spread, and discount. 
2. Do underwriter±investor networks built in previous equity offerings 
LQFUHDVHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDQHZGHDO" 
 
1.2. Research Motivation and Proposed Contribution 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 separated the roles of commercial and 
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investment banking. For the next 45 years, commercial banks and their 
subsidiaries were not allowed to underwrite corporate debt or equity securities. 
The restrictions were relaxed beginning in 1988 for debt securities and in 1990 
for equities. On November 14, 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act was finally 
repealed. As a result of the less restrictive regulatory environment, 30 
commercial banks entered equity underwriting during 1990±1999, through the 
establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. Thereafter, banks, which prior to 
December 1996 underwrote less than 1% of the equity issue volume per year, 
underwrote upwards of 20% of issue volume annually (Chaplinsky and Erwin, 
2009). Meanwhile, after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, 
commercial banks acted as co-managers in about 49% of transactions (Jeon 
and Ligon, 2011). Banks started the 1990s with virtually no share of equity 
underwriting, then substantially increased their prominence as equity 
underwriters over this decade. 
 
Despite the growing number of commercial banks becoming co-managers1 in 
equity underwriting, little effort has been put into the investigation of the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ XQGHUZULWLQJ DQG IORWDWLRQ FRVWV
Moreover, the studies that have been done have not come to the same 
conclusion. Narayanan et al. (2004) use a sample of SEO syndicates from 
1994 to 1997 and find that lending banks are more likely to co-manage an 
issue if the lead manager has a high reputation and is non-lending. Moreover, 
with such a syndicate arrangement, issuers benefit from low underwriting fees, 
although they do not receive better pricing on their offerings. Suzuki (2010) 
                                                             
1
 The composition of the underwriter syndicate is discussed in section 2.6. 
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finds that banks holding loans from issuers have a negative effect on price 
discount and no effect on underwriting fees. This finding implies the 
FHUWLILFDWLRQ UROH RI FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ FR-managers. Jeon and Ligon (2011) 
study the role that co-managers play in reducing flotation costs of SEOs. They 
investigate how different characteristics of an underwriter syndicate affect 
flotation costs, such as the number of co-managers, the reputation of lead 
managers and the involvement of commercial banks. They find that the 
presence of commercial banks as co-managers can reduce underpricing as well 
as underwriting spread, and improve announcement return. In other words, 
having commercial banks as co-managers can reduce flotation costs.  
 
However, Puri (1999) suggests that the holding of equity or debt by 
commercial banks may hinder their certification role. Hebb and MacKinnon 
(2004) find the presence of commercial banks in underwriter syndicates results 
in increased uncertainty in IPO valuation. They suggest that the market 
perceives the possibility of a conflict of interest when commercial banks 
underwrite equity issues. Song (2004) finds that commercial banks are more 
likely to serve as co-managers when issuers have lower stock ratings and, thus, 
rely more on bank loans. This indicates that if commercial banks act as 
co-managers, they do not improve the certification ability of the syndicate. 
The overall findings of Chaplinsky and Erwin (2009) suggest that it has been 
difficult for banks to achieve economies of scale in underwriting, as evidenced 
by loss of market share. 
 
Previous studies did not consider that the effects of commercial bank 
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underwriters on SEO floatation costs may vary in the different situation. 
However, this assumption may not apply in practice; indeed, their effects 
should depend on the nature of the situation. My study aims to fill this gap. 
The broad motivation behind my research is to understand how commercial 
bank co-managers affect the cost of SEO flotation in practice. My results 
refine prior findings by pointing out that the market perception of SEOs 
underwritten by commercial banks varies in different circumstances. In fact, 
commercial bank co-managers can actually increase SEO flotation costs if 
their behavior and motivation convey an impression to the market that they are 
operating opportunistically. 
 
Investment banking is a relationship-based rather transaction-based business 
(Huang et al., 2008). Therefore, many scholars put their effort into studying 
WKH IXQFWLRQ RI XQGHUZULWHUV¶ QHWZRUNV LQ HTXLW\ RIIHULQJV James (1992) 
claims that investment banks build relationships with securities issuers through 
repeat dealing. Huang et al. (2008) suggest that investment banks develop 
relationships with investors through repeat dealings in securities offerings, 
brokerage services, and analyst research coverage. The resulting investor 
networks benefit investment banks by lowering the costs of searching for 
potential investors, winning trust from investors, and inducing investors to 
produce and truthfully reveal information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; 
Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Sherman and Titman, 2002). In accordance 
with those studies, Sherman (2000) attributes the growing popularity of book 
building in IPO underwriting to the formation, on the part of underwriters, of a 
client base of regular institutional investors. Loughran and Ritter (2002) and 
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Reuter (2006) find that in the late 1990s underwriters normally benefited their 
regular buy-side clients by the allocation of highly underpriced issues. Binay 
et al. (2007) find that regular investors benefit more than casual investors in 
IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. They also suggest 
that the underwriter±investor relationship is more important in the distribution 
of IPOs with strong demand, in the IPOs of less liquid firms and in deals by 
less reputable underwriters. Huang et al. (2008) cRQILUP LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV¶
network function and show that their networking abilities can attract more 
investors. Huang and Zhang (2011) employ the idea of underwriter±investor 
networks to support the marketing role of underwriters in SEO offerings. Their 
results confirm that a network of underwriters can help to attract investors to 
SDUWLFLSDWH LQ VKDUH RIIHULQJV µERRN-EXLOGLQJ GHDOV¶ DQG ORZHU WKH 6(2
discount (the margin between the lower price of the new shares and the current 
trading price of existing shares). 
 
Although many studies focus on the functions and the benefits of underwriter±
investor relationships in equity offerings for underwriters, little attention has 
been paid to the exact effect of the underwriter±investor network on potential 
LQYHVWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR SDUWLFLSDWH 7R WKH EHVW of my knowledge, Binay et al. 
(2007), Huang et al. (2008) and Huang and Zhang (2011) are the only studies 
ZKLFKLQYHVWLJDWHLQYHVWRUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQGHFLVLRQVLQGHDOVZKHUHWKH\KDYH a 
pre-existing relationship with the underwriter relationship. Even so, these 
studies are all far from comprehensive.  
 
Binay et al. (2007) EDVH WKHLU PHDVXUH RI µUHODWLRQVKLS¶ RQ WKH GLIIHUHQFH
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between the probability of institutional participation conditional on past 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH VDPH OHDG XQGHUZULWHUV¶ ,32V DQG WKH XQFRQGLWLRQDO
probability of institutional participation. This measure is expressed as a 
percentage and actually captures the difference in the participation ratio for the 
WZR JURXSV QDPHO\ µSUHYLRXVO\ SDUWLFLSDWHG¶ LQYHVWRUV DQG XQFRQGLWLRQDO
investors. However, there are several limitations to their study. One is that it 
examines only the network of lead managers of a current deal. Though lead 
managers are likely to be more important, co-managers are also useful in 
marketing and allocating the offerings (Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011) and so their contribution should be included. The second 
limitation is that the measure of relationship reflects only a difference between 
two groups, and cannot capture the decision to participate made by each 
eligible investor. Thirdly, Binay et al. (2007) present only descriptive statistics 
and do not run a regression that could rule out the influence of other factors.  
 
Huang et al. (2008) also study the effects of the underwriter±investor 
relationship on the participation decisions of investors. The main limitation of 
their work is that the sample relates only to private investment in public equity. 
Considering the different mechanisms underlying public offerings and private 
investment in public equity, their study cannot, therefore, provide strong 
evidence on the effects of the underwriter±LQYHVWRU QHWZRUN RQ LQYHVWRUV¶
participation decisions in public offerings.  
 
Huang and Zhang (2011) show the effects of the underwriter±investor network 
in traditional book-built SEOs as evidence of the market effort of underwriters. 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
9 
 
They assign each eligible investor (defined as investors that participate in at 
least 0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the current SEO and that participated 
in at least 10 SEOs during the 5 years prior to the current SEO) to each deal 
and investigate the effects of network on the participation decision. Their 
results show that a previously established relationship, whether that is with the 
lead managers or the co-managers of the current deal, makes investors favor 
the current deal. However, Huang and Zhang (2011) limit their sample to 
traditional book-built SEOs. Consequently, whether an underwriter±investor 
UHODWLRQVKLS DIIHFWV LQYHVWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ SXEOLF RIIerings 
remains an open question. 
 
This thesis fills a gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive and 
robust investigation on whether the underwriter±investor network affects 
LQYHVWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ HTXLW\ RIIHULQJV 7KH UHVXOWV UHSRUted 
could provide hints regarding why accelerated SEOs are proving so popular, as 
well as on the motivation for successful investment banks to acquire distressed 
banks after a period of financial crisis, as recently experienced. 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 gives a brief introduction to the 
essential elements of SEO transactions. This discussion provides background 
information which is the basis for the sample selection and hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 discusses studies related to equity offerings. This chapter focuses on 
the literature on SEO underpricing and the role of underwriters in equity 
markets.  
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Chapter 4 investigates the effects of commercial bank co-managers on SEO 
flotation costs, with a focus on SEO underpricing (discount). Chapter 5 
provides evidence for the hypothesis that the underwriter±investor network 
affects the decisions of investors on whether or not to participate in a 
particular share issue. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Introduction to Equity Offerings 
2.1. IPOs 
In the initial development of most companies, funds are raised by selling 
equity to a small number of investors. Usually, it is not easy for these investors 
to resell the equity, since the companies are not listed. Because of this lack of 
liquidity, the companies offer greater compensation (in the form of the 
discount, or underpricing) to investors when raising equity capital at this stage. 
Later, when the companies have developed to a certain level, they may need 
additional capital and consider raising it via the listed equity market. Thus, the 
FRPSDQLHVWKLQNDERXWµJRLQJSXEOLF¶DQGVHOOLQJHTXLW\WRDODUJHQXPEHURI
investors. This process is called an Initial Public Offering (IPO). In contrast 
with the shares of unlisted FRPSDQLHVOLVWHGFRPSDQLHV¶VKDUHVFDQEHWUDGHG
on a much more liquid market. Consequently, listed companies pay less 
compensation to their investors than they paid before going public. However, 
an IPO requires companies to pay fees to the firms involved in the auditing 
and legal processes required for an IPO, as well as to the firm underwriting the 
IPO, which is usually an investment bank 
 
2.2. SEOs 
Any issuance of shares by a company after its IPO is termed a Seasoned 
Equity Offering (SEO). A more precise definition of an SEO is that it is a 
registered offering of a block of a security (normally a large block, as a 
proportion of existing shares) that has been previously issued to the public. 
 
Generally, there are two main functions of an SEO. One is to raise fresh equity 
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for companies. In this case, the shares are offered in the primary market and 
the proceeds of the sale go to the issuing company. Such offerings are known 
as primary distribution. Another function of an SEO is to provide a way for 
existing shareholders to reduce their positions in a company. Such offerings 
are called secondary distribution. In practice, large investors are more likely to 
implement secondary distribution. The reason is that only the secondary 
market is able to absorb such large volumes of shares. Meanwhile, the 
proceeds of secondary distribution go to those shareholders rather than to the 
issuing company. One SEO could contain both primary and secondary 
distributions. As primary distribution is more related to financial activities, 
most academic studies of SEOs constrain their samples to include at least 
some primary distributions. 
 
2.3. Differences between IPOs and SEOs 
The market for SEOs is larger than that for IPOs. According to Bortolotti et al. 
(2008), the global dollar volumes of SEOs were nearly twice the global dollar 
volumes of IPOs in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, though IPO volume ($256.4 
billion) was closer to SEO volume ($317.2 billion), it still represented only 
around 80% of SEO issuance. 
 
Although IPOs and SEOs share nearly the same offering processes, there are 
several important differences between the two. One major difference is the 
degree of information asymmetry. Generally, IPOs have more severe 
information asymmetry than SEOs because, by definition, an IPO involves 
firms which have issued no public shares previously. For such firms, limited 
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information is available publicly. In contrast, SEOs are conducted by listed 
companies, which are legally required to release certain types and amounts of 
information; moreover, the market prices of the shares of SEO issuers are 
already available to the public. The theory of market efficiency supposes that 
market prices reflect all information relating to the companies and, to the 
extent that the theory applies, SEO pricing is based on market closing prices 
prior to issues. Conversely, before an IPO there is no market price available to 
the public and investors bear greater information asymmetry risk. 
 
Another difference is in flotation methods (also called underwriting method in 
some studies, since most SEOs are underwritten by investment banks). In the 
86µILUPFRPPLWPHQW¶LVWKHPDLQIORWDWLRQPHWKRGXVHGIRU,32V$FFRUGLQJ
WR WKH µ$OO 86 3XEOLF 1HZ ,VVXHV¶ UHFRUGV LQ 6'& 3ODWLQXP WKH LVVXHV
underwritten by the firm commitment method made up 98% of all US IPOs 
during the period 1980±2010. For SEOs, although firm commitment is also the 
main underwriting method (Booth and Smith, 1986), issues underwritten by 
other flotation methods represent a substantial portion of all offerings. For 
LQVWDQFH IURP WR WKHµ$OO863XEOLF1HZ,VVXHV¶UHFRUG LQ6'&
Platinum shows that around 82% of all US SEOs were underwritten by the 
firm commitment method and the remaining offerings were underwritten via 
other flotation methods2.  
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 6KHOIUHJLVWUDWLRQKDVEHFRPHGRPLQDWHGQRZDGD\V%HIRUHVKHOIUHJLVWUDWLRQ¶VGRPLQDQFH
the market was dominated by firm commitment for a very long time and firm commitment still 
occupies a comparable portion of the market. 
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2.4. Flotation Methods 
2.4.1. Firm Commitment Method 
The progress of a firm commitment offering is roughly as follows. Firstly, the 
issuer needs to find investment banks to act as lead underwriters and to 
assemble other investment banks to form a syndicate in order to share risk and 
facilitate share distribution3. The syndicate buys the issue from the issuer and 
guarantees sales of a certain number of shares to investors at a specified price. 
Secondly, after the syndicate is established, the lead underwriter undertakes 
µGXHGLOLJHQFH¶WKDWLVFKHFNVWKHILQDQFLDOVWDWXVRIWKHLVVXHUUHJLVWHUVWKH
issue (in the US, this is with the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC) 
and presents a preliminary prospectus to key potential investors (also known 
DV D µURDG VKRZ¶ 7KH LVVXHU LV QRW SHUPLWWHG WR VHOO DQ\ VKDUHV EHIRUH
approval from the SEC after the registration. Therefore, at this stage, the 
syndicate can only determine a possible price range of the issue. Thirdly, after 
the issue has been approved by the SEC, the issuer meets with the underwriter 
V\QGLFDWH DQG IL[HV WKH ILQDO RIIHU SULFH WKH µSULFLQJ PHHWLQJ¶ 7KH RIIHU
normally starts the following day. The guarantee period of the underwriter 
syndicate starts from the pricing meeting, because the guarantee requires a 
specific offer price. The guarantee period expires at the end of the offer period. 
A successful offer is usually sold out within a couple of days, and so the 
guarantee period of the firm commitment method is typically short. 
 
2.4.2. Other Flotation Methods 
Best efforts: The best efforts method does not require investment banks to 
                                                             
3
 See further in section 2.6. 
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guarantee to sell a certain number of securities. Instead, they promise only to 
sell as much of the issue as possible to the public and to act as agents. Under 
this flotation method, the investment banks bear less risk than with firm 
commitment issues. Therefore, in best efforts issues, the investment banks 
charge lower underwriting fees. According to previous studies in equity 
offerings, the best efforts method is much more frequently used in IPOs than 
in SEOs. This is probably because IPOs are riskier than SEOs due to the 
problem of information asymmetry; for example, IPO stocks have no public 
market price prior to the issue, no stock analysts following the company, 
limited information available to the public and a high concentration of 
ownership, often with managers as the major holders of equity. Therefore, if 
investment banks believe the risk related to an IPO is too high, they use the 
best efforts method instead of the firm commitment method in order to reduce 
their risk. 
 
Rights: Rights offers can be both underwritten and no-underwritten. If issuers 
choose the no-underwritten method to issue rights offers, the issuers bear all 
the risk associated with issues. These offers, in contrast to public offers, permit 
only existing shareholders to purchase a pro rata portion of the issues at a 
fixed price. A rights offer is normally open for a fixed period (often one month) 
from the start of the issue. During this period, the existing shareholders are 
granted the right to accept or decline the offer. The shareholders can subscribe, 
sell the rights on the secondary market or do nothing. In other words, a rights 
offer could be treated as an option or a warrant for the shareholders. The offer 
price is often set at a discount from the market price of the issue date. The 
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price will hold until the offer has been subscribed or withdrawn. It is possible 
for the offer price to exceed the market price during this period; to offset this 
risk, the rights offer price is normally more discounted than that in a firm 
commitment offer. Typically, the rights subscription price is 15±20% below 
the current market price of the stock. 
 
The underwritten rights offer is often called a standby rights offer. The 
XQGHUZULWHUVFKDUJHDIL[HGµVWDQGE\¶IHHDQGµWDNH-XS¶IHHLQDVWDQGE\ULJKWV
offer because they bear the price risk, as they do in a firm commitment issue. 
Though not very common in the US market, rights offers are usually fully 
subscribed (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). In a standby rights offer, underwriters 
typically take around 15% of the issue (Singh, 1997). Rights issues are 
generally used by closed-end investment companies4, while European SEOs 
are normally sold by rights. 
 
Accelerated underwriting: accelerated underwriting is discussed by 
Bortolotti et al. (2008). Different from traditional firm commitment 
underwriting, accelerated underwriting executes the transactions much more 
quickly ± it is normally finished in three days. Accelerated offerings can be 
further divided into three categories, namely accelerated book-built offerings, 
block trades and bought deals. 
 
The process of accelerated book-built offerings (ABO) is similar to traditional 
firm commitment underwriting in terms of book-building, shares allocation 
                                                             
4
 Also called `closed-HQG IXQG¶ ZKLFK QRUPDOO\ RQO\ UDLVH PRQH\ E\ ,32V DQG QR 6(2V
thereafter. 
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and responsibilities of underwriters. The main difference is in the execution 
speed because ABO firms are typically well known and have good share 
liquidity. 
 
In bought deals (BDs) and block trades (BTs), the price is fixed by auction. 
BTs and BDs involve little information production. Issuers sell shares to the 
investment banks with highest bid. These investment banks then resell the 
shares to institutional investors. Thus, both BTs and BDs are closed very 
rapidly. 
 
According to Bortolotti et al. (2008), the main advantage of accelerated 
underwriting is that it reduces flotation costs, which include SEO 
announcement return and underwriting fees. In recent years, accelerated 
underwriting has occupied a considerable portion of the equity offerings 
market. Armitage (2010) finds that many rights issues have been declined by 
existing shareholders in the UK, while these shareholders as well as new 
investors are more interested in block trades. In the US, SEOs executed 
through accelerated underwriting account for over half the value of SEO 
offerings. The number of ABOs increased dramatically from 1997 (nearly zero) 
to 2004 (around a third of the total SEOs). 
 
Shelf registration: In 1983, Rule 415 was introduced by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission. This rule allows one single registration file to be 
used to issue multiple tranches of securities. However, not all companies can 
implement this flotation method. According to Rule 415, there are four 
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requirements for a shelf registration issue: 1) the issue is of common stock 
(with or without voting rights) having a market value of at least $75 million; 2) 
the issuer has had no default on debt, preferred stock or rental payments for 3 
years; 3) all SEC disclosure requirements have been met for the last 3 years; 4) 
WKHILUP¶VGHEWLVLQYHVWPHQWJUDGH  
 
Issuers who use shelf-registration to register securities can hire underwriters 
from a list. The registered securities may be offered on an immediate, 
continuous or delayed basis over the next two years. Shelf-registration can 
increase the flexibility and the speed of issues by allowing firms to execute 
issues when market conditions become favorable.  
 
7KH 6(& FUHDWHG D QHZ FDWHJRU\ RI LVVXHUV FDOOHG µZHOO NQRZQ VHDVRQHG
isVXHUV¶ :.6,V ,IDFRPSDQ\PHHWVRQHRI WZRFRQGLWLRQV UHTXLUHGE\ WKH
SEC, it will grant WKSI status. The registration statements of WKSIs are 
automatically effective on filing, without SEC review. Shelf-registration 
nowadays has become an important part of the SEO market in the US. 
According to Autore (2011), there were 317 shelf offerings from 2004 to 2006, 
totalling $51 billion, compared with only 146 traditional offerings, totaling 
$18 billion. 
 
Private placement: In a private placement, the shares of the issuing firms are 
transferred from current shareholders to a single investor or a small number of 
investors. Private placements are non-public and are regulated by Rule 144 
and Rule 144a in the US. Institutions such as banks, insurance companies and 
Chapter 2  Introduction to Equity Offerings 
19 
 
pension funds are typical investors in private placements. 
 
2.5. Flotation Costs 
Flotation costs are made up of direct costs and the indirect costs of selling a 
security through a public offering.  
 
The direct costs refer to underwriter compensation, registration and listing fees, 
legal, accounting and printing expenses, and so on. Underwriter compensation 
has several components, such as: an over-allotment option (typically this is a 
one-month warrant to purchase an additional 15% of shares at the same price 
as the offering itself); long-term warrants, exercisable at the offer price; extra 
UHLPEXUVHPHQWRIXQGHUZULWHUH[SHQVHVE\WKHLVVXHUDQGXQGHUZULWHU¶VJURVV
spread (the difference between the public offering price and the underwriter 
SXUFKDVH SULFH 7KH XQGHUZULWHU¶V gross spread is typically the largest 
component of underwriter compensation.  
 
The indirect costs of the flotation relate to the discount, the announcement 
return, the possible cost of issue delay or withdrawal, as well as management 
time and energy devoted to the offering process. Among them, the discount 
GHILQHGDVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHSULRUWUDGLQJGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHDQGLWV
closing market price immediately following the public offering) is generally 
the largest of the indirect costs. Announcement return, defined as the abnormal 
return during the filing date of an issue, and expected costs of issue delay and 
withdrawal are generally measured by probability. Management time and 
energy devoted to the offering process is another significant indirect cost but it 
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is hard to measure and quantify and has rarely been studied. 
 
To summarize, flotation costs can be separated into direct and indirect costs. 
Direct costs can be further divided: 
1. Fees to underwriters (including warrants and over-allotment options); 
2. Fees to accountants and law firms; 
3. Listing fees, registration fees, printing, advertising as well as road show 
expenses and the cost of management time. 
Indirect flotation costs include: 
1. Issue discount (underpricing), which can potentially be captured by 
underwriters through their power to allocate the issue to preferred customers 
and affiliates; 
2. Announcement effect, which represents the market reaction to the 
announcement of the offering and is negative on average 
3. Costs of delays or withdrawal of an offering.  
 
 
2.6. Underwriter Syndicate 
In an equity offering, underwriters normally perform as agents and execute the 
issue for the issuing firm (the client). Among all flotation methods, the firm 
commitment method requires underwriters to play a crucial role. To 
summarize, underwriters typically do the following work in a firm 
commitment issue: 1) they provide procedural and financial advice to issuers; 
2) they promise to buy the entire issue from the issuer; 3) they resell the shares 
to investors. Underwriters often form a syndicate to buy and distribute the 
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shares so that the risk associated with the issue is shared with other members. 
Besides sharing risk, the underwriter syndicate can also broaden distribution, 
encourage research support and support market making following the offering.  
 
The syndicate will normally comprise a group of banks. The members are 
likely to take on different roles and responsibilities and be accordingly 
rewarded in terms of management fees, underwriting fees and selling 
concessions. 
 
Book managers: Book managers, sometimes called lead managers or lead 
underwriters, are the underwriters that form and coordinate syndicates and 
receive the management fees. In equity offerings, the book managers typically 
record the activities of the syndicate and underwrite the largest portion of the 
securities. The important role of book managers has been recognized by many 
studies on equity offerings. Loughran and Ritter (2004) measure the reputation 
of the underwriters by using the ranking of lead managers in IPOs. Studies of 
SEOs implement a similar ranking method. Some studies have pointed out that 
SEOs are less underpriced if they employ lead managers with high reputations. 
Mola and Loughran (2004) used the ranking of analyst teams of lead managers 
to represent the analysis capacity of the underwriters. 
 
Co-managers: Co-managers, also known as co-lead managers or co-lead 
underwriters, do not have the responsibility of recording the activities of the 
underwriter syndicate and so receive no management fees. Co-managers share 
underwriting risks and underwriting fees with the book managers, but 
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generally underwrite a smaller portion of the shares than book managers. Jeon 
and Ligon (2011) find that most syndicates (86%) in SEOs of industrial firms 
from 1997 to 2007 consisted of more than one co-manager. The average 
number of co-managers was 2.44 per deal during this period. Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) find that more co-managers provide greater analyst coverage 
for issuers after IPOs. This finding is supported by Chen and Ritter (2000). 
Having more co-managers also results in more market markers after IPOs 
(Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Corwin and Schultz (2005) also point out that 
though issuers thereby benefit from having more co-managers in the syndicate, 
the syndicate size is limited by the offer size, competition for future 
underwriting business and higher underwriting spread. 
 
Other Syndicate Members: There may be some banks in the syndicate that 
are responsible only for the distribution of the shares. These banks are 
QRUPDOO\FDOOHGµRWKHUV\QGLFDWHPHPEHUV¶2WKHUV\QGLFDWHPHPEHUVDUHDOVR
allocated selling concessions. Reallowance fees are paid to other members of 
the syndicate (sometimes called secondary sellers). Lead underwriters, 
co-managers and other syndicate members typically commit to producing 
analyst coverage together for the shares in a period after the offering. The 
purpose of analyst coverage is to draw the attention of investors to the 
VHFXULWLHVDQGLQFUHDVHDVWRFN¶VOLTXLGLW\ 
 
2.7. Types of Underwritten Securities 
There are many types of securities in equity transactions: issuing firms may 
have different equity structures and their specific corporate charter may 
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require different types of shares. Some are rarely studied in the literature, 
presumably due to their unique characteristics. 
 
Common Shares (Class A and Class B): Common shares (class A and class 
B) are the most common types of securities in equity offerings. Common 
shares, also known as ordinary shares, are standard voting shares: they grant 
holders the right to vote on matters of corporate policy and the composition of 
the board of directors. The main differences between common shares and class 
A or class B shares concern the underlying voting rights. Class A shares 
normally have enhanced voting rights, while class B shares have limited 
voting rights. 
 
ADRs: American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are a way for foreign firms to 
raise capital in the US market. An ADR can be treated as a certificate which 
represents ownership of shares of a foreign company and allows those shares 
to be traded in the United States. Under the ADR arrangement, the shares of 
the foreign company are deposited in a US bank. Then, the US depository 
bank issues ADRs based on the deposited shares. Meanwhile, the depository 
bank then converts dividends and other payments into US dollars to ADR 
holders in the US (Diro Ejara and Ghosh, 2004).  
 
Given the differences in operational environments and the offering process 
across countries, many studies of equity offerings (especially of the 
underpricing of equity offerings) exclude non-US companies in their samples. 
Chen et al. (2009) study how investment banks determine the gross spread in 
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ADR SEOs from 1980 to 2004 and find that it can be explained in a similar 
way (offer characteristics) to that of common US SEOs. 
 
Unit: A unit is a product which includes two or more classes of securities. 
Investment trusts issue units and normally offer redeemable units to investors 
for a specific period. One unit represents one share of a fixed and unmanaged 
portfolio which typically consists of shares and bonds. It is designed to 
provide capital appreciation and dividend income and is generally invested in 
by three types of companies: investment trusts, mutual funds and closed-end 
funds. Units are often excluded from the sample selection in academic equity 
underpricing studies due to their complex features. 
 
REITs: real estate investment trusts. REITs are closed-end investment 
companies that invest in commercial real estate. In equity studies, the term 
REITs refers to the shares issued by real estate investment trusts. REITs are 
more liquid than direct investment in real estate because these shares are 
traded on a stock market. The trusts often hold various types of real estate and 
so the risks within the real estate industry are diversified. Thus, REITs provide 
investors with easy access to real estate and diversification within real estate. 
REITs can be further categorized into mortgage REITs and equity REITs, 
according to the type of investment. Mortgage REITs primarily invest in 
mortgages and are similar to bond investments. Equity REITs mainly invest in 
commercial or residential properties, using leverage, and are similar to 
investments in leveraged equity real estate. Studies of equity often exclude 
REITs from their samples as REITs are a closed-end investments. 
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2.8. The Regulation of Equity Offerings in the US market 
Equity offerings are regulated by two major laws in the US. The first is the 
Securities Act of 1933, which requires issuers to sell the entire issue at a single 
price to all investors. Additionally, issuers need to meet filing rules and 
extensive disclosure requirements prior to the offering date. Prospective 
issuers have to file an S-1 statement with SEC prior to the offering. Then, the 
SEC will send the issuer a letter of comment asking for additional disclosures 
and request amendments to the registration statement within approximately 30 
days. After that, the issuers will send responses. This process of letter 
exchange may be repeated several times before the SEC declares the 
registration finally effective. The issuers can proceed with the offerings as 
soon as the filing statements have been approved. However, exemptions may 
be made to the registration requirements of the Securities Act for small issues, 
private placements, mergers and reorganizations. Nevertheless, after such 
exemption, privately placed securities cannot be resold for a year without 
being publicly registered with the SEC. 
 
The second major act is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This requires 
issuers of publicly held securities to make periodic disclosures through public 
filings of annual 10-K statements, quarterly 10-Q statements and occasional 
8-K statements if material changes occur.  
 
In recent years, there have been trends towards more rapid disclosure of 
changes in company conditions, less delay in securities issuance and an easing 
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of restrictions on private placements and foreign security issuance and the use 
RI86DFFRXQWLQJ VWDQGDUGVXQGHU µJHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHGDFFRXQWLQJSULQFLSOHV¶
(GAAP)5 . However, not all new legislation has sought to ease the regulatory 
environment. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was implemented, requiring 
major changes in the committee structure of boards of directors, auditor 
independence and certification of company financial disclosures. 
 
Rule 415, governing shelf registration, which was adopted by the SEC in 1982, 
allowed public companies to sell securities more rapidly. The securities of 
issuers under shelf registration could be sold from time to time in a two-year 
period. The offer terms at each sale are based on current market conditions and 
other factors. Rule 415 makes it unnecessary for issuers to file new registration 
statements at each sale date, and thus reduces delays for issuers. However, not 
all companies are eligible to use this flotation method. Shelf registration is 
normally available to large companies of good repute that have a market value 
of at least $75 million, and no records of defaults on any debt, preferred stock 
or rental payments for the previous 3 years. Eligible issuers have to meet all 
SEC disclosure requirements in the last 3 years and to have been granted 
investment grade for their debt. 
 
On December 1st, 2005, a new rule, which created a new category of issuers 
FDOOHGµZHOONQRZQVHDVRQHGLVVXHUV¶ :.6,V, became effective. WKSIs are 
publicly listed firms that are eligible to issue shelf offerings automatically. 
                                                             
5
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When issuers meet one of the two requirements6 of the SEC, they may 
become WKSIs. A WKSI can have oral or written communication with 
investors before, during and after the offering process. WKSIs are given 
automatic shelf registration status and are permitted to register unspecified 
amounts of different types of securities on Form S-3 or F-3, without allocating 
between primary and secondary offerings. Due to automatic shelf registration 
status, these registration statements are effective on filing without SEC 
approval. Issuers can add further classes of securities and eligible 
majority-owned subsidiary securities after the registration statement is 
HIIHFWLYH LI WKH\ PDNH D µSRVW-HIIHFWLYH DPHQGPHQW¶ WR WKH RIIHULQJV¶
registration statements. WKSIs are permitted to omit the plan of distribution, 
the name of any selling security holders, the description of securities to be 
offered, and the allocation between primary and secondary shares. However, 
these changes should be incorporated in prospectus supplements and 
post-effective date amendments to the shelf registration statements. 
 
Besides WKSIs, the SEC has made several other changes to the regulations in 
recent years. One of the major changes is that the SEC increased disclosure 
requirements in registration statements and 10-K statements in terms of risk 
factors. Another change is that Rule 415 will no longer limit the amount of 
securities registered on a shelf registration statement. Initially, the SEC 
mandates an issuer to provide a registration with a fixed amount intended to be 
offered. The shelf registration statement is valid for two years from the 
                                                             
6
 The two requirements are (1) have outstanding a minimum of $700 million of common 
equity market capitalization world-wide that is held by non-affiliates, or (2) if they are only 
registering non-convertible securities other than common equity, that during the past three 
years they have issued non-convertible securities other than common equity in registered 
primary offerings with an aggregate value of $1 billion. 
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effective date. However, the SEC has allowed shelf registration statements to 
remain effective for many years in practice. The new rules also permit issuers 
to conduct primary offerings immediately after the effectiveness of a shelf 
registration statement. Shelf issuers may also sell equity at varying prices 
rather than a conventional fixed price offer without limitations on volume and 
without needing to identify potential underwriters. 
 
Besides securities regulations, there are some other laws and rules impacting 
the security offering process. Before 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited 
commercial banks and their subsidiaries from affiliating with securities firms 
or underwriting corporate securities. In 1999, this act was repealed and 
replaced by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. The repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act had a direct effect on securities underwriting, by 
increasing competition for corporate underwriting assignments through 
granting entry to commercial banks. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 encourages the establishment of more 
independent boards and requires outside directors take on major governance 
roles within the board of directors. This act has enhanced shareholder voting 
rights and increased the credibility of firm disclosure by providing greater 
auditor independence and requiring the chief executive officer (CEO) and 
FKLHI ILQDQFH RIILFHU &)2 WR SHUVRQDOO\ FHUWLI\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V DQQXDO
financial statements. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I will introduce the most common research topics related to 
equity offerings and discuss the reason for firms to conduct equity offerings 
and equity flotation costs. This chapter looks at all the possible determinants 
of SEO underpricing, paving the way for hypothesis development in the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 4). This chapter also aims to shed light on whether 
XQGHUZULWHUV LQIOXHQFH LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ GHFLVLRQV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ DQ
equity offering, and if so how. This discussion facilitates the establishment of 
the hypothesis of the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5). 
 
3.1. Overview of Studies on Equity Offerings 
As noted in Chapter 2, equity offerings can be categorized into two groups, 
IPOs and SEOs. In practice, there are several topics common to both IPO and 
SEO studies: the determinants of offer underpricing, market timing and gross 
spread. Due to its particular characteristics, an SEO has unique features, 
relating to underwriting methods, market price and more information being 
available to the public. Thus, studie have looked at SEO announcement effects, 
the determinants for flotation costs, the reasons for choosing different 
underwriting methods, and the reasons for the difference in prominent 
underwriting methods among regions. The aim of this chapter is to introduce 
the important studies of equity offerings. 
 
Flotation costs are an important portion of gross proceeds in equity offerings. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, these costs can be further divided into direct and 
indirect costs. Direct flotation costs include the fees paid to underwriters, 
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registration and listing fees, legal fees, accounting fees and printing expenses. 
Underwriting fees represent the major portion of direct flotation costs. The 
studies on direct flotation costs are summarized in Section 3.3. Indirect 
flotation costs include underpricing, announcement effects and the probability 
of issue withdrawal; studies of these are discussed in Section 3.4. For IPO 
studies, indirect flotation costs do not include announcement effects, because 
the shares were (by definition) not publicly tradable before the IPO. First, 
though, in Section 3.2 I discuss the reasons why firms launch an SEO. The 
studies on the impact of underwriters on securities offerings are discussed in 
Section 3.5. Last but not the least, I discuss the studies on the effects of 
underwriter-investor network in the literature. 
 
3.2. Reasons for Conducting Equity Offerings 
Within the literature, there are three main explanatory frameworks for equity 
offerings, namely pecking-order theory, tax and leverage cost trade-off models, 
and market timing theory. There are also some other explanations, for example 
relating to the corporate lifecycle stage and near-term cash need. This section 
briefly considers these explanations. Table 1 shows a brief summary of these 
explanatory frameworks.  
 
3.2.1. Pecking-Order Theory and Empirical Results  
The pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984)suggests that companies 
effectively rank their means of accessing capital. Companies prefer internal 
ILQDQFH ILUVW µUHWHQWLRQ¶ WKHQ VDIH VHFXULWLHV HJ GHEW DQG ODVWO\ ULVNLHU
routes, such as equity. In short, when a company is facing investment 
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opportunities, it will first use retention. If retention cannot meet the funding 
requirement, straight debt will be issued. Then, if the company still needs 
funding, it will issue convertible bonds (straight debt with a conversion 
feature). Equity is normally the last resort if extra capital required. Therefore, 
the motivation for a company to conduct an SEO is that all other measures 
have not been able to generate the cash flows required for investment. 
 
Table 1 Reasons Why Companies Conduct Equity Offerings 
Theory Reason to Conduct Equity offerings Studies 
Pecking-order 
theory 
The reason for a company to conduct 
an equity offering is that all other 
measures cannot generate the cash 
flows required for investment 
Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Leary and Roberts 
(2010) 
Tax and leverage 
cost trade-off 
models 
The reason for a company to issue 
equity is a change in either equity or 
debt, or even the debt target ratio 
itself. In order to keep to its target 
debt ratio, the company has to make 
equity offerings 
Modigliani and Merton 
(1958), Fama and French 
(2002), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Chang and 
Dasgupta (2009) 
Market timing Managers try to sell highly priced 
shares when stock market conditions 
permit 
Taggart (1977), Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), 
Loughran and Ritter 
(1997), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), DeAngelo et al. 
(2010) 
Corporate 
lifecycle stage 
Young companies with high 
market-to-book ratios and low 
operating cash flows tend to sell 
equity to fund investment, while 
mature companies prefer to fund 
investment internally 
Carlson et al. (2006), 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) 
Near-term cash 
need 
Issuers have to conduct equity 
offerings in order to avoid running 
out of cash in the near term 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) 
 
A basic pecking-order model is tested by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
7KH\ HVWLPDWH XVLQJ 2/6 UHJUHVVLRQ D ILUP¶V QHWJURVV GHEW LVVXHG RQ LWV
financing deficit for a small sample of 157 firms that survived from 1971 to 
1989. They confirm the greater time-series explanatory power of the basic 
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pecking-order model compared with a static trade-off model and draw the 
conclusion that the basic pecking-order model is an excellent first-order 
predictor of financing behaviour. 
 
By contrast, Frank and Goyal (2003) selected a sample of US publicly traded 
firms, regardless of survival, from the period 1971±1998. The pecking-order 
WKHRU\WXUQVRXWWREHDSRRUSUHGLFWRURIILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJEHKDYLRXUIRUWKHLU
sample after implementing the same regression as that in Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999). They confirm that the large firms show some aspects of 
pecking-order behaviour. However, the evidence is not robust if conventional 
leverage factors are included in the regression or the sample period is 
restricted to the 1990s. Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2003) find a decline of 
over time in support for the pecking-order theory and propose two reasons for 
this: one is that more small firms have been listed publicly over time and small 
firms often do not follow the pecking-order theory; the other reason is that 
equity has become more important and, thus, the support of pecking-order 
theory declines even for larger firms. 
 
The conclusion of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is also questioned by 
Fama and French (2005), who study a sample of companies that frequently 
issue large blocks of shares via SEOs. Their empirical results provide little 
evidence for the central predictions of pecking-order theory about how often 
and under what circumstance firms issue and repurchase equity. Due to the 
contradictions of the trade-RIIPRGHO¶VFHQWUDOSUHGLFWLRQVGRFXPHQWHGLQWKHLU
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previous work (Fama and French, 2002), they suggest a combination of the 
two models to explain financing decisions. 
 
Leary and Roberts (2010) select a sample of 34,470 firm-year observations 
over the period 1980±2005 drawn from Compustat to test the pecking-order 
theory. They find that fewer than 20% of firms follow the pecking-order 
predictions concerning debt and equity issuance decisions under the strict 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI SHFNLQJ RUGHU WKDW OLPLWV WKH YDULDWLRQ LQ ILUPV¶ VDYLQJ DQG
debt policies. This result remains the same even after relaxing the limits on 
ILUPV¶GHEWYDULDWLRQDQGDOORZLQJGHEWFDSDFLW\WRYDU\in a manner consistent 
with that of firms rated as investment grade in the same industry. However, if 
the debt capacities of the firms are allowed to vary with a variable often 
attributed to trade-off theory, the predictive ability of the pecking-order theory 
is increased and over 80% of the observed debt and equity issuance decisions 
are classified accurately. Leary and Roberts (2010) claim that this finding is 
consistent with Fama and French (2005) and both the pecking-order and the 
trade-off model cover elements that can explain financing decisions.  
 
3.2.2. Trade-Off Theory and Empirical Results  
Modigliani and Merton (1958) propose the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
Trade-off is described in many finance textbooks as a common practice 
adopted by companies. This theory supposes that the debt-equity decision can 
be viewed as a trade-off between interest tax shields and the costs of financial 
distress. In contrast with the pecking-order theory, which suggests that firms 
take on as much debt as possible, trade-off theory argues that companies 
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should have a target debt ratio which balances the benefits brought by interest 
tax shields and the costs of financial distress or bankruptcy. Therefore, the 
trade-off theory suggests that the reason for a company to issue equity 
offerings is a change in either equity or debt, or even the debt target ratio itself. 
As a result, the company should implement equity offerings to maintain the 
target debt ratio.  
 
Both the pecking-order model and the trade-off model are tested by Fama and 
French (2002). In summary, they claim the two models share many predictions 
about dividends and leverage. However, the two models also give 
contradictory views on some other issues. Both models predict: 1) a negative 
relationship between investment and book leverage; 2) a positive relationship 
between firm size and leverage dividend payout; 3) A negative marginal 
relationship between leverage and the target dividend payout ratio.  
 
The trade-off model predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability. However, Fama and French (2002) find a positive relationship 
from their empirical tests. They also produce evidence for the leverage target 
reverting to the mean and this rate of mean reversion (7-17%) is low (Fama 
and French, 2002).  
 
By contrast, Flannery and Rangan (2006) find firms move relatively quickly 
towards their target debt ratio, claiming a rate of mean reversion of more than 
30% per year. The inconsistency of the adjustment speed between Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) and Fama and French (2002) suggests some testable 
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assumptions about the adjustment speed and the dynamic properties of target 
leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Table 2 shows the effects of exclusion 
of partial adjustment and firm fixed effects on the adjustment speed 
summarised by Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
 
Table 2 Effects of Exclusion of Partial Adjustment and Firm Fixed Effects 
on the Adjustment Speed 
Assumptions Example of 
Studies 
Effect Conclusions 
from Flannery 
and Rangan 
(2006) 
A firm's observed 
capital ratio is also its 
desired (target) ratio; 
when the market debt 
ratio (MDR) is the 
dependent variable, the 
coefficient on lagged 
MDR is zero 
Fama and 
French 
(2002) 
When the lagged MDR is 
added, it has a very 
highly significant 
coefficient; thus, ignoring 
lagged MDR would lead 
to an incorrect model 
specification 
Partial 
adjustment 
toward a target 
capital ratio 
exists 
Firm fixed effects can 
be excluded 
Fama and 
French 
(2002), 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
(2002), 
Huang and 
Ritter (2009) 
Firm-specific unobserved 
effects substantially 
influence estimated 
adjustment speeds, 
apparently because they 
substantially sharpen 
estimates of the target 
debt ratio 
Exclusion of 
firm fixed 
effects is 
unwarranted 
Target measurement 
noise can be included 
Flannery and 
Rangan 
(2006) 
Adding target 
measurement noise will 
bias the estimated 
coefficient on MDR 
toward unity. A noise 
volatility of 20% to 25% 
roughly halves the 
estimated adjustment 
speed from 34.5% to 
about 17% 
The effect of 
noisy targets on 
the estimated 
adjustment 
speed is 
substantial 
 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) claim that target adjustment behaviour, direct 
rebalancing behaviour and significant firm-specific variables are observable in 
leverage regressions even in samples through simulations in which no target 
behaviour is assumed. As a result they doubt the effectiveness of existing tests of 
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target behaviour based on leverage ratio changes. Additionally, they suggest that 
we need to look at financing behaviour (debt versus equity choices) to determine 
the useful tests in identifying target behaviour. Table 3 illustrates conclusions 
drawn from test results on simulation samples under three types of tests. 
 
Table 3 Conclusions Based on Simulation Samples 
Test Representative 
Studies 
Results on 
Simulation samples 
Conclusion 
Adjustment 
speeds 
Fama and French 
(2002), Flannery 
and Rangan 
(2006) 
A move from random 
financing to vigorous 
target behaviour 
generates only a 10% 
change in the 
estimated speed of 
adjustment 
The estimated speeds 
of adjustment are 
likely to provide a 
very imprecise picture 
of the extent of 
rebalancing going on 
in the data 
Direct evidence 
of rebalancing 
behaviour 
Leary and 
Roberts (2010), 
Alti (2006),  
Mechanical effects 
can arise when firms 
do not follow target 
behaviour 
Tests of rebalancing 
behaviour do not have 
the power to reject 
mechanical effects 
associated with 
non-target behaviour 
Significant 
effects of 
firm-specific 
variables in 
leverage 
regressions 
Frank and Goyal 
(2003) 
Even for simulation 
samples, several 
firm-specific 
variables are 
statistically 
significant in 
leverage regressions 
It is difficult to 
conclude the observed 
relationship between a 
particular 
firm-specific variable 
and the leverage ratio 
in the actual sample 
 
De Jong et al. (2011) focus on financing decisions for which the trade-off 
theory and the pecking-order theory have different predictions. Their sample 
comes from the Compustat and CRSP database for the period 1985±2005. 
They find that, for over-leveraged firms, more than three-quarters of the 
observations reflect a further increase in leverage further through issuing debt. 
This result agrees with the pecking-order theory, which assumes that debt is 
favoured over equity. For under-leveraged firms, De Jong et al. (2011) find 
that firms prefer to repurchase equity first, and then debt. Thus, the static 
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trade-off theory is a better predictor for repurchase decisions. 
 
3.2.3. Market Timing and Empirical Results  
Since both the pecking-order theory and the trade-off model are problematic 
(Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2010), some other explanations 
have been developed for the reasons of conducting equity offerings. Among 
them, the market timing hypothesis may be the most popular. The underlying 
thinking of the market timing hypothesis is that managers try to sell highly 
priced shares when stock market conditions permit. 
 
The relevant studies can be categorized into four groups according to their 
findings (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The first group shows that firms tend to 
issue equity rather than debt when market value is high and tend to repurchase 
equity when market value is low. For the second group, analysis of long-run 
post-issue stock returns suggests that issuers use, on average, successful 
market timing strategies. Thirdly, firms prefer to issue equity when investors 
are over-optimistic about earning prospects after analysing the profitability 
forecasts and realisations around equity issues. Finally, anonymous surveys 
show that managers admit to using market timing strategies.  
 
3.2.3.1. Market-to-Book Ratio and Stock Return  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) utilize a historical market-to-book ratio to capture 
fLUPV¶SDVWDWWHPSWVDWPDUNHWWLPLQJ$IWHUFRQWUROOLQJIRUFXUUHQWLQYHVWPHQW
opportunities in the form of current market-to-book ratio, the historical 
market-to-book ratio can be interpreted as a proxy for mispricing. They find a 
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significantly negative relationship between leverage and the historical 
market-to-book ratio, a finding in line with the market timing hypothesis. 
 
In the trade-off framework, the market-to-book ratio is often used as a measure 
of growth opportunities (Fama and French, 2002). A high market-to-book ratio 
can be viewed as a sign of high growth options. Therefore, controlling for 
ILUPV¶ JURZWK RSSRUWXQLWLHV LV QHFHVVDU\ DQG LPSRUWDQW ZKHQ LQWHUSUHWLQJ
market-to-book ratio as an indicator of mispricing. 
 
Hertzel and Li (2010) implement a methodology proposed by Rhodes±Kropf 
et al. (2005) that decomposes the pre-issue market-to-book (MTB) ratio into 
misevaluation and growth option components. They find issuing firms have 
greater mispricing and greater growth options compared with the overall 
market. This finding is interpreted as evidence that both firm-level 
overvaluation and financing needs affect managerial decisions to issue equity. 
 
Besides market-to-book ratio, pre-issue return is also a proxy used by studies 
to capture attempts at market timing. Lyandres et al. (2008) confirm that firms 
with large stock price increases are more likely to issue equity and repurchase 
debt than firms with stock price declines. Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct 
a survey suggesting the recent stock price performance is one of the most 
important factors affecting the decision to issue equity. 
 
Additionally, $OWÕ DQG 6XODHPDQ  study timing behaviour by 
investigating equity issues that follow periods of high stock returns. They find 
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that only when institutional investor demand is strong do stock price increases 
have a significant impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. When 
institutional investor demand is weak, there is little evidence in support of 
timing behaviour. 
 
3.2.3.2. Long-Run Post-Issue Underperformance  
Market timing can also be detected by examining the long-run stock returns of 
issuers. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that firms issuing either IPOs or 
SEOs during 1970±90 have low long-run return over the five years after the 
issue. However, the low long-run return cannot be fully explained. Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) suggest a new explanation: that firms tend to take advantage 
of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity when they are 
overvalued. Loughran and Ritter (1997) also document the declines in profit 
margin and return for issuers, relative to non-issuers, within four years of 
offering, in their sample of SEOs from 1979 to 1989. 
 
However, some studies propose alternative explanations for the long-run 
underperformance based on return benchmark misspecification. Brav et al. 
(2000) find that IPO returns are similar to non-issuing firm returns in event 
time performance tests after matching on firm size and book-to-market ratios. 
Although SEO returns show some underperformance relative to various 
characteristic-based benchmarks, time series factor models show that SEO 
returns covary with non-issuing firm returns. Additionally, Brav et al. (2000) 
suggest that model misspecification could be an important consideration in 
long-run performance tests. 
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Eckbo et al. (2000) find that issuer stocks are on average less risky than stocks 
of matched firms due to changes in unexpected inflation and default risk and 
stock liquidity caused by equity issues. Therefore, issuer stocks require lower 
expected returns than those of firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. 
As a result, they argue that the abnormal performance is caused by the failure 
of the matched firm technique of Loughran and Ritter (1995). Carlson et al. 
(2006) also support Eckbo et al. (2000) by showing that standard matching 
procedures fail to fully capture the dynamics of risk and expected return by 
developing a real option theory of observed returns throughout the SEO 
episode. They argue that expected returns of issuer stocks decrease because 
growth options are converted into lower-risk assets. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Hertzel and Li (2010) divide 
market-to-book ratios into three components. They find that SEO firms with 
high misevaluation have significant negative abnormal returns. The conclusion 
still holds even after controlling for the investment factor proposed by 
Lyandres et al. (2008). Moreover, no relationship between post-issue abnormal 
returns and the pre-issue growth option component of MTB (market to book 
ratio) is found. Their results provide evidence for the real investment 
explanations of low post-issue stock returns. 
 
$OWÕ DQG 6XODHPDQ  implement two approaches, event-time and 
calendar-time, to detect SEO long-run return performance. The event-time 
approach is mainly used in descriptive analysis. The calendar-time approach 
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shows significantly negative alphas of long-run returns. Additionally, $OWÕDQG
Sulaeman (2012) FODLP WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHPDQG IRU LVVXHUV¶ VWRFNV has 
insignificant effects on the long-run post-issue underperformance of the 
issuing companies. 
 
3.2.3.3. Other Empirical Studies Related to Market Timing  
Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) test the equity market timing hypothesis in 
major industrialized G-7 countries. They find that the historical 
market-to-book ratio is inversely related to leverage in most industrialized 
countries. Additionally, they confirm that firms in G-7 countries (except Japan) 
rebalance their capital structure after equity issuance. Meanwhile, a negative 
relationship between current market-to-book ratio with book leverage for US 
and Canadian firms is documented when the historical market-to-book ratio is 
included in the regressions. This result is consistent with the trade-off 
framework. 
 
In contrast, Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) find evidence that is inconsistent 
with the market timing hypothesis. Their research supports the market 
feedback hypothesis proposed by Jegadeesh et al. (1993). This hypothesis 
suggests that high post-LVVXHSHUIRUPDQFHFRQYH\VWKHPDUNHW¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKH
PDUJLQDO UHWXUQ WR WKH ILUP¶VSURMHFWV LVKLJKHQFRXUDJLQJPDQDJHUV WR UDLVH
DGGLWLRQDO FDSLWDO WR LQFUHDVH WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW $GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH\
document some support for the effects of institutional investors in the market 
feedback mechanism. 
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Jenter et al. (2011) employ a sample of put option sales on company stocks by 
large US firms to examine the market timing hypothesis. The put option sale 
setting can overcome two problems that many previous studies examining 
equity issues have suffered from: the first is the difficulty in interpreting 
equity issues and repurchases; the second is associated with measuring 
abnormal returns over long periods of time. Jenter et al. (2011) claim their 
method can address both. When stocks are undervalued, managers tend to sell 
puts on their stocks. They document a 5% abnormal stock return in the 100 
days following put option issues. Additionally, much of the abnormal return 
follows the first earnings release date after the sale. This result suggests that 
managers can identify the mispricing of equity and use securities issues to 
time the market. 
 
3.2.4. Other Explanations for Equity Offerings  
Besides the above explanations, DeAngelo et al. (2010) propose two 
explanations for conducting SEOs, namely corporate lifecycle and near-term 
cash need. The lifecycle theory hypothesis suggests that young companies 
with high market-to-book ratios and low operating cash flows tend to sell 
equity to fund investment intermediately. As these growth-stage issuers 
represent a large proportion of all issuers, the pre-SEO share price increases 
reflect an increase in the value of growth option. 
 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) find that both the market-timing theory and the 
corporate lifecycle theory have statistically significant support from empirical 
data on the decision to conduct an SEO. However, they argue that neither 
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theory adequately explains SEO decisions because the majority of issuers are 
not growth firms and the vast majority of firms with good market-timing 
opportunities fail to issue stock. DeAngelo et al. (2010) therefore claim that a 
near-term cash need is the primary motive for conducting an SEO, as 62.6% of 
issuers would have run out of cash in the year after the SEO without the 
proceeds. 
 
3.3. Studies on Direct Flotation Costs 
$VLQGLFDWHGLQ6HFWLRQ WKHXQGHUZULWHU¶VJURVVVSUHDGLV WKHPDLQGLUHFW
cost of an SEO. This section first focuses on two theories proposed to 
determine underwriting spread, namely economy of scale and U-shape 
underwriting spread. Then, the 7% solution and net proceeds maximization 
theory are discussed. Finally, this section considers the effects of liquidity and 
information asymmetry on underwriting spread. 
 
3.3.1. Economy of Scale and U-Shaped Underwriting Spread 
Smith (1977) examined mean underwriter fees and the other expenses of IPOs 
and SEOs across issue size categories and three major underwriting methods, 
namely firm commitment, best efforts and rights offers. In the research, Smith 
(1977) claims two findings. First, issue size is negatively related to 
underwriter fees as a percentage of gross proceeds. This could be explained by 
bigger economies of scale leading to more efficiency in relation to fixed costs. 
Secondly, underwriting spread could be affected by different underwriting 
methods. Smith (1977) documents that firm commitment offers have the 
highest mean underwriting spread, while rights offers have the lowest mean 
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underwriting spread for issues of comparable size. 
 
Studies of underwriting spread in SEOs are mainly restricted to the firm 
commitment method, as that is dominant. Lee et al. (1996) investigate the 
direct flotation costs (including underwriting spread and other expenses) of 
IPOs, SEOs and convertible and straight corporate debt issues from 1990 to 
1994. They find direct costs of SEOs show economies of scale, which is 
consistent with the findings of Smith (1977). Additionally, they find direct 
costs average 7.1% for SEOs. 
 
However, more capital raised does not always mean the reduction of 
underwriting spreads. Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) find that fixed costs are no 
more than 10% of total fees on average when they investigate the underwriting 
spread on 1325 SEOs from 1990 to 1997 in the US market. Further, their 
research finds that issuers face U-shaped spreads: the spread initially declines 
as the fixed cost is distributed over the proceeds, but then increases after the 
capital raised exceeds a certain amount, due to diseconomies of scale and the 
increase in variable costs. Such a U-shaped relationship is confirmed by 
Hansen (2001), Drucker and Puri (2005) and Kim et al. (2010). 
 
The explanation of economy of scale is supported by recent empirical 
evidence. Lee and Masulis (2009) find that the log of net proceeds is 
negatively related to gross spreads in their regression tests after researching a 
sample of 963 SEOs over the period 1990±2002. Jeon and Ligon (2011) use 
gross proceeds as a control variable and confirm the negative effect of gross 
proceeds on underwriting spread. 
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3.3.2. The 7% Solution and Net Proceeds Maximization Theory 
 Chen and Ritter (2000) find that more than 90% of the IPOs (the proceeds of 
these IPOs are from $20 million to 80 million) from 1995 to 1998 had a spread 
of 7%. This clustering of spreads is called the 7% solution. However, only 26% 
of the IPOs from 1985 to 1987 had a 7% spread.  Chen and Ritter (2000) 
attribute this phenomenon to investment bankers tending to use non-price 
competition, such as analyst coverage and price support instead of low 
underwriting spread in order to attract deals. However, Hansen (2001) claims 
there is no evidence that investment bankers collude to profit from the 7% 
solution and argues that the 7% gross spread is in fact an efficient contract, as 
a 7% spread is normally profitable. 
 
According to Garner and Marshall (2010), more than one-third of IPOs did not 
charge 7% spreads in a sample of 2265 firm commitment IPOs between 1993 
and 2004. Furthermore, Garner and Marshall (2010) find that those IPOs 
where underwriters charge less than 7% are normally underwritten by 
middle-tier underwriters. They consider this phenomenon as evidence of a 
trade-off between IPO compensation and future SEOs business.  
 
Chen et al. (2009) investigate the clustering of spreads at the 7% level for an 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) sample from 1980 to 2004 and confirm 
its existence for ADR IPOs but not SEOs. They therefore claim that US 
underwriters set gross spreads differently for IPOs and SEOs. 
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Yeoman (2001) develops the net proceeds maximization theory, which is 
different from the 7% solution. The net proceeds maximization theory sets out 
to explain how spread and offering price are determined in all underwritten 
offerings, including IPOs and SEOs. In short, Yeoman (2001) suggests that a 
potential trade-off or substitution relationship exists between underwriting 
spread and equity underpricing. To build the study, Yeoman (2001) generates 
both optimal spread and offering price for equity issues by equilibrium 
constraints initially. Thereafter, Yeoman (2001)tests the optimal spreads 
obtained from the first step with a sample of 1143 SEOs from 1988 to 1993 
and presents evidence for the net proceeds maximization theory. 
 
However, Garner and Marshall (2010) find no evidence support the net 
proceeds maximization theory. They suggest there is no significant 
relationship between IPO underpricing and underwriting spread. Additionally, 
Kim et al. (2010) test three possible relationships between SEO underwriting 
spread and underpricing: insignificant relationship, substitution relationship 
and complementary relationship. Kim et al. (2010) find potential `joint 
determination¶ of underwriting spreads and initial returns. Their sample 
comprises 4875 IPOs and 4348 SEOs from 1980 to 2000. By implementing a 
3SLS approach, their study confirms the existence of a complementary 
relationship. In other words, underwriting spreads are positively and 
significantly related with underpricing for both IPOs and SEOs. 
 
3.3.3. Liquidity, Asymmetric Information and Underwriting Spread 
Butler et al. (2005) suggest that stock market liquidity is an important 
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determinant of the costs of raising external capital. A liquid market will 
facilitate market-making. Investment banks generally play the market-making 
role in placing an equity offering, and they will be expected to charge a lower 
underwriting spread if the market is more liquid.  
 
To test this, Butler et al. (2005) employ a sample of 2387 SEOs from 1993 to 
 DQG ILQG WKDW WRWDO LQYHVWPHQW EDQNV¶ IHHV JURVV VSUHDG DUH LQGHHG
substantially lower for firms with more liquid stocks. Butler et al. (2005) 
incorporate SEO gross spreads and a set of liquidity variables into a regression. 
To control for the effects of other factors, their study also uses several factors 
suggested in the previous literature as control variables. These include lead 
manager reputation, return volatility, share price, firm size, principal amount 
and several dummy variables. Their study not only confirms that stock market 
liquidity can reduce gross spread but also suggests that the effect of liquidity is 
stronger for large equity issues. In other words, the marginal cost of illiquidity 
is higher for a large issue.  
 
Lee and Masulis (2009) also support the role of asymmetric information in 
determining underwriting spreads. However, they note that common measures 
of information asymmetry lack strong theoretical support. These include stock 
return volatility (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Drucker and 
Puri, 2005) DQDO\VWV¶ HDUQLQJV IRUHFDVW GLVSHUVLRQ GHEW UDWLQJV DQG ELG±ask 
spread (Corwin, 2003). As a result, Lee and Masulis (2009) build their own, 
alternative measure of information asymmetry, which employs accounting 
information quality as the proxy. The underlying theory is that accounting 
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statements are the primary source of information about corporate performance 
available to outside investors; therefore, if the accounting quality deteriorates, 
WKHLQYHVWRUV¶XQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHILUPVKRXOGULVHDQGGHPDQGIRULWVHTXLW\
should fall, leading to more underwriting efforts and a higher underwriting 
spread.  
 
In their study, Lee and Masulis (2009) employ two models to measure 
accounting quality, namely the MDD and the FDD models. MDD and FDD are 
the two extensions of DD model (built by Dechow and Dichev (2002)) which 
measure a firP¶VLQIRUPDWLRQDV\PPHWU\E\LWVDFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQTXDOLW\
The reason for Lee and Masulis (2009) to use the extensions of DD model is 
that they consider accounting information as more direct approach to assessing 
the information available to outside investors than the other more commonly 
used proxies. The basic idea of their method is to represent the accrual quality 
E\WKHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIDILUP¶VFURVV-sectional regression residuals across 
the period. Larger standard deviations of residuals mean a greater portion of 
current accruals left unexplained by the models; in other words, accrual 
quality is lower. After using accrual quality to measure information asymmetry, 
the regression results confirm the significantly positive relation between 
information asymmetry and gross spreads. 
 
Besides accounting quality, Jeon and Ligon (2011) propose a new factor which 
may also be related to information asymmetry. The new factor is the reputation 
of co-managers in the syndicate. They extend the research on the effect of 
co-managers on flotation costs from IPOs (Corwin and Schultz, 2005) to SEOs. 
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Their hypothesis is that the prestige of the underwriting bank will be related to 
the credibility of the certification of an issue (a highly prestigious bank will 
enhance the quality), which may reduce information asymmetry and therefore 
lower SEO flotation costs. Jeon and Ligon (2011) employ 2071 completed and 
183 withdrawn SEOs from 1997 through to 2007. Besides the effects of the 
reputation of co-managers on underwriting spread, they investigate the effects 
of commercial bank co-managers (versus investment bank co-managers) as 
well as the number of co-managers on underwriting spread. Their results 
suggest the inclusion of commercial bank co-managers significantly reduces 
underwriting spread. Moreover, the relationship between underwriting spread 
and the number of co-managers is quadratic. The number of co-managers has a 
positive relationship with underwriting spread initially and a negative 
relationship thereafter, when the number of co-managers is large. 
 
3.4. Studies on Indirect Flotation Costs 
This section will provide an overview of indirect flotation costs in equity 
offerings. Unlike direct flotation costs, indirect flotation costs represent the 
implicit compensations paid by an issuer to underwriters. Indirect flotation 
costs typically include announcement effects, underpricing, offer withdrawal 
and delays. The first two are the most commonly discussed, probably because 
only a small fraction of all proposed issues are withdrawn or delayed. 
Furthermore, as there is no market price for shares before IPOs, announcement 
effects apply only to SEOs. Therefore, this section first summarizes the studies 
on the announcement effects of SEOs, then studies on the underpricing of 
equity offerings are investigated and finally a brief introduction is given to the 
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literature on the withdrawal or delay of share offerings. 
 
3.4.1. Announcement Effects 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) find a negative stock price change after the 
announcement of an SEO in a sample from 1963 to 1980. Their sample 
includes 972 primary stock offerings, 242 combined primary and secondary 
stock offerings, and 182 dual debt and equity offerings. They confirm 
statistically that the information conveyed by the offerings of industrial firms 
is much greater than for public utilities. To implement a regression analysis, 
they employ several explanatory variables, including percentage change in 
outstanding shares, changes in financial leverage, stock return volatility and a 
dummy variable indicating management share sales. The analysis provides 
HYLGHQFHWKDWVWRFNSULFHFKDQJHVDUHSURSRUWLRQDOWRFKDQJHVLQPDQDJHPHQW¶V
proportion of shareholdings in the firm. This result is consistent with the 
agency model proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Furthermore, 
consistent with Masulis (1983), Masulis and Korwar (1986) also suggest that 
returns during the announcement period are positively related to leverage 
change. 
 
Many empirical studies have followed Masulis and Korwar (1986) and 
provide evidence of the significantly negative market reaction to SEOs. 
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) find that the abnormal return during the 
announcement period, defined as from one day prior to the announcement to 
the announcement date, is on average -3.65% in their sample. Korajczyk et al. 
(1991) research the abnormal returns on SEOs in more detail. They find 
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average abnormal returns of -2.26% and -0.43% on the day preceding and the 
day of the announcement respectively. Denis (1991) finds that the 
announcement period abnormal returns are -4.33% for shelf offerings and 
-3.62% for non-shelf offerings. He defines the announcement period as the 
two days from the day prior to the announcement date to the announcement 
date. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) use the same definition and find an 
average abnormal return of -2.5% over the sample period from 1974 to 1990.  
 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) use a different definition of the 
announcement period, as the day prior to the announcement date to the day 
after the announcement date, represented as day -1 to day +1, where day 0 is 
the announcement date. Using this definition, they compare the price reaction 
to the announcements of SEOs for both US issues and global issues and report 
that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for US offers and global offers 
are -2.4% and -2.2% respectively. 
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) use a sample of 1703 SEOs from 1990 to 1997 
to investigate reactions to the announced offer price. They find an 
announcement period abnormal return of -2.23%. After implementation of a 
cross-section estimation of the announcement period abnormal returns, 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) confirm the existence of a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the expected discounting and the announcement 
reaction, which suggests that investors account for expected discounting when 
they learn of the SEO. 
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3.4.2. Explanations of Announcement Effects  
This section will first discuss the three main hypotheses explaining 
announcement effects: the price-pressure hypothesis, the wealth redistribution 
hypothesis and the information release hypothesis (Kalay and Shimrat, 1987). 
Some models based on the information release hypothesis will be discussed 
thereafter. 
 
3.4.2.1. Three Hypotheses Related to Announcement Effects 
The price-pressure hypothesis is proposed by Myron (1972), who claims that 
the demand curve of the shares offered is downward sloping. When SEOs are 
announced, investors will expect more shares to be poured into the market and 
the price of the security will therefore decrease. However, the evidence for this 
hypothesis is mixed (e.g. Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 
1986). 
 
The underlying theory of the wealth redistribution hypothesis is that there is an 
offset relationship between the market value of outstanding bonds and 
outstanding equity. Due to the increase in the equity, the leverage ratio of the 
firm decreases, which means the risk debt is also lowered. As a result, the 
market value of debt is raised, and as a corollary the market value of equity 
decreases because the value lost by shareholders are granted to bondholders. 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) find empirical evidence for the wealth 
redistribution hypothesis and suggest a negative relation between the abnormal 
return on the announcement day and the leverage change caused by the 
issuance. However, after taking the relative size of the issue into consideration, 
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the negative relationship no longer exists (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Asquith 
and Mullins, 1986). 
 
The basic idea of the information release hypothesis is that the market assumes 
that firms possess superior information compared with outside investors. 
Therefore, equity offerings can be treated as a signal of negative information 
released by the issuers (Brealey et al., 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Merton 
and Rock, 1985).  
 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) investigate the three above hypotheses, to see which 
has the most explanatory power. Their empirical results suggest that bond 
prices are negatively related to the announcement of equity offerings. As a 
result, they conclude that the information release hypothesis is the prevailing 
factor affecting share prices. However, they also suggest that the other two 
hypotheses are still worth consideration. 
 
3.4.2.2. Adverse Selection, Agency Issues and Information Asymmetry 
Models based on the information release hypothesis are also called adverse 
selection models. The underlying assumptions are that, first, managers aim to 
maximize the wealth of shareholders; and second, that capital markets are 
efficient. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that managers prefer to issue equity 
when the current stock price is higher than its intrinsic value. Therefore, 
rational investors will interpret the decision to offer further equity as a signal 
that shares are overvalued and the share price will therefore decrease. 
 
Chapter 3  Literature Review 
54 
 
An alternative framework for adverse selection relates to agency issues. This 
framework is based on the idea that managers are motivated to pursue their 
own private benefits. Thus, the money raised by firms may be used for such 
agency spending, and the market will react negatively in this situation. Jung et 
al. (1996) find that firms without valuable investment opportunities have more 
negative announcement returns than firms with better investment opportunities. 
To identify the investment opportunities, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) use 
book±market ratios as the proxy. They interpret their results as strongly 
supporting the agency model. 
 
Walker and Yost (2008) also find a negative announcement period abnormal 
return, averaging -2.76%. They define the abnormal return as a two-day 
cumulative return (over the announcement date and the day after 
announcement date). Their study mainly investigates how the stated use of 
proceeds in the prospectus of SEOs affects flotation costs. To gather 
information on the stated use of proceeds, Walker and Yost (2008) FKHFNILUPV¶
registration files, which are available from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission online. They mainly categorize the stated use into three groups, 
namely investment, debt reduction and general corporate purposes. Walker and 
Yost (2008) note that most firms increase their level of investment regardless 
RI ZKDW WKH\ VD\ LQ WKH UHJLVWUDWLRQ ILOHV DQG ILQG WKDW ILUPV JLYLQJ µJHQHUDO
FRUSRUDWH¶ UHDVRQV IRU WKH VKDUH LVVXHQRUPDOO\ VKRZDVLJQLILFDQWO\QHJDWLYH
abnormal return during the announcement period. They conclude that the 
market reacts more positively towards firms with more specific stated use of 
proceeds than towards those ones with vaguely stated plans. 
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Lee and Masulis (2009) study the underlying reasons for announcement effects. 
Though their work is based on both adverse selection and alternative agency 
model frameworks, they utilize accrual quality (accounting information quality) 
as a proxy to measure information asymmetry. They hypothesize that poor 
accrual quality prevents investors from evaluating the true financial status of 
the issuing firm and increases information asymmetry between issuers and 
investors. In this situation, the probability of both adverse selection and moral 
hazard is higher, which leads to larger negative SEO announcement effects. 
Their hypothesis is supported by empirical results showing a significant 
negative coefficient of the accruals quality measures. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) research the relationship between information 
asymmetry and announcement effects. In contrast with earlier literature, they 
measure the degree of information asymmetry by the characteristics of 
co-managers. Based on the idea that co-managers can reduce information 
asymmetry in SEO transactions, they hypothesize that: 1) the announcement 
return will increase with the number of co-managers if co-managers can 
certify the value of the issuing firm; 2) announcement returns will be 
positively associated with the inclusion of highly reputable co-managers and 
commercial bank co-managers if such highly reputable co-managers can 
credibly certify the value of the securities. Their empirical results show that: 1) 
there is no significant relationship between the number of co-managers and the 
announcement returns; and 2) the high reputation co-managers can play a 
certification role, reducing the information asymmetry in SEOs, and thus 
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increasing the announcement return of SEOs. 
 
3.4.3. Empirical Studies on Underpricing of Equity Offerings 
Most theoretical studies attribute the underpricing of equity offerings to 
information asymmetry. However, it is difficult to test the explanations of 
equity underpricing based on information asymmetry directly. A number of 
empirical studies have focused SEOs since they became popular in the 1990s. 
Those on underpricing can be divided into two main groups, those undertaking 
a long-run analysis of equity underpricing and those looking at the 
determinants of underpricing. 
 
3.4.3.1. Long-Run Analysis of Equity Underpricing 
The long-run average underpricing of both IPOs and SEOs has experienced 
significant changes. Lowry et al. (2010) find that the monthly mean of IPO 
initial returns is 12.1% from 1965 to 1980. However, the IPO initial returns 
rise to 25.8% from 1991 to 2005. Autore (2011) finds that the SEO mean 
discounting is 0.87% from 1982 to 1987, then increases to 2.16% between 
1988 and 1993, and is 3.03% in 1994±1999 and 3.20% in 2000±2004. Many 
scholars have tried to explain these results. 
 
Long-Run IPO Underpricing  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) confirm that IPO average underpricing doubled 
from 7% during 1980±1989 to nearly 15% during 1990±1998. Thereafter, the 
mean underpricing of IPOs dropped from 65% during 1999±2000 to 12% 
during 2001±2003. Their study also examines the three hypotheses for the 
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long-run change in underpricing: the changing risk composition hypothesis 
(Ritter, 1984), the realignment of incentives hypothesis (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2003) and the changing issuer objective function hypothesis 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
 
The changing issuer objective function hypothesis suggests that, given 
constant levels of managerial ownership and other characteristics, issuers may 
become more willing to accept underpricing. According to Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2003), there are two reasons why this might be. The first is that 
issuers may be willing to accept excessive underpricing if the underwriters can 
provide satisfactory analyst coverage. The second reason is the co-opting of 
decision-makers through side payments. This refers to the behaviour whereby 
XQGHUZULWHUV DOORFDWH µKRW¶ ,32V WKRVH OLNHO\ WR SURYH KLJKO\ SURILWDEOH WR
venture capitalists and the executives of issuing firms. This is known as 
spinning and began in the 1990s, becoming commonplace by the end of the 
decade.  
 
According to the empirical results of Loughran and Ritter (2004), the risk 
composition hypothesis could partially explain the changes in IPO 
underpricing, but there is little evidence supporting the realignment of 
incentives hypothesis. Loughran and Ritter (2004) confirm that analyst 
coverage and side-payments to CEOs and venture capitalists were significantly 
related to underpricing during the internet bubble. 
 
Lowry et al. (2010) implement a study on the relationship between IPO initial 
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return and IPO initial return volatility. Their underlying theory is that IPO 
initial return volatility could reflect the difficulty of pricing IPOs. Testing 
empirically, they find that the IPO initial return volatility fluctuates greatly 
over time. They claim a strong positive correlation between the mean and the 
volatility of initial returns over time. In order to explain the fluctuation of the 
IPO initial return volatility, Lowry et al. (2010) test it against type of issuer as 
well as variation in market-wide conditions. Theoretically, young, small and 
technology firms are more difficult to price. Therefore, when the proportion of 
these types of firms is higher, IPO initial return volatility should also be higher, 
due to the uncertainty. Lowry et al. (2010) estimate the influence of each 
characteristic on both the level and the uncertainty of firm-level initial returns 
by implementation of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The empirical 
results suggest that both the mean and the variability of initial returns are 
relatively high for those types of issuer that are especially difficult to value. 
 
Lowry et al. (2010) also use ARMA models to account for residual 
autocorrelation and EGARCH models to account for heteroskedasticity, so 
that they are able to examine whether there are likely to be additional 
time-series factors. After adding the time-series terms, the coefficients of firm 
characteristics are unchanged. Thus, Lowry et al. (2010) confirm that firms 
with greater uncertainty tend to produce greater initial returns. 
 
Lowry et al. (2010) also suggest that other factors, such as market-wide 
conditions, have an important effect on IPO pricing according to the 
significance of the time-series parameters. They use both the NASDAQ 
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time-series return volatility and the NASDAQ cross-section return volatility to 
capture monthly initial returns. They find little evidence for a positive 
relationship between average initial returns and the NASDAQ cross-sectional 
return volatility, and no evidence to support any significant relationship 
between the NASDAQ cross-sectional return volatility and initial return 
volatility. However, they do find a significant relationship between NASDAQ 
time-series return volatility and the level and volatility of IPO initial returns. 
 
Long-Run SEO Underpricing  
Mola and Loughran (2004) examine three hypotheses to explain the long-run 
change in SEO underpricing, namely the changing issuer composition 
hypothesis, the short-selling hypothesis and the leaving a good taste 
hypothesis. Their results suggest that none of these can fully explain the 
increasing SEO discount. Therefore, they propose their own hypothesis, which 
they call the increased investment banking power hypothesis.  
 
The changing issuer composition hypothesis suggests that as most SEOs are 
now increasingly through NASDAQ, NASDAQ issues overall will 
increasingly reflect the characteristics of the SEO market. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the assumptions made by Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), who 
HPSOR\ µ1$6'$4-OLVWHG ILUPV¶ DV D YDULDEOH 6LQFH 1$6'$4 LVVXHV RIWHQ
involve greater uncertainty than NYSE/Amex SEOs, having more issues done 
on NASDAQ should mean greater average SEO discounts. However, counter 
to expectation, NYSE/Amex SEO discounts also show a statistically 
significant increase during the sample period from 1986 to 1999. In other 
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words, the changing issuer composition hypothesis has its limitations in 
explaining the increase in average SEO discount. Mola and Loughran (2004) 
also find little evidence to support the short-selling hypothesis. They find that 
issuers with no SEO during the previous year reported larger SEO discounts 
than firms with an SEO in that year. Thus, they claim some evidence for the 
leaving a good taste hypothesis, which assumes large discounts are given 
because firms want to come back later for additional funding. 
 
In addition, Mola and Loughran (2004) find evidence to support their own 
increased investment banking power hypothesis, which suggests that banks 
use analyst coverage to extract extra benefit from issuers for themselves. 
Therefore, they examine analyst coverage and the characteristics that 
determine the SEO market share of underwriters and find evidence of market 
concentration in the SEO underwriting industry. They conclude that the 
changing composition and investment banker power hypotheses can explain 
the long-run change of SEO underpricing. 
 
Kim and Shin (2004) attribute the increase in SEO underpricing to the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21 by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on August 25, 1988. This rule imposes the restraints to the 
covering of short sales using shares from Seasoned Equity Offerings. The 
purpose of the rule is to minimize manipulative short selling prior to SEOs. 
However, Corwin (2003) and Kim and Shin (2004) find that abnormal 
negative returns still increased after the implementation of Rule 10b-21. The 
underlying idea of the short-selling hypothesis is that Rule 10b-21 actually 
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restricts informational short sales and reduces the information of prices, 
thereby increasing underpricing. Kim and Shin (2004), by introducing a 
dummy variable, show that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 has positive 
effects on SEO underpricing. After checking all the hypotheses they could find, 
Kim and Shin (2004) suggest the implementation of Rule 10b-21 is linked to 
the increase of in SEO underpricing. 
 
Autore (2011) argues that the theoretical models supporting the hypothesis 
that Rule 10b-21 increases SEO discounting, on three grounds: first, shares are 
not always allocated to manipulative investors; second, underwriters can still 
use information collected in the book-building process to price the offer, even 
though the information is limited by Rule 10b-21; and third, Rule 10b-21 
affects informed short sellers who have favourable information more than 
short sellers who have negative information. 
 
Autore (2011) then builds his own methodology to test the hypothesis that 
Rule 10b-21 increases SEO discounting. The test is based on a sample of 
shelf-registered offers. Shelf-registered offers were initially excluded from the 
effect of Rule 10b-21, until September 2004. The results suggest that the 
discounting of shelf offers slightly decreases after the regulation took effect. 
To exclude the effects of market-wide differences on empirical results, Autore 
(2011) employs a difference-in-difference methodology. The study analyses 
the impact of the adoption of Rule 10b-21 in 1988 by using shelf offers as a 
control group, since shelf offers were exempt from that rule at that time. The 
study shows that the rule seems to increase discounting in shelf offers by 
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approximately the same amount that it increases discounting in traditional 
offers. Therefore, the study provides evidence that the pre-issue short-sale 
constraints do not increase SEO discounting. Autore (2011) attributes the 
increasing of SEO discounting to the increasing popularity of overnight shelf 
offers. 
 
3.4.3.2. Determinants of SEO Underpricing  
Two studies comprehensively analyse the determinants of SEO underpricing. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) suggest the discounting can be divided into 
expected and surprise components. They include six variables identified with 
the expected components in earlier empirical models of underpricing in 
seasoned offers. These variables are the amount of the offering, the relative 
size, stock return volatility, stock price, NASDAQ listing and lead bank 
reputation. The paper also includes offer-day returns as the surprise 
components. All of these components are statistically significant. Besides 
these, they also LQFOXGH WKH LQYHUVH0LOOV¶ UDWLR DQGRWKHUSRVVLEOHYDULDEOHV
such as industry-specific dummy variables and dummy variables for each 
calendar year. The LQYHUVH0LOOV¶UDWLR is significant and none of the industry 
and offer-year dummy variable effects are statistically significant.  
 
Corwin (2003) also implements multivariable models to examine the 
determinants of underpricing for SEOs. The determinants selected include 
uncertainty and asymmetric information, price pressure, pre-offer price moves 
and manipulative trading, transaction cost savings and underwriter pricing 
practices. The empirical results confirm the significantly positive relationship 
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between SEO underpricing and the level of uncertainty about firm value. The 
results also suggest a significantly positive relationship between underpricing 
and relative size. The effect is pronounced when there is relatively inelastic 
demand for the shares. However, little evidence is found for a reliable 
relationship between SEO underpricing and proxies for asymmetric 
information.  
 
Corwin (2003) uses market-adjusted returns prior to the offer to examine the 
manipulative trading hypothesis. The bid±ask spread is utilized to measure 
transaction cost savings. Corwin (2003) finds little evidence to support a 
relationship between bid±ask spread and underpricing. Corwin adds 
conventional underwriter pricing practices into the analysis, in contrast to 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003). Strong evidence is found for SEO prices, 
rounded to even-dollar amounts or $0.25 increments. This study also confirms 
that the offer price is likely to be set at the closing bid quote for NASDAQ 
offers and at the closing transaction price for NYSE offers. 
 
Following these two studies of the determinants of SEO underpricing, other 
studies proposed new factors. These include a new proxy for information 
asymmetry (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009), the roles of institutional investors 
(Chemmanur et al., 2009) and the role of underwriting syndicates (Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011; Huang and Zhang, 2011). Chemmanur and Yan (2009) 
implement a new method to deal with information asymmetry in equity 
offerings. They first assume that a firm faces asymmetric information in both 
the product and the financial markets. If a firm needs external financing to 
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fund its growth opportunities, the product market advertising is visible to the 
financial markets as well. In this situation, the firm will naturally consider a 
combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing and 
underfinancing to convey the product quality and the intrinsic value to 
customers and investors. Therefore, product market advertising and equity 
underpricing can be treated as substitutes for each other when a firm issues 
new equity. This hypothesis is tested by Chemmanur and Yan (2009) with a 
sample of 1517 equity offerings7 from 1990 to 2000. They find supportive 
evidence for their hypothesis in the context of firms making IPOs and SEOs. 
In addition, they study information asymmetry and the roles of institutions.  
 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) suggest two possible roles for institutions with 
private information about SEOs: manipulative trading and information 
production. For the information production role, they assume that institutions 
produce information about issuers and request allocations in SEOs about 
which they obtain favourable private information. From a large sample of 
transaction-level institutional data, they find support for an information 
production role for institutions instead of a manipulative trading role. They 
also find that more pre-offer institutional net buying and larger institutional 
allocations normally result in a smaller SEO discount. This suggests that 
institutions seek to increase their allocations when they have more favourable 
information about the long-term prospects of the issuers and, thus, SEO 
underpricing is reduced. It is worth mentioning that the conclusion of 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) does not have direct implications for the increase in 
                                                             
7
 Including 884 IPOs and 633 SEOs. 
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SEO underpricing during the past two decades. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) investigate the role of co-managers in underwriting 
syndicates. The study raises three hypotheses for the effects of co-managers on 
SEO flotation costs. One hypothesis is that the number of co-managers in the 
syndicate is negatively associated with SEO underpricing. The second is that 
highly reputable co-managers will reduce SEO underpricing. The third is that 
commercial banks serving as co-managers reduce SEO underpricing compared 
with investment banks serving as co-managers. All of these hypotheses are 
based on the certification roles of underwriters. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) use the OLS, 2SLS and treatment effects regression to 
test their hypotheses. They show that adding a co-manager significantly 
reduces underpricing by 0.2% in the OLS. However, after controlling for the 
endogenous choice of the number of co-managers by using 2SLS, they find no 
evidence to support a relationship between number of co-managers and SEO 
underpricing. The empirical results from both OLS and treatment effect 
regressions confirm that the involvement of highly reputable co-managers 
significantly decreases SEO underpricing. The underpricing is decreased by 
1.0% and 1.9% estimated by OLS and treatment effect regressions 
respectively. SEO underpricing is decreased by about 0.5% when commercial 
banks are included as co-managers in the syndicate. The above results suggest 
that the number of co-managers does not significantly affect SEO underpricing 
after controlling for endogeneity of syndicate structure, while having highly 
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reputable co-managers and commercial bank co-managers has significant 
effects on the decrease in SEO underpricing. 
 
According to previous literature, underwriters may also play a marketing role 
in underwriting. Huang and Zhang (2011) hypothesize that the marketing 
efforts can influence the demand for SEO shares in the primary market and, 
thus, lower the offer price discount. They use the number of managing 
underwriters (lead managers and co-managers) in an SEO syndicate as a proxy 
of marketing efforts made by underwriters. Huang and Zhang (2011) find that 
the natural logarithm of the number of managers is negatively related to the 
SEO discount. They also confirm that the benefits of additional managers are 
greater for larger relative offer size and higher stock return volatility. All these 
results support the marketing hypothesis. They then examine the effects of 
investor networks on SEO discount. This variable is defined as the number of 
µUHODWLRQVKLS LQYHVWRUV¶ HDFK XQGHUZULWHU KDG EHIRUH WKH FXUUHQW GHDO $
relationship investor is defined as one that participated in at least in 10 SEOs 
in the 5 years prior to the current SEO, with at least one underwriter in the 
syndicate (a lead or co-managing underwriter). Participation is determined by 
that investor having increased its holding of the stock after the SEO. Through 
empirical tests, Huang and Zhang (2011) find that the number of managing 
underwriters for an SEO is negatively related to the offer price discount, 
especially when the relative offer size is large and the stock return volatility is 
high. Larger investor networks of comanaging underwriters also lower offer 
price discounts. The results can be considered strong support for the marketing 
role of investment banks in book-built SEOs. 
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3.4.3.3. Explanations for SEO Underpricing 
Following the discussions above, this section introduces several important 
explanations of SEO underpricing and discount. To summarize, there are six 
main explanations from the literature for SEO underpricing: information 
asymmetry, uncertainty about firm value, price pressure, short-selling and 
manipulative trading, price clustering and investment banking power, and 
NASDAQ-listed firms. 
  
3.4.3.3.1. Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry may be the most popular explanation in equity pricing. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggest that many information models used in 
IPO pricing can be extended to the case of SEOs. However, according to 
recent empirical studies, information asymmetry seems to be a smaller factor 
in SEO pricing than in IPO pricing. These studies include a variety of 
measures of information asymmetry. For example, Corwin (2003) uses firm 
size and the bid±ask spread to measure the information problem. The results 
show little evidence of a relationship between information asymmetry and 
SEO underpricing. Huang and Zhang (2011) implement an alternative method 
by using the logged pre-issue market capitalization as a control variable for 
information asymmetry. They find the market capitalization is significantly 
positively related to the SEO discount. 
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) assess whether information released during the 
registration period can affect the discount. To measure information asymmetry, 
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Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) utilize three measures. Their results confirm a 
significantly positive relationship between expected discounting and positive 
private information released in the registration period. To summarize, though 
some prior studies suggest information asymmetry significantly influences the 
pricing of equity offerings, information asymmetry is seemingly not an 
important consideration in SEO pricing. 
 
3.4.3.3.2. Uncertainty about Firm Value  
Stock return volatility is often used to measure uncertainty about firm value or 
price uncertainty, though some studies consider stock return volatility as a 
proxy for information asymmetry. For example, Drucker and Puri (2005) and 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) use stock return volatility to measure 
information asymmetry. Nevertheless, Lee and Masulis (2009) claim that 
stock return volatility is likely to capture other economic effects besides 
asymmetric information. They point out that stock return volatility can also be 
used to measure uncertainty and is influenced by industry-wide and 
economy-wide shocks. 
  
Corwin (2003) employs stock return volatility as a proxy for price uncertainty. 
Here, volatility is calculated by the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the 30 trading days ending 11 trading days prior to the issue. The 
empirical results suggest a significantly positive relationship between the level 
of uncertainty about firm value and price uncertainty.Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2003) also find a positive relationship between stock return volatility and the 
SEO discount. Chemmanur et al. (2009) define volatility as the standard 
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GHYLDWLRQ RI WKH LVVXHU¶V VWRFN UHWXUQ IURP  WUDGLQJ GD\V SULRU Wo the 
offering to 42 trading days prior to the offering. They use volatility as a 
control variable and find that the volatility is significantly positively related to 
SEO discount in all regressions. Huang and Zhang (2011) implement the same 
definition of volatility as Corwin (2003) and confirm that volatility is 
significantly positively related to SEO discount. As a result, though some 
papers doubt the effects of stock return volatility, I still include it as a factor in 
my research. 
 
3.4.3.3.3. Price Pressure  
Price pressure is defined as the effects of having more outstanding shares. The 
effects can be either permanent or temporary. If the demand curve for the 
shares of the issuing firm is downward sloping, an increase in supply will 
result in a permanent decrease in stock price. This is called downward-sloping 
demand, or permanent price pressure (Corwin, 2003). According to some 
studies, a permanent stock price decrease may not take place on the issue day. 
In contrast, for temporary price pressure, since an SEO brings a temporary 
liquidity shock, a discount is required to compensate investors for absorbing 
the additional shares (Corwin, 2003). 
  
Offer size and relative offer size are the two most commonly used proxies for 
price pressure. Hansen (2001) points out that the relative amount of IPOs 
should increase underpricing. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) GHILQH µUHODWLYH
RIIHU VL]H¶ DV WKH JURVV SURFHHGV ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH PDUNHW YDOXH RI HTXLW\
measured one week before the offer day. The results suggest the discount is 
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higher for larger relative size. Bortolotti et al. (2008) use a similar definition of 
price pressure to Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), and the coefficients of the 
regressions turn out to be insignificant. 
 
Relative offer size is sometimes also defined as the number of shares offered 
over the total number of shares outstanding before the offer (Corwin, 2003; 
Huang and Zhang, 2011). The results reported by both Corwin (2003) and 
Huang and Zhang (2011) suggest the relative offer size is significantly 
positively associated with SEO discount. Corwin (2003) also shows a 
significant price drop in the days prior to the offer, followed by a significant 
price recovery following the offer. As a result, there is little evidence to 
support permanent price pressure, while the results of the empirical test 
strongly support the temporary price pressure hypothesis. 
 
3.4.3.3.4. Short-selling and Manipulative Trading  
The short-selling hypothesis is proposed by Hovakimian and Hutton (2010). 
They find a price pattern which means an average 1.5% price decline 
accompanied by abnormally high trading volume in a short period (15 minutes) 
after an announcement from 1981 to 1983. This price drop is followed by a 
significant recovery of 1.5% after the issue day. Therefore, this phenomenon 
provides some evidence for the argument that investors depress stock prices 
through short-selling to affect the offer prices of new equity issues. 
Additionally, Jenter et al. (2011) claim that such manipulative trading might 
reduce the informativeness of secondary market prices before the offering and 
force firms to offer a high discount on new shares. 
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Corwin (2003) divides the research period into two parts, according to the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21. This study shows that a large price drop prior 
to the offer date did not lead to more underpricing before the implementation 
of Rule 10b-21but that large price movements in either direction did lead to 
more underpricing after the implementation of Rule 10b-21. Therefore, 
Corwin (2003) suggests that increased restrictions on short sales result in more 
uncertainty. This conclusion is supported by Kim and Shin (2004), who record 
that there is still a significant increase in SEO underpricing between the 
periods before and after the implementation of Rule 10b-21, and after they 
exhaust all possible explanations. They conclude that the implementation of 
Rule 10b-21 reduced the informativeness of market prices and led to more risk 
and higher SEO underpricing. 
 
3.4.3.3.5. Price Clustering and Investment Banking Power 
Some studies suggest that price clustering may affect equity offer pricing. 
More specifically, the hypothesis is proposed that offer prices are likely to be 
set at integer values. Bradley et al. (2004) point out that IPOs priced at integer 
values have in higher first-day returns than those priced in dollar fractions. 
This is explained by the desire of the underwriters to reduce the costs of 
negotiation. They argue that clustering at integers is also a way to compensate 
the underwriter for increased uncertainty. 
 
Corwin (2003) tests the effects of price rounding on SEO underpricing by 
examining the relationship between underpricing and price level. The 
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empirical test provides strong evidence that offer prices tend to be rounded to 
whole-dollar amounts or $0.25 increments. Mola and Loughran (2004) 
confirm the finding that SEOs priced at integer values have a larger average 
discount than those priced at fractional values. Additionally, the use of integer 
offer prices in IPOs increased over time from 1986 to 1999 (Mola and 
Loughran, 2004). IPOs priced at integer values had an average first-day return 
of 21.4% while those priced at fractions had an average first-day return of 
8.9%. 
 
In contrast with earlier studies, Mola and Loughran (2004) consider the 
clustering of SEO prices as evidence of increased investment banking power. 
They point out that analyst coverage is an important explanation for increased 
SEO discounting. Their study also documents evidence of market 
concentration in the SEO underwriting industry. The underlying idea is that 
big banks have more influential analysts and have more customers in other 
areas. Firms prefer to choose familiar analysts who will issue favourable and 
influential reports. Therefore, big banks have more pricing power in SEOs 
because they have greater market share. However, Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2003) find evidence that a highly reputable lead manager reduces the SEO 
discount. 
 
A number of studies treat price clustering as an important control variable. 
These include Chemmanur et al. (2009), Jeon and Ligon (2011), Autore (2011) 
and Huang and Zhang (2011), all of which implement a dummy variable that 
equals one if an offer is priced at an integer value and zero otherwise. The 
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coefficients of this variable are strongly significant in regressions in all these 
studies. 
 
3.4.3.3.6. NASDAQ-Listed Firms  
NASDAQ-listed firms are different from NYSE-listed firms in many respects. 
For example, NYSE-listed firms are often larger and their shares are traded 
more actively. Corwin (2003) notes that NYSE issues normally represent a 
VPDOOHU IUDFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V H[LVWLQJ VKDUHV WKDQ GR 1$6'$4 LVVXHV 7KH
VWDWLVWLFVRI&RUZLQ¶VVDPSOHVKRZWKDWWKHRIIHUHGVKDUHVRIDQ1<6(LVVXHU
represent an average 16% of pre-issue shares outstanding, while the offered 
shares of NASDAQ-listed companies occupy an average 26.8% of pre-issue 
shares outstanding. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also incorporate a NASDAQ 
dummy in their empirical model and confirm that the expected SEO discount 
is larger for NASDAQ firms. Mola and Loughran (2004) also confirm that 
NASDAQ-listed issues are associated with greater discounts. However, some 
recent studies report insignificant influences of the NASDAQ dummy on SEO 
discount or underpricing. These studies include Jeon and Ligon (2011), Autore 
(2011), and Huang and Zhang (2011). 
 
3.5. Structure and Function of the Underwriter Syndicate 
This section provides an overview of studies on underwriter syndicates. It 
introduces the structure as well as the function of underwriting syndicate first. 
Then, studies of the effects of different features of underwriting syndicates on 
SEO underpricing will be discussed. The different features include the 
reputation of the underwriters, the number of underwriters and the 
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involvement of commercial bank co-managers. 
 
3.5.1. The Structure of the Underwriting Syndicate 
An underwriter syndicate typically includes several categories of underwriter, 
namely lead underwriter (book manager), co-manager(s) and selling groups 
(selling syndicate).  
 
The lead underwriter8 determines who is to form the syndicate and manages 
the overall process of the offering. The management fees are paid to the lead 
managers because they typically record the activity of the syndicate. In a 
syndicate, lead manager(s) also underwrite the largest portion of the securities. 
Many studies recognize the important role of book managers. For example, 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) use the ranking9 of lead managers in IPOs to 
represent the reputation of the underwriter syndicate. Mola and Loughran 
(2004) use the ranking of the analyst team of the lead managers to measure the 
analysis capacity of the underwriters. 
 
Similar to lead managers, co-managers also bear underwriting risks and 
receive underwriting fees. However, they do not receive management fees 
because they do not record the activities of the underwriter syndicate. Though 
lead managers are likely to be more important, additional managing 
underwriters are useful in the distribution of offerings (Huang and Zhang, 
2011). According to Jeon and Ligon (2011), the importance of co-managers is 
increasing and most of the syndicates in SEOs consisted of more than one 
                                                             
8
 ,QIDFWWKHUHLVRIWHQPRUHWKDQMXVWRQHCOHDG¶XQGHUZULWHU 
9
 -D\5LWWHU¶VXSGDWHG&DUWHU-Manaster underwriter ranking. 
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co-manager from 1997 to 2007; the average number was 2.44 per deal.  
 
In a syndicate, the banks that are responsible only for the distribution of shares 
are said to belong to the selling group or syndicate. Reallowance fees10 are 
paid to these banks. Members of the selling group, which can number in the 
hundreds for some issues, sign a selected dealer agreement that stipulates the 
terms of the relationship, including the commission (called the selling 
concession), the date of termination (typically 30 days), and whether the 
selling groups must buy unsold shares. Additionally, the analyst coverage for 
the shares after the offering is normally implemented by lead underwriters, 
co-managers and selling syndicate.  
 
3.5.2. The Functions of the Underwriting Syndicate 
In the literature, the functions of underwriters are usually categorized in four 
groups, namely information production, certification, analyst coverage and 
marketing. 
 
Information production theory denotes that having more underwriters help 
better convey the information to book managers. Corwin and Schultz (2005) 
suggest underwriters convey information of market interest in an IPO to book 
managers both directly and indirectly, through conversations with issuers, 
FDOOHGµZKLVSHULQJVLQWKHLVVXHU¶VHDU¶,QDGGLWLRQWKHLVVXHUZLOOFRQYH\WKH
information to the book managers through negotiations with them.  
 
                                                             
10 In securities underwriting, reallowance fee is the fee that the underwriting group pays to a securities 
firm that is not part of the syndicate, but that still sells shares in the offering. 
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Certification reduces information asymmetry and adverse selection (Huang 
and Zhang, 2011). According to information production theory, underwriters 
can reduce indirect costs for issuing firms. According to Jeon and Ligon 
(2011), more co-managers, the better reputation of those co-managers and the 
involvement of commercial bank co-managers can all improve the certification 
function of the underwriter syndicate. 
 
Syndicate members also provide analyst coverage. Corwin and Schultz (2005) 
find that each additional co-manager adds 0.8 analyst issuing reports in three 
months after an IPO. They also find that if an underwriter has a top-ranked 
DQDO\VW LQ WKH LVVXHU¶V LQGXVWU\ WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI WKDW XQGHUZULWHU EHLQJ
included in the syndicate significantly increases. Aggarwal et al. (2002) 
suggest that analyst coverage on an IPO can shift up the demand curve for the 
stock and, thus, is positively related to its 6-month return between the offer 
date and the lockup expiration date. James and Karceski (2006) show that 
stock prices increase more for newly listed US firms when underwriters 
provide a strong buy recommendation and when the target price is high. 
Degeorge et al. (2007)KRZHYHUTXHVWLRQWKHYDOXHRIVXFKDQDO\VWµK\SH¶IRU
a sample of French IPOs. 
 
7KHXQGHUZULWHUV¶PDUNHWLQJHIIRUWVFDQVKLIWXSDQGIODWWHQ the demand curve 
of an SEO (Gao and Ritter, 2010)according to Gao and Ritter (2010), who 
argue that underwriters exert few or no marketing efforts in accelerated 
book-built and bought deals but do play an important marketing role in 
book-built (also called fully marketed) SEOs. Consistent with their argument, 
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they show that firms with inelastic demand curves tend to choose fully 
marketed SEOs. Huang and Zhang (2011) focus on the marketing efforts of 
underwriters in the primary market of book-built SEOs. They report that the 
XQGHUZULWHUV¶PDUNHWLQJHIIRUWVFDQORZHUWKHRIIHUSULFHGLVFRXQWE\VKLIWLQJ
up and flattening the demand curve of an SEO. 
 
3.5.3. The Effects on Flotation Costs of the Different Features of 
Underwriter Syndicates 
This section reviews previous studies on the relationships between the 
underwriter syndicate and flotation costs. Three features have been focused on: 
the effects of the reputation of the underwriter (possibly the most commonly 
studied feature), the number of co-managers and the involvement of 
commercial bank co-managers. A brief summary of the effects of these 
features is presented next. 
 
3.5.3.1. The Reputation of the Underwriters 
Many scholars find that underwriter reputation can reduce the indirect costs of 
issuance (Carter and Manaster (1990); Megginson and Weiss (1991); Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001); Chen and Mohan (2002).  
 
After controlling for endogeneity in issuer±underwriter matching in the 
investigation of bond underwriting services, Fang (2005) finds that more 
reputable banks offer the bond issuers with higher bond price and charge 
KLJKHU IHHV EXW LVVXHUV¶ QHW SURFHHGV are still higher compared with less 
reputable banks. Such relations are pronounced in the junk-bond category. 
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Fang (2005) LQWHUSUHWV WKLV SKHQRPHQRQ DV UHIOHFWLQJ EDQN XQGHUZULWHUV¶
reputation. He also suggests that economic rents are earned on reputation, 
which provides an incentive for underwriters to maintain their reputation. 
Chuluun and Khorana (2007) study the structural features of underwriting 
syndicates (including µSUHVWLJH¶DQG WKHLU LPSDFWRQFRPSOHWLRQVSHHGRIIHU
discount, and post-issue performance of SEOs. They find prestigious 
syndicates are associated with a lower discount, which is consistent with the 
certification hypothesis.  
 
Chen and Mohan (2002) investigate the relationship between underwriter 
reputation, underwriter spread and underpricing. They contend that 
underwriter spread may represent an explicit pricing of risk for an IPO issue 
and they find that it is significantly correlated with underpricing, which 
represents an implicit pricing of risk. Their results roughly suggest that deeper 
underpricing often is accompanied by higher underwriter spread. However, 
after analysing their results in detail, they find for the medium-reputation 
underwriters, underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing negatively, 
suggesting a substitution relationship. For the low- and high-reputation 
underwriters, initial underpricing affects underwriter spread positively, 
indicating a complementary relationship. Jeon and Ligon (2011) examine the 
effect of including co-managers in the underwriting syndicate on expected 
flotation cost. They find that highly reputable underwriters serving as 
co-managers play a certification role, reducing indirect costs. 
 
Thus, although highly reputable underwriters are shown in the literature to 
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reduce indirect costs significantly, their effect on underwriter spread, which is 
considered a direct cost, is ambiguous. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and 
Puri (1999) argue that more reputable underwriters charge higher fees to cover 
the costs incurred in providing superior certification and monitoring services. 
On the other hand, Livingston and Miller (2000) find a negative relationship 
between underwriter reputation and underwriting spreads. Jeon and Ligon 
(2011) support Livingston and Miller (2000)¶V finding by studying the relation 
between underwriter spread and reputation, and find a negative relationship. 
They attribute this finding to prestigious underwriters having bargaining 
power in persuading syndicate members to accept lower fees in order to 
increase market share. 
 
Figure 1 A Summary of the Effects of Different Characteristics of 
Underwriters on Floatation Costs 
 
Underwriter 
Number 
 Reputation 
  CB 
If High 
If High 
 
If Exist 
 
Indirect costs (decrease) 
Direct costs (increase) 
Indirect costs (decrease) 
 
Floatation costs (decrease) 
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3.5.3.2. The Number of Co-managers 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) find that having more co-managers can reduce the 
indirect costs of issuance, as they can serve to lower information asymmetry 
and act as certification agents. Jeon and Ligon (2011) find the more 
co-managers, the lower the indirect cost. However, the increase of the number 
of co-managers can result in a higher underwriting spread, because 
underwriting spreads are shared with all the syndicate members participating 
in the syndicate.  
 
3.5.3.3. The Involvement of Commercial Bank Underwriters 
As discussed in Section 1.2, for a long time in the USA, only investment banks 
could participate in underwriter syndicates. This situation changed after the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall Act, allowing commercial banks to participate as 
co-managers where an IPO or SEO was led by an investment bank (sometimes 
termed a hybrid syndicates). Commercial banks serving as co-managers could 
conceivably use their proprietary information to enhance the quality of 
certification of issues and, as a result, reduce indirect flotation costs (Song, 
2004). Narayanan et al. (2004) also find commercial banks ask for lower 
underwriting spreads.  
 
However, there is also an opposite view, that commercial banks with 
proprietary information about an issuer, derived from a lending relationship, 
might face conflicts of interest in underwriting that relate to misrepresenting 
the value of issues in order to use the proceeds to repay bank loans. Puri (1999) 
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suggests that the equity- or debt-KROGLQJFRPPHUFLDOEDQNVPD\KLQGHUEDQNV¶
certification role. Hebb and MacKinnon (2004) find the presence of 
commercial banks in underwriter syndicates results in increased uncertainty of 
IPO valuation. They suggest that the market perceives the possibility of a 
conflict of interest when commercial banks underwrite equity issues. Song 
(2004) also find that commercial banks are more likely to serve as 
co-managers when issuers have lower stock rankings and, thus, rely more on 
bank loans. This result indicates that the inclusion of commercial banks as 
co-managers does not improve the certification ability of the syndicate.  
 
Chaplinsky and Erwin (2009) find little evidence that commercial banks 
advance their position in equity underwriting beyond the share obtained 
through acquisition of investment banks with an existing share of equity 
underwriting. They attribute this phenomenon to lack of experience and the 
high cost of scope expansion. In other words, commercial banks up to that 
time are still not quite professional in equity underwriting and suffer from 
weaker certification ability compared with investment banks. 
 
Though the effect on indirect costs of having commercial banks act as 
co-managers is ambiguous, they do seem to have an effect on direct costs, 
because commercial banks may benefit from informational economies of 
scope through their business relationships (e.g. lending) with issuers (Drucker 
and Puri, 2005). As they have more information and bear lower risk of 
uncertainty, commercial banks should ask for less underwriting spread as 
compensation. This theory receives support from Jeon and Ligon (2011), who 
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find the presence of commercial banks can lower underwriting spread. 
 
3.6. Effects of the Underwriter±Investor Network 
Investment banking is a relationship-based rather than transaction-based 
business (Huang et al., 2008). The effects of the nature of the relationships 
between underwriters and investors have long interested financial economists. 
,W LV ZLGHO\ DFFHSWHG WKDW DQ XQGHUZULWHU¶V QHWZRUN RI UHJXODU LQYHVWRUV
benefits issuers by maximizing the proceeds of an issue (Sherman and Titman, 
2002; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990). Sherman 
(2000) points out that the reason for the growing popularity of book building 
in IPO underwriting is the formation of regular institutional investor clienteles. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) suggest that underwriters typically benefit their 
regular buy-side investors by allocating highly underpriced IPOs to them. 
Reuter (2006) supports this . Binay et al. (2007) find that regular investors 
benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in 
underpriced issues. They also suggest that the underwriter±investor 
relationship is more important in the distribution of IPOs with strong demand, 
IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals with less reputable underwriters. 
 
Huang et al. (2008) FRQILUPLQYHVWPHQWEDQNV¶QHWZRUNIXQFWLRQDQGVKRZWKDW
the networking abilities of investment banks can attract more investors by 
examining a sample of Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs). Huang 
and Zhang (2011) use a sample of traditional book-built SEOs and find that the 
investor networks established by managing underwriters increase the 
likelihood of investor participation and benefit issuers in the form of lower 
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discounts on their offers. 
 
3.7. Conclusion of Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature on equity offerings regarding reasons for 
conducting equity offerings, studies on direct flotation costs, studies on 
indirect flotation costs, structure and function of underwriter syndicate as well 
as effects of the underwriter-investor networks. 
 
To summarize, there are three most popular reasons for conducting equity 
offerings, that is, pecking order theory, trade-off theory as well as market 
timing theory. However, recent empirical literature does not come to an agreed 
conclusion. Nevertheless, both pecking order and trade-off theory are 
problematic. As a result, market timing theory seems to be the most popular 
explanation for conducting equity offerings. Moreover, DeAngelo et al. (2010) 
propose another two explanations for conduct SEOs, that is, corporate 
lifecycle and near-term cash need. 
 
This chapter also reviews the floatation costs of equity offerings. Floatation 
costs could be further divided into direct flotation costs and indirect flotation 
costs. Direct flotation costs mainly refer to underwriting spread, while indirect 
floatation costs mainly include announcement return and discount. The review 
of previous studies in the determinants of floatation costs provides evidence 
for including possible variables to implementing my research on the floatation 
costs in Chapter 4. 
Previous studies on structure and function of the underwriter syndicate are also 
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reviewed to facilitate the further discussions on choosing necessary variables 
in my research model. Meanwhile, the illustration of previous theories on how 
commercial bank underwriters may affect floatation costs paves the way to 
build the hypothesis for my own study in Chapter 4. Based on the findings of 
previous literature, I expect to confirm commercial bank co-managers have 
more proprietary information from another angle and find evidence for the 
idea that how market considers commercial bank co-managers¶ use of such 
proprietary information is the key factor affecting floatation costs. 
 
The literature on the effects of underwriter-investor network mainly supports 
that underwriter-investor network is a very important factor in equity offerings. 
Former underwriter-investor relationship could benefit issuers by maximizing 
the issue proceeds and benefit investors through greater participation in 
underpriced issues. Based on the discussions of previous studies, I raised the 
research hypothesis in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, the chosen of variables in 
previous literature provides evidence for my variables selection. Previous 
literature implies the possibility that underwriter-investor network may 
facilitate investors to participate in new issues. My research is expected to 
provide evidence for this implication. 
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Chapter 4: Commercial Bank Co-managers and the Flotation Costs of 
SEOs 
4.1. Introduction 
The flotation cost is an inevitable and considerable cost for firms which want 
to issue equity. It mainly consists of three components: underwriting spread, 
underpricing and announcement return. Due to its importance for issuers who 
want to maximize the expected net proceeds of security offerings, flotation 
cost is of great research interest. The determinants of flotation cost normally 
investigated are the characteristics of issuing firms and underwriters. The work 
reported in this chapter is a deep investigation of the effects of the 
characteristics of underwriters on flotation costs.  
 
Among the characteristics of underwriters, the number participating within a 
syndicate and their reputation are the two most often considered and scholars 
have come to a seemingly agreed conclusion. However, this is not so when 
considering the role of commercial banks in underwriting. There¶re two 
opposite theories regarding the effect of involving commercial banks in the 
underwriting syndicate. One theory indicates that having commercial banks 
act as co-PDQDJHUV ZLOO VLJQLILFDQWO\ HQKDQFH WKH ZKROH V\QGLFDWH¶V
certification role and reduce flotation costs (Jeon and Ligon, 2011). On the 
other hand, as commercial banks may have private information about a firm 
through loans or a clearing function, banks can misrepresent the value of a 
ILUP¶V VHFXULWLHVRQ WKHEDVLV WKDW WKHSURFHHGV FDQEHXVHd to repay its own 
claims (Puri, 1999; Song, 2004). This can obviously constitute a conflict of 
interest. 
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For this reason, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 separated the roles of 
commercial and investment banking. For more than 50 years thereafter, 
commercial banks and their subsidiaries were not allowed to underwrite 
corporate debt or equity securities. The restrictions were then relaxed, 
beginning in 1988 for debt securities and in 1990 for equities. On November 
14, 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act was finally repealed. As a result of the less 
restrictive regulatory environment, 30 commercial banks entered equity 
underwriting during 1990±1999, through the establishment of a Section 20 
subsidiary11. Prior to December 1996, banks underwrote less than 1% of 
equity issue volume but thereafter underwrote upwards of 20% of issue 
volume annually (Chaplinsky and Erwin, 2009). Commercial banks now act as 
co-managers in about 49% of transactions (Jeon and Ligon, 2011). Banks thus 
substantially increased their prominence as equity underwriters. 
 
Despite the growth in popularity of commercial banks becoming co-managers 
in equity underwriting, not much work has been done to investigate the 
relationship between underwriting by commercial banks and flotation costs. 
Moreover, those studies that have been done have not come to the same 
conclusion. Narayanan et al. (2004) use a sample of SEO syndicates from 
1994 to 1997 and find that lending banks are more likely to co-manage an 
issue if the lead manager has a high reputation and is not another lending bank. 
Moreover, with such a syndicate arrangement, issuers benefit from low 
underwriting fees, although they do not receive better pricing on their 
                                                             
11
 Section 20 subsidiary allows commercial banks to participate the underwriting and dealing 
of securities. 
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offerings. Suzuki (2010) finds that banks holding loans from issuers have a 
negative effect on price discount and no effect on underwriting fees. This 
finding implies the certification role of commercial banks co-managers. Jeon 
and Ligon (2011) comprehensively study the role co-managers play in 
reducing the flotation costs of SEOs. They investigate how different 
characteristics of the underwriter syndicate, such as the number of 
co-managers, the reputation of lead managers and the involvement of 
commercial banks, affects flotation costs. They find that the involvement of 
commercial banks as co-managers can reduce underpricing as well as 
underwriting spread and improve announcement return. In other words, having 
commercial banks act as co-managers can reduce flotation costs.  
 
In contrast to the findings of Jeon and Ligon (2011), Puri (1999) suggests that 
equity- or debt-holding commercial EDQNVPD\KLQGHUEDQNV¶FHUWLILFDWLRQUROH 
Hebb and MacKinnon (2004) find the presence of commercial banks in 
underwriter syndicates results in increased uncertainty of IPO valuation. They 
suggest that the market perceives the possibility of a conflict of interest when 
commercial banks underwrite equity issues. Song (2004) finds that 
commercial banks are more likely to serve as co-managers when issuers have 
lower stock rankings and, thus, rely more on bank loans. This indicates that 
having commercial banks act as co-managers does not improve the 
certification ability of the syndicate. The overall findings of Chaplinsky and 
Erwin (2009) suggest it has been difficult for banks to achieve economies of 
scope in underwriting, as evidenced by loss of market share. 
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Previous studies did not consider that the effects of commercial bank 
underwriters on SEO floatation costs may vary in the different situation. 
However, the effects are likely to be more complicated and to depend on the 
specifics of each situation. My study will fill this gap. The broad motivation 
behind my research is to understand how commercial bank co-managers affect 
SEO flotation costs in practice. My results refine prior findings by indicating 
that the market perception of SEOs underwritten by commercial banks is 
depends upon the circumstances. In particular, commercial bank co-managers 
can in some circumstances increase the SEO flotation cost if their behaviour 
and motivation convey the impression to the market that they are acting 
opportunistically. 
 
4.2. Hypothesis 
The potential benefits of cross-usage of banking information have been 
examined extensively in the academic literature. When underwriting a new 
security, underwriters are required to perform due diligence. Because of its 
previous relationship with the issuer, a commercial bank may already have 
much of this information. Commercial banks, therefore, can actually certify 
firm value if they use their private information properly. This argument is 
consistent with that of Booth and Smith (1986), who show that the 
certification effect is greater for underwriters with inside information (e.g., 
previous banking information).  
 
However, contrary to the certification hypothesis, it is also possible for banks 
to use their private information shift bankruptcy risk from themselves to the 
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market, as hypothesized by Puri (1999). This hypothesis is called conflict of 
interest. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) describe how a commercial bank may 
have an incentive to use its private information if it underwrites public 
securities for troubled firms, and asks the firms to use the proceeds to retire its 
loans made to the firms previously. If the market perceives such an incentive, 
it will discount the value of securities underwritten by commercial banks to a 
greater degree than those underwritten by investment banks. 
 
 
Figure 2 Differences between CB and IB when Underwriting 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the differences between CB and IB when underwriting. 
Compared with IB underwriters who could only underwrite securities, CB 
underwriters could issue loans as well as underwrite securities. According to 
this fact, CB underwriters may have more proprietary information than IB 
underwriters. Naturally, there are two possibilities for CB underwriters to use 
such proprietary information, one is properly used and the other one is 
misused. 
 
:KHQ VWXG\LQJ WKH HIIHFW RI FRPPHUFLDO EDQNV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ XQGHUZULWHU
syndicates on flotation costs, market perception is the key factor. In other 
CB 
Loan 
Securities 
Information 
IB Securities 
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words, if the market suspects that commercial banks will use their private 
information to mitigate information asymmetry, commercial bank involvement 
in an underwriter syndicate will reduce flotation costs and play a certification 
role. Alternatively, if the market suspects commercial banks will use their 
private information to benefit themselves, their certification ability will be 
weaken and flotation costs will be increased. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has used a specific measure 
that seeks to identify whether a commercial bank underwriter conveys to the 
market an impression of acting in self-interest. In other words, previous 
studies did not consider that the effects of commercial bank underwriters on 
SEO floatation costs may vary in the different situation. Therefore, though 
PRVW UHFHQW HPSLULFDO WHVWV VXSSRUW FRPPHUFLDO EDQN XQGHUZULWHUV¶
certification role, they cannot reject the existence of a conflict of interest, 
which may be perceived by the market in certain circumstance. As a result, the 
main step for further study of the effect of commercial bank co-managers is to 
establish a measure to identify a circumstance where commercial bank 
co-managers have a motivation to act in their own self-interest and, more 
particularly, are seen by the market to have such a motivation. 
 
I implement two criteria to identify such a circumstance. The first concerns 
whether the commercial bank co-managers are likely to be opportunists in any 
current deal. To implement this criterion, I assume that commercial bank 
co-managers have more incentive to help issuers use SEO proceeds to pay 
EDFNORDQVDQGUHGXFHLVVXHUV¶EDQNUXSWF\ULVNZKHQLVVXHUV¶OHYHUDJHLVKLJKHU
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than a threshold. The rational for this is that high-leverage issuers have a high 
ULVNRIEDQNUXSWF\7KXVWRDYRLGWKHLVVXHU¶VEDQNUXSWF\DQGGHIDXOWRQORDQV
commercial bank may act as opportunists. However, determining what that 
threshold should be is not an easy judgement to make: how high a leverage is 
UHDOO\µKLJK¶"7KHUHIore, I set the threshold at the industry average.  
 
The second criterion concerns market perceptions of commercial bank 
co-PDQDJHUV¶ SUHYLRXV XQGHUZULWWHQ GHDOV 3UHYLRXV GHDOV DQG SUHYLRXV
behaviour should be observable to the market (i.e. potential investors) and 
evidence of opportunistic behaviour will be noted. The reason for this criterion 
is that flotation costs are actually based on the reactions and perceptions of the 
market. If a commercial bank co-PDQDJHU¶VSUHYLRXVDFWVJLYHWKHPDUNHWDQ\
basis for suspicion, the flotation costs of the current underwritten SEO should 
be increased. To implement this criterion, the leverage of the issuer is used. If 
its leverage is higher than the industry average before issuance and reduced 
thereafter, then the commercial bank co-PDQDJHUV LQ WKDW ILUP¶V 6(2 DUH
ODEHOOHGµSUHYLRXVRSSRUWXQLVWV¶  
 
To summarize, 6(2V ZLWK µVXVSLFLRXV¶ FRPPHUFLDO EDQN FR-managers and 
highly leveraged issuers should experience higher flotation cost than others. 
Based on these specific circumstances (commercial bank co-managers are 
opportunists in previous deals and they may play the same role in current 
underwriting), I build my hypothesis as follows: 
 
SEOs with commercial bank co-managers who acted as opportunists in the 
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previous deal may play the same role in the current underwritten deal and 
the higher flotation costs will therefore be higher. 
 
 
Figure 3 Key Explanation for Hypothesis 
 
4.3. Empirical Setup 
4.3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
The sample selection criteria mainly follow the work of Jeon and Ligon (2011). 
I select SEO deals from the Thomson One database. The sample period is from 
1995 to 2011. The number of SEOs in the initial sample is 4590. During the 
sample period, I collect only ordinary common share offerings (i.e. Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) share codes 10 and 11) and exclude the 
following offers: 
 
(1) issues by non-US firms, REITs, and limited partnerships (CRSP share code 
40 or greater), 
(2) issues by firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, 
(3) issues with offer prices less than $3 or greater than $400, 
(4) issues by financial (one-digit SIC code 6) and utility (one digit SIC code 4) 
Self-interest
Motivation
Self-interest
Behavior
Perceived by
investors
CB co-managers
Higher flotation
costs
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firms, 
(5) issues where price and financial data are not available in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT, 
(6) units (CRSP share code 70 or greater), ADRs (the first digit of CRSP share 
code 3), and rights offerings, and  
(7) pure secondary offers. 
 
There are 2444 SEOs in the sample after the above criteria are applied. Then, I 
supplement the SDC database with financial data from COMPUSTAT and 
stock price data from CRSP. Following Huang and Zhang (2011), I collect 
analyst recommendations from the InstitutLRQDO %URNHUV¶ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S).  
 
Following Corwin and Schultz (2005), I assign to each underwriter in the 
syndicate one of the following three designations: book manager, co-manager, 
or syndicate member. I measure the reputation of each underwriter by using 
Jay RittHU¶V XSGDWHG Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter ranking, 
DYDLODEOH RQ -D\ 5LWWHU¶V ZHEVLWH DW WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI )ORULGD
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter). 
 
To implement my research, there are also two specific sets of data which 
require hand collection. 7KH ILUVW LV WKH µUHDO¶ ILOLQJ GDWH RI HDFK VKHOI 6(2
Actually, the Thomson One database records the filing date of each deal and 
many previous studies treated this filing date as the announcement date (or 
identify the announcement date mainly based on this filing date). However, 
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due to the increasing popularity of shelf offers and the shelf RIIHU¶V NH\
characteristic (one registration can be used for several tranches), the filing date 
cannot be naturally converted to the announcement date. I consider the date 
when the file for the specific offer was submitted to the SEC as the 
announcement date for each offer. Therefore, I collect such data from the 
6(&¶V ('*$5 GDWDEDVH PDQXDOO\ E\ VHDUFKLQJ LVVXHUV¶ ILOHV FORVH WR RIIHU
date (normally in 3 months) and adjust the announcement date of each shelf 
offer (tranche) as the earliest filing date for the particular offer (tranche).  
 
The second set of data requiring manual collection is the category of 
underwriters (commercial bank or investment bank). According to Drucker 
and Puri (2005), I ideQWLI\ HDFK XQGHUZULWHU DV DQ µLQYHVWPHQW EDQN¶ RU
µFRPPHUFLDO EDQN¶ EDVHG RQ WKH VWDWXV RI SDUHQWKROGLQJ FRPSDQ\ RI WKH
underwriter at the time of the issue. Due to the many mergers and acquisitions 
in the financial sector, I use the mergers and acquisitions database from 
Thomson One to help in this classification. For example, Nations Bank 
acquired Montgomery Securities on 10/1/1997. Montgomery Securities is 
classified as an investment bank prior to 10/1/1997, but after 10/1/1997 I 
classify it as a commercial bank. ,PDLQO\XVHWKH6HFWLRQ6XEVLGLDULHV¶OLVW
DV ZHOO DV WKH 6HFWLRQ N( 6HFXULWLHV 6XEVLGLDULHV¶ OLVW WR LGHQWLI\
XQGHUZULWHUV¶FDWHJRULHVFRPPHUFLDOEDQNLQYHVWPHQWEDQN0RUHRYHU,DOVR
XVH :LNLSHGLD WKH XQGHUZULWHUV¶ RIILFLDO ZHEsite and Bloomberg 
Bussinessweek to aid my classification. 
 
Besides manually collected data, I further match SEO deals with the 
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Compustat database for accounting information, following Kim and Park 
(2005). According to Kim and Park (2005), the accounting information used in 
research should be the latest available. Considering the time interval between 
the end of each fiscal quarter/year and the release of financial statements, 
LVVXHUV¶DFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHDGMXVWHGIRUGLIIHUHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV
Following Kim and Park (2005), I also set the time window between the end 
of a fiscal quarter and a financial statement filed to be 60 days and the interval 
between the end of the fiscal year (fourth fiscal quarter data included) and a 
financial statement filed to be 120 days. Therefore, if an offer occurs in the 
third or fourth fiscal quarter, accounting data of the last fiscal quarter should 
be used if the offer is issued more than 60 days after the end of last fiscal 
quarter and the data of the fiscal quarter before the last one should be used if 
WKHLQWHUYDOLVVKRUWHUWKDQGD\V,IDGHDOLVRIIHUHGLQWKHLVVXHU¶VILUVWILscal 
quarter, the data of the third fiscal quarter of the last fiscal year should be used, 
as 120 days should be allowed for the data of the fourth fiscal quarter of the 
last fiscal year. The most complicated situation is when an SEO occurs in an 
LVVXHU¶Vsecond fiscal quarter. In this condition, if an offer occurs less than 30 
days before the end of last fiscal quarter, the accounting data of the last third 
quarter should be merged for the current deal. If an offer occurs more than 60 
days from the end of the last fiscal quarter, the data of the first fiscal quarter 
should be used if it is available. If a deal happens more than 30 days but less 
WKDQGD\VIURPWKHHQGRIODVWILVFDOTXDUWHU WKHODVWIRXUWKTXDUWHU¶VGDWD
should be merged. The following table is a simple explanation of the 
adjustment method. 
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Quarter Current date Latest Date of Information Available 
1 Whole quarter 3rd quarter of last year 
2 First 30 days 3rd quarter of last year 
31-60 days 4th quarter of last year 
61 days and later 1st quarter of this year 
3 First 60 days 1st quarter of this year 
61 days and later 2nd quarter of this year 
4 First 60 days 2nd quarter of this year 
61 days and later 3rd quarter of this year 
 
4.3.2. Description of the Variables Used  
This section reports the definitions of the variables that are necessary in my 
research. I divide them to four subgroups: flotation cost, syndicate 
characteristic variables, issuer characteristic variables and issue characteristic 
variables. Flotation cost comprises announcement returns, discount and 
underwriting spread. Syndicate characteristic variables include the number of 
co-PDQDJHUV ERRN UXQQHUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ DQG VR RQ ,VVXHU FKDUDFWHULVWLF
variables mainly capture the accounting information of issuers, while issue 
characteristic variables regard the background and classification of deals. I 
summarize all these variables in Appendix 1. 
 
4.3.2.1. Flotation Cost 
Announcement returns are the cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day 
window [-1, 1] or over the five-day window [-2, 2] around the announcement 
of the SEO, where returns are calculated using the market model with the 
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CRSP value-weighted index as the market. The estimation period for 
parameters is from 200 days to 40 days prior to the announcement date. 
 
Discount is defined as the return from the offer price to the pre-RIIHU GD\¶V
closing price (Corwin, 2003), i.e. ln (pre-offer day close/offer price). This 
definition is similar to that of discounting in Altinkilic and Hansen (2003).  
 
Underwriting spread is the underwriter gross spread, expressed as a 
percentage of offer size, which is the sum of the management fee, 
underwriting fee, and selling concessions, obtained from Thomson One. 
 
4.3.2.2. Syndicate Characteristic Variables 
Lead rank LVWKHOHDGXQGHUZULWHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQEDVHGRQLWVDGMXVWHGCarter and 
Manaster (1990) reputation rank, obtaineG IURP-D\5LWWHU¶VZHESDJHDW WKH
University of Florida. I will average the reputation ranks for multiple lead 
underwriters.  
 
Multi-book equals one if an offer is underwritten by more than one lead 
underwriter and zero otherwise.  
 
CB-Lead is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the offer has a 
commercial bank as a lead underwriter and is zero otherwise.  
 
CB-COM is a dummy variable that equals one if a syndicate includes at least 
one commercial bank as a co-manager. I collect and identify this set of data 
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manually, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
 
CMCB-Susp is a dummy variable that equals one if a syndicate includes at 
least one commercial bank co-PDQDJHUWKDWEHKDYHGDVDQµRSSRUWXQLVW¶LQLWV
last deal in the previous two years. A commercial bank co-manager is treated 
DV D SRWHQWLDO µRSSRUWXQLVW¶ LI WKH OHYHUDJH RI WKH LVVXHU LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH
industry average before issuance and lower thereafter. 
 
CMCB-HL is a dummy variable that equals one if a syndicate includes at least 
one commercial bank and the leverage of the issuer is higher than the industry 
average before issuance. 
 
CMCB-Susp&HL is a dummy variable that equals one if both CMCB-Susp 
and CMCB-HL equals one. This variable takes a value of one if a highly 
leveraged firm issues an SEO that has at least one commercial bank 
co-PDQDJHULVFODVVLILHGDVDSRWHQWLDOµRSSRUWXQLVW¶LQLWVODVWGHDO  
 
4.3.2.3. Issuer Characteristics Variables 
Lnassets, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, is a measure of firm 
size and of information asymmetry and firm transparency.  
 
Volatility is the stock return standard deviation from 60 trading days through 
to 11 trading days prior to the announcement date.  
 
Market to book is defined as the sum of total assets and market value of equity 
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minus book value of equity divided by total assets.  
 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
4.3.2.4. Issue Characteristics Variables 
Lnproceeds is the natural logarithm of the number of shares issued multiplied 
by offer price. It measures issue size and controls for economies of scale in 
security issuance. 
 
Pure Primary is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a pure primary 
offering, and zero otherwise. 
 
NASDAQ is a dummy variable that equals one if an offer is issued by a 
NASDAQ-listed firm. 
 
Integer is a dummy variable that equals one if an offer is priced at an integer 
value and is zero otherwise. 
 
SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the offer date is after the effective 
date of the Sarbanes-Oxely Act (SOX) (7/30/2002). SiQFH WKDW UHJXODWLRQ¶V
inception, firm transparency may be improved and information asymmetries 
between investors and issuers may be reduced because the market has access 
to more reliable public information. 
 
ACTMAR is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a quarter has more 
Chapter 4                       Commercial Bank Co-managers and Flotation Costs of SEOs 
100 
 
than 75% of the number of SEOs completed in each quarter. The quantity of 
offering is a measure of supply relative to demand. 
 
LnAnalyst is the natural logarithm of the number of analyst recommendations, 
obtained from InstitutionDO%URNHUV¶(VWLPDWLRQ6\VWHP,%(6 
 
Shelf is a dummy variable that equals one if an offer is shelf-registered. The 
data are from the Thomson One database. 
 
Accelerate is a dummy variable that equals one if an SEO is an accelerated 
offer. The data are available in the Thomson One database. According to 
recent studies, accelerated SEOs have different flotation costs from traditional 
ones. Thus, it is necessary to include this as a control variable in my study. 
 
Overnight is a dummy variable that equals one if an offer occurs within two 
days of its announcement date. This definition is from Autore (2011), who 
ILQGV VXFK µRYHUQLJKW¶ GHDOV DUH PXFK PRUH SRSXODU IURP  , PDQXDOO\
collect this set of data, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
 
4.3.3. Baseline Model 
I use a common OLS model to implement my regression: 
 ܻ ൌ  ? ߚ௜ܺ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ߚ௡ାଵܼ                                  (Model 4.1) 
 
Here, ܼ denotes variables relating commercial bank co-managers (CB-COM, 
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CMCB-Susp, CMCB-HL and CMCB-Susp&HL) while ܺ௜  are the other 
variables. ߚ௜ are coefficients and ܻ is the dependent variable (announcement 
return, discount or gross spread). 
 
4.4. Statistical Analysis 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents illustrative descriptive statistics for SEO samples from 1995 
to 2011. The definition of each variable is given in Appendix 2. The total 
number of SEO samples is 2443. The highest annual number occurs in 1996, 
followed by 1995 and 1997. The average announcement return over three-day 
window (CAR[-1,1]) is 2.1%. The mean and median values of the discount are 
3.72% and 3.36% respectively. The mean and median values of the gross 
spread are both nearly 5.05%, which is consistent with numerous previous 
studies.  
 
The mean of number of managers (NO. of Mgr) is 3.94, with a relatively 
steady increasing trend. The highest number of managers occurs in 2008. The 
statistical characteristics of the number of managers are in coincident with 
HDFK \HDU¶V DYHUDJHG SURFHHGV 3URF $YJ RI ZKLFK WKH PHDQ DQG PHGLDQ
values are 165.47 and 143.43 respectively. The averaged proceeds in each year 
also show a roughly increasing trend, with highest in 2008.  
 
Among all deals, the proportion of deals with highly leveraged issuers (HL 
Ratio) fluctuates around an average of 38.47%. The proportion of deals 
underwritten by commercial banks (CB) for highly leverage issuers (HL&CB 
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Ratio) is slightly higher than in the whole sample, averaging 39.77%, while 
the proportion of deals underwritten purely by investment banks (IB) for 
highly leveraged issuers (HL&IB Ratio) is lower, averaging 36.59%. This 
result implies that highly leveraged issuers prefer the help of commercial 
banks to that of investment banks when they have to turn to the equity market 
for funding.  
 
The variable CBCM Ratio represents the percentage of deals underwritten by 
CB co-managers in whole deals each year. After the repeal of Glass-Steagall 
Act at the end of 1999, CB-underwritten SEO deals occupy more than 40% of 
the total, while the figure was only around 20% before the repeal. This 
suggests the popularity of CB co-managers in SEO underwriting. The 
increased importance of CBs in underwriter syndicates is also supported by the 
CB Ratio (the proportion of CB-underwritten SEOs to the whole sample), CB 
Proc. Ratio (the ratio of proceeds of CB-underwritten SEOs to the whole 
VDPSOH¶V WRWDO SURFHHGV DQG &0&% 3URF 5DWLR WKH UDWLR RI SURFHHGV RI
CB-XQGHUZULWWHQ6(2VWRWKHZKROHVDPSOH¶VWRWDOSURFHHGV  
 
Table 5 presents a summary of SEO flotation costs by offering technique: 
non-shelf, shelf but non-accelerated, accelerated but non-overnight, and 
overnight. Overnight offerings have the highest discount, at 7.1%, while the 
discount with the other techniques is around 3%. Non-shelf offerings cost 
issuers the highest underwriting spread. For the shelf offers, a quicker 
technique demands a lower underwriting spread. Non-shelf offerings show the 
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lowest announcement return, while overnight offerings have the lowest 
announcement return among the shelf offerings.  
 
Considering the large differences in flotation costs between overnight and 
non-RYHUQLJKWRIIHUVLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRXVHµRYHUQLJKW¶DVDFRQWUROYDULDEOHWR
implement a multivariate regression. 
 
In Table 6, different statistics presented for three subgroups, that is, 
opportunistic CB, opportunistic IB and the rest of the VDPSOHµ2SSRUWXQLVWLF
&%¶ GHQRWHV WKH SDUW RI WKH VDPSOH ZLWK &% FR-managers who have 
opportunist motivation and behaviour (as explained in Section 4.2). 
µ2SSRUWXQLVWLF ,%¶ VLPLODUO\ GHQRWHV WKH SDUW RI WKH VDPSOH ZLWK ,%
co-managers who have opportunist motivation and behaviour. The third 
subgroup is the rest of the sample. From Table6, it is clear that the second and 
third subgroups have similar characteristics for most variables, while the 
selection criteria are generally the same for the first two subgroups. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of a univariate analysis of SEO flotation costs 
(discount, underwriting spread and announcement return), by independent 
variables. There are three subgroups categorized by three components of 
flotation costs. For each subgroup, the whole sample is further divided into 
four parts by quartiles. To form the quartiles, each independent variable is 
sorted from low to high. Then I set the threshold value by the value at lowest, 
1/4, 1/2, 3/4 and highest of the whole. Quartiles increase according to the 
quartile number and the value in each part should be more than previous 
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threshold and less or equal to next threshold. The definitions of all 
non-dummy variables are given in Section 4.3.2 as well as in Appendix 1.Most 
of the results are in line with prior studies. For example, LnAnalyst, 
LnProceeds, RelativeSize and MarketCap seem to decrease flotation costs 
while Volatility seems to increase costs. 
 
Table 8 presents a univariate analysis of SEO flotation cost by dummy 
variables. The variables, such as, Overnight, Accelerated, Shelf, Integer, 
Nasdaq, Pure Primary, could increase discount dramatically, while CB 
Co-manager and HQ_co-manager decrease discount considerably. The results 
coincide with previous literature. However, Overnight, Accelerated and Shelf 
decrease underwriting spread and increase announcement return, in other 
words, decrease the floatation costs in terms of underwriting spread and 
announcement return. The reason may be that overnight/accelerated/shelf 
offers are closed much faster than normal ones, and thus, require less service 
from underwriters and leave less time for the market to react. 
 
The statistics in this section indicate that the characteristics of underwriting 
syndicate are an important factor in the determination of the floatation costs of 
SEOs. Meanwhile, the results also suggest that offering techniques would 
affect floatation costs dramatically and need to be considered in multivariate 
analysis. However, descriptive statistics as well as univariate analysis do not 
rule out the impact of other variables. Therefore, to get more detailed and 
convinced evidence, regression analysis is necessary. 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes 2443 completed SEOs from 1995 through to 2011 as reported in Thomson One database. Definitions of variables are given in Appendix 2. 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 
Mean Median 
NO. of Deals 236 263 227 133 180 196 125 111 126 146 103 101 102 55 154 94 91 2443 
 
ANN RET -0.019 -0.017 -0.028 -0.026 -0.023 -0.015 -0.034 -0.019 -0.023 -0.024 -0.021 -0.025 -0.009 -0.044 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.021 -0.021 
Discount 0.031 0.039 0.032 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.040 0.034 0.036 0.032 0.035 0.033 0.029 0.038 0.065 0.054 0.056 0.037 0.034 
Gross Spread 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.048 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.050 
NO. of Mgr 2.614 2.791 3.035 3.353 3.739 3.980 3.320 3.703 3.794 3.904 3.786 3.802 4.598 7.073 4.591 4.106 4.802 3.941 3.794 
NO. of Lead 1.004 1.004 1.000 1.015 1.050 1.066 1.192 1.234 1.302 1.390 1.398 1.396 1.657 1.745 1.721 1.681 1.813 1.333 1.302 
NO. of COM 1.610 1.787 2.035 2.338 2.689 2.913 2.128 2.468 2.492 2.514 2.388 2.406 2.941 5.327 2.870 2.426 2.989 2.607 2.468 
HL Ratio 0.331 0.316 0.366 0.436 0.350 0.281 0.392 0.432 0.468 0.404 0.398 0.337 0.373 0.455 0.545 0.372 0.286 0.385 0.373 
HL&CB Ratio 0.345 0.398 0.373 0.419 0.336 0.242 0.375 0.453 0.495 0.448 0.390 0.361 0.351 0.475 0.619 0.375 0.306 0.398 0.375 
HL&IB Ratio 0.326 0.278 0.363 0.458 0.385 0.457 0.448 0.360 0.400 0.293 0.423 0.276 0.440 0.400 0.306 0.368 0.241 0.366 0.368 
DR&CB Ratio 0.455 0.542 0.478 0.527 0.531 0.491 0.615 0.663 0.560 0.524 0.597 0.500 0.532 0.325 0.610 0.464 0.387 0.518 0.527 
DR&IB Ratio 0.558 0.561 0.488 0.508 0.481 0.629 0.690 0.640 0.457 0.610 0.500 0.552 0.520 0.467 0.528 0.474 0.586 0.544 0.528 
CB Ratio 0.233 0.316 0.295 0.556 0.711 0.821 0.768 0.775 0.722 0.719 0.748 0.713 0.755 0.727 0.766 0.596 0.681 0.641 0.719 
CMCB Ratio 0.139  0.213  0.189  0.398  0.528  0.724  0.616  0.640  0.516  0.486  0.447  0.455  0.480  0.509  0.539  0.319  0.374  0.445  0.480  
Proc. Sum 19216.3 22929.6 18290.4 15304.2 30883.5 53211.8 17929.6 13759.0 16241.5 23195.6 12252.6 14479.9 18980.3 27077.6 29121.4 14290.6 15348.4 21324.2 18290.4 
Proc. Avg 81.4 87.2 80.6 115.1 171.6 271.5 143.4 124.0 128.9 158.9 119.0 143.4 186.1 492.3 189.1 152.0 168.7 165.5 143.4 
CB Proc. Ratio 0.108 0.169 0.103 0.209 0.247 0.466 0.466 0.514 0.467 0.462 0.416 0.392 0.391 0.483 0.636 0.475 0.431 0.378 0.431 
CMCB Proc. 
Ratio 0.047 0.110 0.070 0.141 0.174 0.340 0.301 0.330 0.263 0.281 0.220 0.191 0.225 0.285 0.298 0.166 0.206 0.215 0.220 
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Table 5 SEO Flotation Cost by Issuing Technique 
In this table, samples have been divided into four subgroups according to issuing technique. Panel A shows the statistics for non-shelf offers (traditional offers), which obey the traditional procedure of SEO issuing. 
Panel B lists the statistics for shelf but non-accelerated offers. Shelf offers are the offers that implement shelf registration, which allows one registration for several tranches of share release. Accelerated offers are the 
offers that happen less than two days before the launch date. Accelerated offers must be shelf offers. Panel C reports the statistics for accelerated but non-overnight offers. Overnight offers are a type of accelerated offer 
but are even quicker. Normally, overnight offers give no advance notice to the market. For overnight offers, files are submitted on the offer date or even later. Panel D presents flotation costs for overnight offers. 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean 
Panel A Flotation cost of non-shelf offers 
NO. of Deals 161 227 202 95 118 130 79 56 57 45 27 34 30 12 12 9 15 1309 
Discount 0.031  0.039  0.033  0.023  0.025  0.033  0.035  0.026  0.035  0.028  0.031  0.028  0.035  0.037  0.064  0.028  0.032  0.032  
Underwriting spread 0.054  0.055  0.054  0.054  0.053  0.053  0.054  0.054  0.055  0.055  0.054  0.054  0.052  0.054  0.043  0.051  0.049  0.054  
Announcement return -0.019  -0.019  -0.031  -0.038  -0.034  -0.025  -0.037  -0.030  -0.035  -0.057  -0.024  -0.037  -0.019  -0.059  -0.080  -0.046  -0.024  -0.029  
Panel B Flotation cost of shelf but non-accelerated offers 
NO. of Deals 3 4 6 12 22 24 16 24 42 64 54 37 48 14 38 31 25 464 
Discount 0.008  0.013  0.011  0.018  0.016  0.026  0.033  0.029  0.028  0.029  0.040  0.026  0.024  0.024  0.038  0.039  0.029  0.029  
Underwriting spread 0.039  0.045  0.044  0.041  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.051  0.053  0.049  0.055  0.055  0.051  0.048  0.048  0.051  0.050  0.050  
Announcement return -0.010  -0.015  -0.026  -0.003  0.000  0.007  -0.022  -0.028  -0.019  -0.007  -0.017  -0.024  -0.010  0.000  0.009  0.011  0.002  -0.008  
Panel C Flotation cost of accelerated but non-overnight offers 
NO. of Deals 
      
1 3 3 6 1 4 4 7 34 13 6 82 
Discount 
      
0.019  0.007  0.022  0.009  0.004  0.024  0.028  0.013  0.035  0.022  0.028  0.026  
Underwriting spread 
      
0.050  0.047  0.044  0.037  0.040  0.050  0.033  0.043  0.046  0.049  0.042  0.045  
Announcement return 
      
-0.129  -0.005  -0.018  0.008  -0.017  0.007  -0.017  -0.046  0.007  -0.002  -0.023  -0.005  
Panel D Flotation cost of overnight offers 
NO. of Deals 
 
1 2 4 6 2 22 19 22 24 16 22 10 18 62 36 37 303 
Discount 
 
0.029  0.010  0.054  0.052  0.012  0.065  0.063  0.049  0.052  0.036  0.059  0.040  0.061  0.100  0.083  0.094  0.071  
Underwriting spread 
 
0.067  0.044  0.041  0.035  0.027  0.044  0.039  0.030  0.034  0.030  0.036  0.035  0.039  0.046  0.052  0.053  0.042  
Announcement return 
 
-0.036  -0.015  0.037  -0.033  0.079  -0.036  0.010  -0.003  -0.024  -0.036  -0.021  0.014  -0.076  -0.020  -0.012  -0.013  -0.018  
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Table 6 Summary of Variables for Different Subgroups of Bank Underwriters 
Table 6 SUHVHQWV WKH UHVXOWV IRU WKUHHVXEJURXSVZKLFKDUHFDWHJRUL]HGE\XQGHUZULWHUV¶ previous behaviour as well as current 
motivation. Opportunistic CB denotes the subgroup of with CB co-managers whose behaviour and motivation suggest they may 
be potential opportunists. The details are presented in the Hypothesis section (4.3). The definition of Opportunistic IB is similar 
to that of Opportunistic CB but focuses on IB co-managers. The definitions of all the variables are explained in Appendix 1. 
Variables Opportunistic CB Opportunistic IB Rest of the sample 
NO. of Deals 161 81 1520 
Discount 0.031  0.039  0.038  
Underwriting spread 0.045  0.052  0.051  
Announcement return -0.014  -0.022  -0.024  
Market capital 21.261  20.171  20.224  
Relative Size 0.178  0.206  0.193  
Lead Rank 8.756  7.482  7.549  
HQ_comanager ratio 0.795  0.519  0.482  
Multi-book ratio 0.559  0.173  0.209  
CB lead Ratio 0.671  0.407  0.435  
LnAsset 7.319  5.667  5.243  
Volatility 0.557  0.546  0.655  
Market-to-Book 0.771  0.809  0.462  
Leverage 0.752  0.772  0.445  
LnProceeds 5.394  4.468  4.422  
Pure Primary 0.789  0.642  0.649  
Nasdaq Ratio 0.280  0.642  0.747  
Integer Ratio 0.335  0.444  0.401  
ACTMKT Ratio 0.366  0.395  0.303  
LnAnalyst 2.208  1.657  1.738  
Shelf Ratio 0.758  0.420  0.451  
Accelerated Ratio 0.267  0.123  0.218  
Overnight Ratio 0.099  0.086  0.184  
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Table 7 Univariate Analysis of SEO Flotation Costs by Independent Variables 
Table 7 presents a univariate analysis of SEO flotation costs by independent variables. There are three subgroups categorized by three components of flotation costs. For each subgroup, the whole sample is further 
divided into four parts by quartiles. Each part lists the average values of SEO flotation costs. Quartiles increase according to the quartile number. In other words, quartile 4 presents the data with highest values of the 
independent variable, while quartile 1 means the lowest. The definitions of all non-dummy variables are given in Section 4.3.2 as well as in Appendix 1. 
Flotation costs Discount Underwriting Spread Announcement Return 
Quartiles 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
LnAnalyst 0.049  0.034  0.030  0.031  0.058  0.053  0.049  0.043  -0.025  -0.025  -0.022  -0.017  
NO. of Obs 595 589 475 499 595 589 475 499 595 589 475 499 
LnProceeds 0.060  0.037  0.029  0.022  0.059  0.053  0.050  0.042  -0.027  -0.026  -0.018  -0.019  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
Leverage 0.039  0.037  0.034  0.037  0.055  0.053  0.048  0.048  -0.025  -0.024  -0.020  -0.020  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
MB Ratio 0.039  0.036  0.034  0.038  0.055  0.053  0.048  0.049  -0.027  -0.021  -0.021  -0.021  
NO. of Obs 539 539 539 541 539 539 539 541 539 539 539 541 
Volatility 0.023  0.035  0.043  0.046  0.046  0.052  0.053  0.053  -0.010  -0.024  -0.028  -0.028  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
LnAsset 0.052  0.037  0.031  0.027  0.059  0.054  0.050  0.041  -0.026  -0.029  -0.022  -0.013  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
Co-manager NO. 0.053  0.032  0.028  0.026  0.051  0.054  0.051  0.047  -0.022  -0.022  -0.029  -0.017  
NO. of Obs 692 619 448 399 692 619 448 399 692 619 448 399 
RelativeSize 0.034  0.033  0.036  0.044  0.044  0.051  0.054  0.056  -0.017  -0.024  -0.021  -0.028  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
MarketCap 0.055  0.039  0.030  0.023  0.060  0.054  0.050  0.041  -0.031  -0.022  -0.019  -0.019  
NO. of Obs 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 540 539 
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Table 8 Univariate Analysis of SEO Flotation Costs by Dummy Variables 
Table 8 shows a univariate analysis of SEO flotation costs by dummy variables. There ar three subgroups in this analysis 
according to three components of flotation costs. The definitions of all these dummy variables are in Section 4.3.2. The columns 
ODEHOOHGC\HV¶OLVWWKHDYHUDJHYDOXHVRIWKHFRPSRQHQWRIIORWDWLRQFRVWVZKHQWKHGXPP\YDULDEOHHTXDOVRQHZKLOHWKHFROXmns 
ODEHOOHGCQR¶OLVWWKHDYHUDJHYDOXHVRIWKHFRPSRQHQWRIIORWDWLRQFRVWVZKHQWKHGXPP\YDULable equals to zero 
Variables 
Discount Underwriting Spread Announcement Return 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Overnight 0.071 0.031 0.042 0.053 -0.018 -0.023 
NO of Obs 303 1855 303 1855 303 1855 
Accelerated 0.062 0.031 0.043 0.053 -0.016 -0.024 
NO of Obs 385 1773 385 1773 385 1773 
Shelf 0.044 0.032 0.047 0.054 -0.012 -0.029 
NO of Obs 849 1309 849 1309 849 1309 
ACTMAR 0.036 0.038 0.052 0.050 -0.019 -0.025 
NO of Obs 905 1253 905 1253 905 1253 
Integer 0.043 0.033 0.052 0.050 -0.026 -0.020 
NO of Obs 860 1298 860 1298 860 1298 
Nasdaq 0.040 0.029 0.053 0.045 -0.026 -0.014 
NO of Obs 1546 612 1546 612 1546 612 
Pure Primary 0.042 0.028 0.050 0.052 -0.018 -0.031 
NO of Obs 1353 805 1353 805 1353 805 
CB Co-manager 0.028 0.043 0.050 0.052 -0.024 -0.022 
NO of Obs 901 1257 901 1257 901 1257 
CB Lead 0.035 0.038 0.049 0.052 -0.021 -0.023 
NO of Obs 851 1307 851 1307 851 1307 
Multi-bookrunner 0.033 0.038 0.048 0.052 -0.016 -0.024 
NO of Obs 422 1736 422 1736 422 1736 
HQ_co-manager 0.026 0.048 0.050 0.052 -0.022 -0.023 
NO of Obs 1108 1050 1108 1050 1108 1050 
 
4.4.2. Regression Analysis 
4.4.2.1. Announcement Return 
In this section, I investigate the effect of co-managers on announcement 
returns. I hypothesize that SEOs with commercial bank co-managers who 
acted as opportunists in their last deal and may play the same role in current 
underwriting would generate a lower announcement return. The underlying 
reason is that any suspicion that commercial bank co-managers suspicion will 
act out of self-interest represents unfavourable information for the market, and 
WKXV KDUPV XQGHUZULWHUV¶ FHUWLILFDWLRQ DELOLW\ DQG GHFUHDVHV DQQRXQFHPHQW
returns. 
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I conduct an OLS regression to examine the role of commercial bank 
co-managers in SEO announcement returns. Table 9 reports the results of 
multiple regressions of SEO announcement returns. Generally, I apply four 
regressions for each of two subgroups. The first five columns show the results 
of the first subgroup, which implements normal regressions without the 
µDFFHOHUDWH¶DQGµRYHUQLJKW¶GXPP\YDULDEOHV7KLV UHJUHVVLRQPHWKRG LVDOVR
suggested by Jeon and Ligon (2011). The last five columns illustrate the 
results of the second subgroup, which implements regressions with the 
µDFFHOHUDWH¶µRYHUQLJKW¶DQGµ\HDU¶GXPP\YDULDEOHV7KHUDWLRQDOHIRUDGGLQJ
the two dummy variables is the boom in the number of accelerated and 
overnight SEOs after 2000 (especially after 2007) according to Autore (2011).  
 
:LWKLQ HDFK VXEJURXS ILUVW FROXPQ ODEHOOHG µ%HIRUH ¶ LOOXVWUDWHV WKH
results of the regression investigating the effect of CB (commercial bank) 
co-managers globally from 1997 to 2007, while second column, labelled 
µ:KROH¶UHSRUWVWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHVDPHUHJUHVVLRQDVWKHILUVWFROXPQH[FHSW
the date is expanded from 1997 to2011. The third column in each subgroup, 
ODEHOOHGµ6XVS&0&%¶UHYHDOVWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQLQYHVWLJDWLQJKRZ
CB co-managers ZLWK VXVSLFLRXV EHKDYLRXU WKH LVVXHU¶V OHYHUDJH LV KLJK
before issuance and lowered thereafter) in their last deals affect the 
announcement return of recent deals. The HL CMCB subgroup represents how 
the announcement returns of the current SEO deals with highly leveraged 
issuers are affected by the involvement of CB co-PDQDJHUV(DFKVXEJURXS¶V
last column shows the results of the regression investigating how the 
involvement of CB co-managers suspected of self-interest behaviour before 
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and with a conflict of interest currently affects the announcement returns of 
SEOs. 
 
Table 9 also shows the F-test results for second subgroup µRegression with All 
Dummy Variable Added¶. The purpose of F-test is to show whether it is 
appropriate to add the dummy variables named µAccelerated¶, µOvernight¶ and 
µYear Dummy¶. However, F-test shows no significant result. Therefore, the 
analysis of the effects of co-managers on announcement return will only focus 
on the first subgroup whose models are recommended by previous literature. 
 
The meaning of each regression variable has been explained in Section 4.3.2 
and is given for reference in Appendix 2. The coefficient of CB-COM is 
negative in the first column, though insignificant. This result is similar to that 
obtained by Jeon and Ligon (2011) when using the OLS method. When the 
sample period is expanded from 1997 to 2011, the coefficient is similar to that 
in the first column and insignificant too. The coefficient of CMCB_Susp&HL 
in the last column is negative, with a bigger absolute value compared with the 
first column. However, the result is also insignificant. The results in the second 
subgroup are similar to those of the first one. 
 
For the other estimations reported in Table 9, several control variables are 
significantly correlated with announcement returns. NASDAQ-listed firms, 
which may have higher informational asymmetries between issuers and 
investors, tend to have more negative announcement returns. On the other 
hand, shelf-registered issues tend to have less negative announcement returns, 
Chapter 4                       Commercial Bank Co-managers and Flotation Costs of SEOs 
112 
 
perhaps because, by SEC Rule 415, the option is only available to large 
publicly listed firms that have fewer asymmetric information problems. 
Announcement returns are also higher for pure primary offerings. Since pure 
primary offerings usually do not involve management sales of stock, the 
market would react less negatively than to mixed offerings. Meanwhile, higher 
market to book ratio significantly reduce announcement return. Overall, the 
results in Table 9 are consistent with adverse selection hypothesis of Myers 
and Majluf (1984). 
 
To summarize, I find no significant evidence to suggest that syndicate 
structure (specifically, the inclusion of commercial banks as underwriters) 
affects announcement return. 
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Table 9 Analysis of Announcement Returns 
This table presents the results of multiple regressions that test the effect of different co-manager structures on SEO announcement returns, 
defined as the cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day window [-1,1], using the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the 
market. The first five columns report the results of regressions similar to previous literature while the last five columns report the results of 
regressions with all dummy variables implied by recent literature. Definitions of variables are provided in section 4.3.2 as well as Appendix 2. 
Dependent 
variable 
Original Regression Regression With All Dummy Variables Added 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Lead Rank 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.30) (0.56) (0.60) (0.55) (0.54) (0.27) (0.68) (0.73) (0.67) (0.66) 
Multi-Book 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.29) (0.84) (0.81) (0.91) (0.88) (0.18) (0.37) (0.33) (0.42) (0.41) 
Lnasset -0.002 -0.004c -0.004c -0.004c -0.004c -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.91) (-1.92) (-1.92) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-0.62) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.26) (-1.32) 
Volatility -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-1.56) (-1.33) (-1.34) (-1.31) (-1.32) 
Leverage 0.057b 0.062b 0.062b 0.067a 0.063b 0.057b 0.056b 0.055b 0.060b 0.057b 
 
(1.98) (2.54) (2.53) (2.70) (2.56) (1.99) (2.26) (2.25) (2.41) (2.29) 
Lnproceeds 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.22) (1.12) (1.05) (1.09) (1.13) (0.53) (0.38) (0.34) (0.36) (0.38) 
Pure Primary 0.012b 0.009c 0.009c 0.009c 0.009c 0.010b 0.008c 0.008c 0.008 0.008 
 
(2.50) (1.91) (1.91) (1.89) (1.90) (2.13) (1.65) (1.65) (1.64) (1.64) 
NASDAQ -0.011c -0.010c -0.009c -0.010c -0.010c -0.012b -0.010c -0.010c -0.011c -0.010c 
 
(-1.92) (-1.76) (-1.68) (-1.86) (-1.79) (-2.06) (-1.84) (-1.76) (-1.93) (-1.87) 
MBRatio -0.065b -0.065a -0.064a -0.065a -0.065a -0.066b -0.059a -0.059a -0.060a -0.059a 
 
(-2.49) (-2.86) (-2.85) (-2.88) (-2.86) (-2.48) (-2.60) (-2.59) (-2.62) (-2.60) 
Shelf 0.018a 0.023a 0.023a 0.023a 0.023a 0.017a 0.022a 0.022a 0.022a 0.022a 
 
(3.35) (4.59) (4.54) (4.57) (4.60) (2.91) (4.05) (3.98) (4.05) (4.07) 
SOX -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(-0.46) (-0.89) (-1.00) (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.32) 
ACTMAR 0.011b 0.009b 0.008b 0.009b 0.009b 0.014b 0.011c 0.011c 0.011c 0.011c 
 
(2.33) (2.11) (2.03) (2.17) (2.14) (2.38) (1.87) (1.84) (1.90) (1.89) 
Lnanalyst 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.84) (1.33) (1.34) (1.30) (1.32) (0.95) (1.62) (1.62) (1.59) (1.62) 
CB-Lead -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(-0.58) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.77) (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.61) 
CB-COM -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(-0.28) (-0.62) (-0.95) (0.08) (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.90) (-1.23) (-0.28) (-0.75) 
CMCB-Susp 
  
0.005 
    
0.006 
  
   
(0.88) 
    
(0.97) 
  
CMCB-HL 
   
-0.008 
    
-0.007 
 
    
(-1.30) 
    
(-1.13) 
 
CMCB-Susp&HL 
    
-0.004 
    
-0.004 
     
(-0.52) 
    
(-0.49) 
I.Accelerate 
     
-0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
      
(-0.11) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) 
I.Overnight 
     
0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
      
(0.25) (-0.88) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.90) 
Intercept -0.029 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 
 
(-0.75) (-0.56) (-0.55) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.42) 
Ind Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Obs 1373 1718 1718 1718 1718 1373 1718 1718 1718 1718 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.022 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
F test      0.93 1.00 1.01 0.98 1.00 
+ a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.2.2. Discount  
In this section, I examine the effect of co-managers on the SEO discount. 
According to the previous literature, if the primary source of the SEO discount 
is information asymmetry between issuers and investors, suspicion that 
underwriters may act out of self-interest should increase the discount. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that if commercial bank co-managers may reasonably 
be suspected of acting out of self-interest are involved in an SEO as 
underwriters, that should increase information frictions between market 
participants, and thus result in a greater discount. 
 
Table 10 also shows the F-test results for second subgroup µRegression with 
All Dummy Variable Added¶. F-test shows significant results, which suggest it 
is appropriate to add dummy variables named µAccelerate¶, µOvernight¶ and 
µYear Dummy¶. Meanwhile, Adjusted ܴଶ is reported in Table 10. Adjusted ܴଶ is a measure of the explanatory ability of a model. It is clear that Adjusted ܴଶ values of all columns in for the regression with all dummy variables are 
ELJJHUWKDQWKRVHLQWKHµRULJLQDOUHJUHVVLRQ¶ZKLch implies the effectiveness 
of adding the year, accelerated SEO and overnight SEO dummy variables to 
implement the regression. 
 
Table 10 reports the results of the relevant multiple regressions. The columns 
are similar to those in Table 9. The coefficient of CB-COM is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. In other words, the involvement of commercial 
bank co-managers can significantly reduce the SEO discount. This conclusion 
is still holds when the sample period is expanded from 1997 to 2011, and after 
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adding in the three dummy variables (year, accelerate and overnight) to the 
regression. This result is also supported by Jeon and Ligon (2011). 
 
In contrast, the third column of second subgroup shows that the involvement 
of commercial bank co-managers can raise discount if the last deal implies a 
conflict of interest. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
Similarly, the fourth column of second subgroup shows a positive insignificant 
relationship between discount and commercial bank co-managers if the 
LVVXHU¶VOHYHUDJHLVKLJKHUWKDQWKHLQGXVWU\DYHUDJHEHIRUHWKHLVVXH7KHILIWK
column of the second subgroup reports a positive relationship between 
discount and commercial bank co-managers, which is significant at the 5% 
level if the commercial bank co-managers show a conflict of interest in their 
last deal and if there is an indication of self-interest in the current deal. To 
summarize, commercial bank co-managers may increase SEO discount if the 
co-managers have revealed their conflict of interest in previous deals and have 
the motivation of self-interest in current deal. 
 
4.4.2.3. Underwriting Spread 
Announcement return and discount are normally treated as indirect flotation 
costs, while underwriting spread is considered a direct flotation cost. 
Underwriting spread is the compensation paid to underwriters as a percentage 
of gross proceeds. Underwriting spreads are higher when stock return 
volatility is greater, firm size is smaller, and less reputable banks are involved 
in the underwriting. In short, greater uncertainty and information asymmetry 
are associated with higher underwriting spread. Moreover, underwriting 
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spreads are also greater for issues that need more underwriting services. Thus, 
I hypothesize that a commercial bank co-manager will ask for more 
underwriting spread if it has revealed its conflict of interest in its last deal and 
has some motivation to act out of self-interest. 
 
Table 11 reports results of the relevant multiple regressions and in all respects 
is similar to Table 9 and Table 10. All F-test results in the second subgroup are 
significant, denoting the safety to add the dummy variables called 
µAccelerated¶, µOvernight¶ as well as µYear Dummy¶. All adjusted ܴଶ values 
in the second subgroup are bigger than those in the first subgroup, which 
indicates that the explanatory power of the model is better after the three 
dummy variables are added in. In contrast to Jeon and Ligon (2011), the 
coefficient of CB-COM is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
implying commercial bank co-managers increase the gross spread. Given that 
the coefficients of all the other variables have signs expected from the 
previous literature while volatility in Jeon and Ligon (2011)¶VVWXG\LV negative, 
my result may be more convincing. Moreover, though Narayanan et al. (2004) 
also report a negative relationship between gross spread and the involvement 
of commercial bank co-managers, they exclude the variables Lnasset and 
Lnproceeds. In an unreported test, I duplicate their method and get a negative 
coefficient, though the adjusted ܴଶ is reduced to around 0.4. Therefore, I 
think Lnasset and Lnproceeds are necessary in tests of underwriting spread 
and my result may be more rational.  
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Table 10 Analysis of Discount 
This table presents the results of multiple regressions that test the effect of different co-manager structures on SEO discount, defined as the return 
from the offer price to the pre-offer close price. The labels as well as their meanings are the same as in Table 9. The estimated model is OLS model 
and definitions of variables are provided in section 4.3.2 as well as Appendix 2. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Original Regression Regression with All Dummy Variables Added 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Lead Rank -0.003c -0.006a -0.005b -0.006a -0.005a -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-1.74) (-2.72) (-2.55) (-2.72) (-2.68) (-1.59) (-1.48) (-1.40) (-1.47) (-1.39) 
Multi-Book -0.005c -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-1.92) (-1.15) (-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.29) (-1.25) (-0.69) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.94) 
Lnasset -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003a -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-1.27) (1.16) (1.11) (1.11) (1.08) (-2.81) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.60) (-1.62) 
Volatility 0.013a 0.021a 0.021a 0.021a 0.021a 0.012a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 
 
(5.09) (8.53) (8.44) (8.53) (8.52) (4.43) (6.44) (6.42) (6.40) (6.43) 
Leverage 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.02) (0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (-0.11) (-0.03) 
Lnproceeds -0.008a -0.010a -0.010a -0.010a -0.010a -0.006a -0.006a -0.006a -0.006a -0.006a 
 (-6.26) (-7.52) (-7.19) (-7.51) (-7.58) (-4.52) (-4.46) (-4.32) (-4.45) (-4.54) 
Pure Primary 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.88) (1.18) (1.12) (1.19) (1.18) (0.91) (1.07) (1.05) (1.08) (1.05) 
NASDAQ -0.004c -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005c -0.004c -0.004c -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-1.67) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.19) (-1.09) (-1.91) (-1.71) (-1.70) (-1.58) (-1.47) 
MBRatio 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(1.54) (0.74) (0.74) (0.72) (0.72) (1.38) (0.82) (0.82) (0.78) (0.79) 
Shelf 0.009a 0.012a 0.012a 0.012a 0.012a 0.004c 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(3.78) (4.99) (5.00) (4.97) (4.95) (1.81) (0.46) (0.50) (0.41) (0.32) 
Integer 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 
 (7.53) (7.30) (7.29) (7.31) (7.32) (7.69) (7.66) (7.65) (7.71) (7.71) 
SOX 0.003 0.011a 0.011a 0.011a 0.011a 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 
(1.37) (4.86) (4.90) (4.88) (4.71) (1.14) (0.92) (0.93) (0.93) (0.79) 
ACTMAR -0.006a 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.005c -0.005b -0.005c -0.005b -0.005b 
 
(-2.87) (0.87) (1.08) (0.83) (0.66) (-1.92) (-1.99) (-1.93) (-2.04) (-2.11) 
Lnanalyst -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.004a -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a -0.005a 
 (-2.48) (-2.24) (-2.28) (-2.21) (-2.23) (-3.31) (-4.07) (-4.08) (-4.01) (-4.07) 
CB-Lead 0.003c 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(1.88) (1.00) (1.09) (0.99) (1.00) (1.46) (0.57) (0.61) (0.52) (0.52) 
CB-COM -0.006a -0.008a -0.008a -0.009a -0.009a -0.003c -0.003c -0.003c -0.005b -0.005b 
 
(-3.08) (-4.21) (-4.30) (-3.97) (-4.53) (-1.79) (-1.70) (-1.76) (-2.24) (-2.38) 
CMCB-Susp 
  
-0.004b 
    
-0.002 
  
   
(-2.34) 
    
(-1.09) 
  
CMCB-HL 
   
0.002 
    
0.004 
 
    
(0.63) 
    
(1.56) 
 
CMCB-Susp&HL 
    
0.006c 
    
0.010a 
     
(1.82) 
    
(2.97) 
I.Accelerate 
     
0.001 -0.010b -0.010b -0.010b -0.011b 
      
(0.12) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.35) 
I.Overnight 
     
0.019b 0.040a 0.040a 0.040a 0.041a 
      
(2.54) (8.61) (8.46) (8.63) (8.74) 
Intercept 0.060a 0.046b 0.047b 0.046b 0.046b 0.054a 0.056a 0.056a 0.056a 0.056a 
 
(3.46) (2.35) (2.39) (2.35) (2.36) (2.77) (2.61) (2.63) (2.62) (2.64) 
Ind Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Obs 1564 1958 1958 1958 1958 1564 1958 1958 1958 1958 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.188 0.197 0.199 0.197 0.198 0.211 0.280 0.280 0.281 0.283 
F test      4.80 14.69 14.41 14.83 14.77 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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The coefficient of CMCB-Susp is similar to that for CB-COM and is also 
significant at the 1% level. This result implies that the behaviour of a 
commercial bank co-manager in its last deal does not influence its effect as a 
µQRUPDO¶ FRPPHUFLDO EDQN FR-manager in SEO underwriting. However, the 
coefficients of CMCB-HL and CMCB-Susp&HL are obviously bigger than 
that of CB-COM, suggesting commercial banks do charge the issuer more if 
WKHLVVXHU¶VOHYHUDJHLVKLJKHUWKDQWKHLQGXVWU\DYHUDJH 
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Table 11 Analysis of Underwriting Spread 
This table presents the results of multiple regressions that test the effect of different co-manager structures on SEO underwriting spread, defined 
as the compensation paid to underwriters as a percentage of gross proceeds. The labels as well as their meanings are the same as those in Table 
9. The estimated model is an OLS model and definitions of variables are given in section 4.3.2 as well as in Appendix 2. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Original Regression Regression with All Dummy Variables Added 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Before 
2008 Whole 
Susp 
CMCB 
HL 
CMCB 
Susp&HL 
CMCB 
Lead Rank -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.78) (-0.02) (-0.36) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.88) (-0.88) (-1.08) (-0.88) (-0.81) 
Multi-Book 0.003a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a 0.002a 0.002a 0.002a 0.002a 0.002a 
 
(5.30) (6.97) (7.06) (6.75) (6.74) (3.60) (4.58) (4.72) (4.36) (4.33) 
Lnasset -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.003a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a 
  (-10.67) (-11.76) (-11.74) (-12.07) (-11.89) (-8.82) (-10.10) (-10.11) (-10.42) (-10.23) 
Volatility -0.000 0.016c 0.019b 0.017b 0.016c 0.018 0.024a 0.025a 0.023b 0.024a 
  (-0.03) (1.86) (2.17) (1.97) (1.90) (1.48) (2.61) (2.74) (2.57) (2.64) 
Leverage 0.003c 0.004b 0.004b 0.003 0.003b 0.002 0.004b 0.004b 0.003c 0.003b 
  (1.87) (2.19) (2.21) (1.57) (2.03) (1.47) (2.30) (2.32) (1.70) (2.14) 
Lnproceeds -0.003a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a -0.004a 
  (-10.05) (-12.20) (-12.73) (-12.18) (-12.31) (-13.46) (-14.45) (-14.69) (-14.43) (-14.52) 
Pure Primary 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.68) (0.75) (0.87) (0.82) (0.74) (0.64) (0.86) (0.92) (0.89) (0.83) 
NASDAQ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.11) (-0.09) (-0.06) (0.26) (0.19) (0.47) (0.36) (0.36) (0.69) (0.62) 
MBRatio -0.003c -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.002 -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b -0.003b 
  (-1.89) (-2.12) (-2.15) (-2.23) (-2.16) (-1.43) (-2.10) (-2.13) (-2.22) (-2.14) 
Shelf -0.003a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-4.37) (-4.66) (-4.73) (-4.72) (-4.74) (1.46) (0.58) (0.45) (0.47) (0.43) 
SOX -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.22) (0.12) (0.06) (0.19) (-0.11) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.16) 
ACTMAR -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (-0.20) (0.36) (-0.06) (0.16) (0.02) (1.45) (1.54) (1.41) (1.40) (1.42) 
Lnanalyst -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a -0.002a -0.002a -0.001a -0.002a 
  (-6.76) (-6.69) (-6.69) (-6.58) (-6.71) (-5.31) (-5.66) (-5.68) (-5.58) (-5.68) 
CB-Lead 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.29) (0.47) (0.29) (0.42) (0.48) (0.34) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.12) 
CB-COM 0.003a 0.004a 0.004a 0.003a 0.004a 0.001a 0.002a 0.002a 0.001a 0.002a 
  (7.73) (9.39) (9.68) (6.21) (8.35) (3.20) (5.34) (5.54) (2.86) (4.49) 
CMCB-Susp 
  
0.002a 
    
0.001a 
  
  
  
(4.62) 
    
(2.84) 
  
CMCB-HL 
   
0.003a 
    
0.002a 
 
  
   
(4.11) 
    
(3.97) 
 
CMCB-Susp&HL 
    
0.002a 
    
0.002a 
  
    
(3.09) 
    
(2.95) 
I.Accelerate 
     
-0.004a -0.002c -0.002b -0.002c -0.002b 
  
     
(-2.65) (-1.94) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-2.00) 
I.Overnight 
     
-0.011a -0.009a -0.008a -0.009a -0.009a 
  
     
(-6.15) (-8.37) (-8.09) (-8.35) (-8.26) 
Intercept 0.085a 0.085a 0.084a 0.085a 0.085a 0.084a 0.089a 0.089a 0.089a 0.089a 
  (20.45) (20.26) (20.29) (20.33) (20.31) (22.26) (19.63) (19.61) (19.74) (19.69) 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Obs 1513 1876 1876 1876 1876 1513 1876 1876 1876 1876 
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.502 0.487 0.493 0.492 0.490 0.606 0.554 0.556 0.558 0.556 
F test      33.22 18.04 17.10 17.96 17.04 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
According to most current empirical studies, it is well accepted that 
commercial bank co-managers can benefit issuers by lowering flotation costs  
(e.g. Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Narayanan et al., 2004; Drucker and Puri, 2005). 
This phenomenon is attributed to the fact that commercial bank underwriters 
can better certificate an SEO than investment bank underwriters. However, 
finding benefits to allowing commercial banks to engage in underwriting is not 
the same thing as finding no conflict of interest. Current empirical studies 
cannot reject the possibility of such a conflict of interest. My study fills this 
gap by investigating the effect of commercial bank co-managers on the 
flotation costs of SEOs in specific conditions where the commercial bank can 
be perceived by the market to have act out of self-interest. In such 
circumstances, I find evidence that commercial banks increase the discount 
and the gross spread rather than reduce them. In other words, commercial bank 
co-managers do not always benefit SEO issuers by lowering flotation costs. 
My finding can also be treated as implying that a conflict of interest does exist.  
 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the findings empirically 
support the concern that commercial bank underwriters may have a conflict of 
interest. Note that the specific circumstance of my study is highly related to 
WKH LVVXHU¶V GHJUHH RI OHYHUDJH DQG EDQNUXSWF\ ULVN WKLV LV LQ OLQH ZLWK WKH
concern that a conflict of interest can arise where banks may require a firm 
that represents a poor±quality loan to issue equity in order WRUHGXFHWKHEDQN¶V
exposure to default risk. Second, the result helps establish a better 
understanding regarding the effect of commercial bank co-managers on SEO 
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flotation costs. Previous studies did not consider that the effects of commercial 
bank underwriters on SEO floatation costs may vary in the different situation, 
whereas I investigate the effect further by setting more specific tests and find 
different results from previous studies. 
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Chapter 5: Underwriter±,QYHVWRU5HODWLRQVKLSVDQG,QYHVWRUV¶
Participation in Equity Offerings 
This chapter reports an empirical study on the effects of the underwriter±
investor relationship on the decision of potential investors on whether or not to 
participate in an SEO. The structure of the chapter is as follows: firstly, the 
conceptual framework and the hypothesis will be proposed; secondly, sample 
selection as well as control variable identification will be briefly introduced; 
thirdly, the descriptive statistics will be shown; then, regressions will be 
implemented and analysis will be presented; and finally, conclusions will be 
drawn.  
 
5.1. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Building 
Huang and Zhang (2011) consider the underwriter±investor relationship to be 
a component of the marketing efforts of underwriters. They also show that that 
relationship does have an influence on the participation decision of investors, 
via a sample of traditional book-built SEOs. However, according to Huang et 
al. (2008), investment banks develop relationships with investors through 
repeat business in securities offerings, brokerage services and analyst research. 
In other words, the underwriter±investor relationship cannot be simply treated 
as a marketing component, as it would exist even in the absence of marketing 
activity. Moreover, in reality, there is a firewall between the ECM (Equity 
Capital Market, normally carrying out marketing activities such as road shows) 
and the Trading/Sales departments of the bank. Therefore, the underwriter±
investor relationship should, in principle at least, be separate from any 
marketing efforts, though there is an overlap between them. 
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Given that the underwriter±investor relationship is not only derived from 
marketing activities but also from the repeat dealings in the process of 
securities offerings, it is natural to hypothesize that the relationship influences 
the decision of investors to participate not only in traditional book-built SEOs 
but also in accelerated SEOs, which have been booming during recent years 
and for which less marketing is done. Additionally, as many underwriter and 
investors deal with both IPOs and SEOs, the relationships built during IPOs 
should also be effective in SEOs, and vice versa. 
 
Another question needing careful consideration is whether the relationships 
built by co-managers are as effective as those built by lead managers. Binay et 
al. (2007) focus on the role of underwriter±investor relationships in the IPO 
process but consider only the relationships built by lead managers through 
previous IPO deals, on the grounds that lead managers are the most important 
in the allocation decisions. However, Jeon and Ligon (2011) point out that 
though lead managers manage the overall process of share offerings, 
co-managers are also responsible for share allocations, revise offer prices 
according to information and provide after-market services. Huang and Zhang 
(2011) also insist on the importance of co-managers in SEOs and suggest that 
they are useful in attracting different investors and providing after-market 
services. Therefore, the present study considers not only the relationships built 
by lead managers but also the relationships built by co-managers. 
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To summarize, I set up the following hypothesis: 
The existence of a previously established underwriter±investor relationship 
will increase the willingness of potential investors to participate in public 
equity offerings underwritten by that underwriter; the relationships built by 
lead managers or co-managers are both effective. 
 
5.2. Sample Selection and Variable Identification 
5.2.1. Basic Data for Deals 
For the study in this chapter, I identify equity deals in the Thomson One 
database. The sample includes IPOs and SEOs for US common stocks during 
the period 1990±2011. Market prices of shares are from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). To be consistent with previous literature 
as well as with the empirical study reported in Chapter 4, I exclude following 
deals: 
(1) issues by non-US firms, REITs and limited partnerships (CRSP share code 
40 or greater), 
(2) issues by firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, 
(3) issues with offer prices less than $3 or greater than $400, 
(4) issues where price and financial data are not available in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT, 
(5) units (CRSP share code 70 or greater), ADRs (the first digit of CRSP share 
code 3) and rights offerings, and  
(6) pure secondary offers. 
Different from the study reported in Chapter 4, the study reported in this 
chapter does include deals issued by financial firms (one-digit SIC code 6), 
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which follows Huang and Zhang (2011).  
 
From the Thomson One database I obtain issue-specific data such as the offer 
date, total proceeds, offer price and the syndicate composition for my common 
equity sample. The market prices of shares as well as SIC codes are from the 
CRSP daily files. The accounting information of issuers is taken from 
Compustat annual files. 
 
Under the 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, all 
institutional investors are required to file quarterly 13F reports to the SEC 
highlighting equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market 
value as of the last date for each quarter if they manage a portfolio with an 
investment value equal to or above $100 million. For each equity deal in my 
sample, I obtain the end-of-quarter shareholdings for each institutional 
investor from the CDA Spectrum 13F Filing database. 
 
5.2.2. Identification of Variables  
To implement this study, the identification of variables needs careful 
consideration. This section sets out the method used to measure underwriter±
investor relationship first and thereafter the other variables are described. 
 
5.2.2.1. Variables Related to the Underwriter±Investor Relationship 
Although some theoretical studies focus on the effects of the underwriter±
investor relationship on equity offerings, few empirical studies look at this 
topic. The reason, perhaps, is the difficulty in building a practical method to 
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measure these relationships (Huang et al., 2008; Binay et al., 2007). In the 
literature, there are two methods, proposed by Binay et al. (2007) and Huang 
and Zhang (2011). 
 
Binay et al. (2007) EXLOG D µUHODWLRQVKLSSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶PHDVXUH WKDW LQGLFDWHV
the propensity of institutional investors to participate in an IPO conditional on 
their involvement in past IPOs by the same lead underwriter. The measure of 
relationship participation for each IPO is the difference between the 
probability of institutional participation conditional on past participation and 
the unconditional probability of institutional participation (expressed as a 
percentage). An investor is defined as participating in an IPO if the number of 
shares of the stock owned by that investor increases from the quarter 
immediately prior to the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO. They 
express their measure as follows: 
 ܴ௜ ൌ ሺ݊௜ோܰோ െ ݊௜ܰሻ ൈ  ? ? ?
 
Here, the unconditional probability of institutional IPO participation, ቀ௡೔ೃேೃ ቁǡ is 
the number of institutions participating in IPO i, ( ݊௜ ), divided by all 
institutions present at the time of the IPO, (N). Institutions that have never 
participated in an IPO are excluded from the analysis. The probability of 
institutional participation in IPO i conditional on past relationships (௡೔ೃேೃ ) is 
constructed as follows. First, for every IPO and for every institution with a 
13F filing at the end of the issuing quarter, they find whether the institution 
Chapter 5   The Underwriter Winvestor Relationships and Investor Participation in Equity Offerings 
127 
 
has participated in any of the past 10 IPOs underwritten by the same lead bank 
within five years of the current IPO. If the lead bank has managed fewer than 
10 IPO deals within the past five years, then they use all available past IPO 
deals. They calculate the conditional probability of participation as the number 
of institutions participating in the IPO that also have past IPO participation 
with the same underwriter, (݊௜ோ), divided by the number of all institutions 
present at the time of the IPO that have past IPO participation with the same 
lead underwriter, (ܰோ). 
 
On the other hand, Huang and Zhang (2011) propose four variables, namely ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ , ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ , ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ , and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , to capture the 
underwriter±investor relationship. ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of SEOs that 
DQµHOLJLEOHLQYHVWRU¶SDUWLFLSDWHGLQLQWKH\HDUVSrior to the current SEO that 
ZHUHXQGHUZULWWHQE\DWOHDVWRIWKHFXUUHQW6(2¶VOHDGXQGHUZULWHUV7KHVHW
of eligible investors comprises all investors that participated in at least 0.5% of 
all SEOs during the year of the current SEO and that participated in at least 10 
SEOs during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. This variable captures the 
influence of the lead underwriter(s) on investor participation. The second 
relationship variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ, is the proportion of SEOs that the eligible 
investor participated in in the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were 
XQGHUZULWWHQ E\ DW OHDVW  RI WKH FXUUHQW 6(2¶V FR-managers. This variable 
captures the influence of the co-manager(s) on investor participation.  
 
To examine whether the likelihood of participation increases if an eligible 
investor has relationships with multiple underwriters of an SEO, Huang and 
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Zhang (2011) replace the relationship variables measured by the actual 
proportions with 2 dummy variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ . ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ HTXDOVLIWKHHOLJLEOHLQYHVWRULVDµUHODWLRQVKLSLQYHVWRU¶RIDW
least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ equals 1 if the 
eligible investoU LV D µUHODWLRQVKLS LQYHVWRU¶ RI DW OHDVW  FR-manager, and 0 
RWKHUZLVH$QLQYHVWRULVYLHZHGDVDµUHODWLRQVKLSLQYHVWRU¶RIDEDQNLI WKDW
investor participated in at least 10 deals for which the bank was a lead or 
co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. 
 
Compared with the measure derived by Huang and Zhang (2011), the measure 
implemented by Binay et al. (2007) is better at capturing the probability of 
participation for a given group of investors, but it ignores the influence of 
underwriter±LQYHVWRU UHODWLRQVKLSV RQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO LQYHVWRU¶V GHFLVLRQ WR
participate. Given that the purpose of my study is to shed light on the influence 
of the underwriter(s) on every single investor, my research mainly employs the 
measure proposed by Huang and Zhang (2011). 
 
My study also proposes a method to reduce the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions in the investment banking industry. Binay et al. (2007) recognize 
that these will affect the accuracy of identifying underwriter±investor 
relationships. However, they choose to ignore this because it is not a big 
problem in the sample period of their study, since few influential deals 
occurred. However, my study covers some of the period since the 2008 
financial crisis, when several giant companies merged or were acquired. 
Therefore, I do consider this problem in my research. The details will be set 
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out in Section 5.2.3.  
 
5.2.2.2. Descriptions of Other Variables 
The other variables that are employed in my research are as follows: ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs in which the 
investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO; it is used to control 
for how active the investor has been in the IPO sample; 
 ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of SEOs in which the 
investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO; it is used to 
control for how active the investor has been in the SEO sample; 
 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs and SEOs in 
which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current offering; it is 
used to control for how active the investor has been in the IPO and SEO 
sample; 
 ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ  is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of the same 
LVVXHU¶V6(2VSDUWLFLSDWHGLQE\WKHLQYHVWRULQWKH\HDUVSULRUWRWKHFXUUHQW
SEO; it is used to control for the issuer±investor relationship; 
 ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ is the logged pre-issue market capitalization (in constant 2004 
$millions), measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the market close before the offer;  
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ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ is the number of shares offered over the total number of shares 
outstanding before the offer, measured in decimals;  
 ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ is the logarithm of the closing price on the day before the offer;  
 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer is listed on the 
NYSE or AMEX, and 0 otherwise;  
 ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ is the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 
trading days ending 11 days before the offer, measured in decimals;  
 ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ is the most recent institutional ownership before 
the offer, measured in decimals; 
 ܫ݊ݏݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ሺ ?ሻ is the most recent institutional ownership before the offer, 
measured E\ WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI WKH 6(2 ILUP¶V HTXLW\ WKDW LV KHOG E\
institutional investors; 
 ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ is the logarithm of the number of shares issued in the current IPO; 
 ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm received financing from 
venture capitalists prior to the IPO (as defined by the SDC), and 0 otherwise; 
 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ equals the logarithm of (1 +) the number of years since the firm 
was founded, measured at the time of the IPO; I use the Field-Ritter data set of 
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founding dates; 
 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ is the absolute value of the percentage change between the 
offer price and the middle of the range of prices in the prospectus; 
 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ, ݄ܶ݁ܿ, and ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ are dummy variables that equal 1 for issuing 
firms that are utility, tech, or biotech firms, respectively, and 0 otherwise;  
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ is WKHUHWXUQIURPWKHRIIHUSULFHWRWKHRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFH
multiplied by 100; 
 ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the SEO is an accelerated 
offer; 
 ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of the same 
LVVXHU¶VGHDOVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQE\WKHLQYHVWRULQWKH\HDUVSULRUWR the current 
deal; it is used to control for the issuer±investor relationship. 
 
5.2.3. Identification of Changes among Underwriters 
Mergers and acquisitions between investment banks present a challenge for 
research on underwriter±investor relationships. Binay et al. (2007) choose to 
ignore this problem because they suggest that a merger or an acquisition 
becomes less and less relevant over time, as the new entity underwrites more 
deals. Furthermore, for their sample period, from 1980 to 2000, few large 
investment banks merged. However, considering my research includes the 
period after the 2008 financial crisis, when several big names in investment 
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banking merged or were acquired, it is necessary to take the changes among 
underwriters into account. 
 
According to Huang et al. (2008), investment banking is a relationship-based 
rather than transaction-based business. Moreover, considering those 
investment banks that merged or were acquired had few tangible assets left 
after the financial crisis, their intangible assets ± such as underwriter±investor 
relationships ± are likely to have been a large part of the reason for their 
DFTXLVLWLRQ )RU H[DPSOH %DUFOD\V DJUHHG WR EX\ /HKPDQ %URWKHUV¶ 1RUWK
American investment banking and capital markets business on Sep 17, 2008. 
Thereafter, Barclays became a top-10 player among global investment banks. 
2EYLRXVO\ %DUFOD\V EHQHILWV IURP WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI /HKPDQ %URWKHUV¶
investment banking business. Therefore, I assume that the business 
relationships established before a merger or acquisition are passed on intact to 
the merged new entities. 
 
As set out in the previous section, the underwriter±investor network is here 
quantified in terms of the number of times an investor participated in the 
XQGHUZULWHU¶VSUHYLRXVGHDOV,DVVXPHWKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEXLOWE\WKHWDUJHt 
banks are absorbed and available for acquirers after the mergers or 
acquisitions happen. Take Lehman Brothers and Barclays for example: before 
Sep 17, 2008, the related investors are identified separately for Lehman 
Brothers and Barclays when an equity offering including at least one of them 
as underwriter happened. After Sep 17, 2008, the related investors of Lehman 
Brothers are automatically transferred to the related investors of Barclays. 
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Given that the networks of relatively small investment banks are not likely to 
be large, my research takes account only of mergers and acquisitions between 
investment banks ranked more than 7 in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rank. 
Then, I list the history of these banks, both mergers and acquirers, as well as 
the timing of those mergers and acquisitions. Finally, when doing the statistics, 
the target-related deals are switched to acquirer-related ones and the 
target-related investors are treated as acquirer-related ones after the merger or 
acquisition. 
 
5.2.4. Data Correction and Adjustment for the CDA Spectrum 13F Filing 
Database 
The CDA Spectrum 13F Filing database is employed to identify the 
participation of an institutional investor in an offering by checking the change 
of the shareholdings of the quarters immediately prior to and immediately after 
that of the offering. Though most of the data in the CDA Spectrum 13F Filing 
database are accurate, sometimes they suffer the problems of systematic or 
non-systematic missing values. 
 
The following is an example of the structure of the CDA Spectrum 13F Filing 
database: 
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mgrname mgrno rdate cusip shares change 
A xxxx 31Mar2011 ******** N1 C1 
A xxxx 30Jun2011 ******** N2 C2 
A xxxx 30Sep2011 ******** N3 C3 
A xxxx 31Dec2011 ******** N4 C4 
 
Here, mgrname represents the name of the institutional investor (in the 
example it is A); mgrno is the standard code for the institutional investor (in 
the example it is xxxx); rdate is the report date, which is normally the end of a 
quarter; cusip is the CUSIP (in the example it is ********) of the company 
whose shares are held by the institutional investors; shares represents the 
shares of the companies (identified by cusip) held by the institutional investor; 
change represents the changes of shareholdings from last report date to the 
current report date and is calculated by current shareholdings minus previous 
shareholdings. 
 
However, the structure of the CDA Spectrum 13F Filing database is not always 
so clear. A common problem is when data are missing between two 
non-consecutive quarters, as in the following: 
mgrname mgrno rdate cusip shares change 
A xxxx 31Mar2011 ******** N1 C1 
A xxxx 31Dec2011 ******** N4 C4 
 
According to my analysis of the whole database, there are three principal 
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reasons for data missing between two non-consecutive quarters: 
1) The shareholding (N4) of the latter quarter (Quarter 4, 2011) is equal to the 
share change (C4) of that quarter (Quarter 4, 2011). In this situation, the 
shareholding decreases to zero after the former month (Quarter 1, 2011). 
This is the most reasonable explanation because the CDA Spectrum 13F 
Filing database does not record non-shareholding, and shareholding equal 
to the share change also proves non-shareholding in the quarter (Quarter 3, 
2011) immediately before the latter quarter (Quarter 4, 2011). This 
problem is systematic. Therefore, I identify the shareholdings for the 
missing quarters as zero. 
 
Figure 4 provides a specific example to explain how I deal with this 
situation. For the observations with mgrno (variable name, identifies 
unique investor) equal to ³16210´ and cusip (variable name, identifies 
unique company which is invested) equal to ³00234610´, there is some 
information missing between ³30sep2010´ and ³30jun2011´. Considering 
the value of ³shares´ equal to that of ³change´ on ³30jun2011´, the value 
of ³shares´ during the gab observations is set to 0. Then, the values of 
³change´ could be calculated as ³-18765´ and ³0´ respectively. 
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Figure 4 Specific Example for Data Correction 
2) The shareholding (N4) of the latter quarter (Quarter 4, 2011) over the 
shareholding (N1) of the latter quarter (Quarter 1, 2011) equals the share 
change (C4) of the latter quarter (Quarter 4, 2011). In this case, I would 
consider the shareholdings for the missing quarters are equal to the 
shareholding of the former quarter (Quarter 1, 2011) because the 
unchanged difference between two recorded quarters suggests the 
shareholdings of the missing quarters remain the same as that of the former 
quarter. Therefore, the problem results from a non-systematic mistake. 
 
Such situation is shown by the observations with mgrno (variable name, 
identifies unique investor) equal to ³12297´ and cusip (variable name, 
identifies unique company which is invested) equal to ³005070V10´ in 
Figure 4. The information gap is between ³31mar2012´ and ³31dec2012´. 
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On March 31st, 2012, the value of ³shares´ is ³170743´. On December 
31st, 2012, the value of ³shares´ is ³87258´ and the value of ³change´ is 
³-83485´. Obviously, latter ³change´ is equal to latter ³shares´ over 
former ³shares´. Therefore, the values of ³shares´ in the gap are set to 
³170743´ and the value of ³change´ in the gap could easily be calculated 
as ³0´. 
3) When neither of the above two reasons apply, the shareholdings of the 
missing quarters are labelled missing except for the quarter immediately 
prior to the latter recorded quarter (Quarter 4, 2011) because the 
shareholding can be calculated by the shareholding of the latter recorded 
quarter minus the change. 
 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 12 presents the means and medians for the firm and offer characteristics 
of the 3413 IPOs in my final sample, sorted by year. It is obvious that the IPOs 
are very popular before 2001, peaking at 588 in 1996. The number of IPOs 
decreases sharply from 2001 to 2003 with fewer than 70 deals for each year. 
Then, the number of IPOs recovers to 178 in 2004 and stays around 150 per 
year during 2005 to 2007. However, there is then another drop of the number 
of IPOs, with only 25 in 2008. Thereafter, the number of IPOs stays at a low 
level, with no more than 100 deals from 2009 to 2011.  
 
The average underpricing, which is defined as 100 times the return from the 
RIIHUSULFHWRWKHRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHLV)URPWRWKH
average underpricing is around 20%. Underpricing reaches its peak at 73.66% 
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in 1999 and drops slightly to 57.89% in 2000. However, paralleling the 
dramatic decrease in the number of IPOs, underpricing decreases to 14.12% in 
2001. It then oscillates around 10% from 2002 to 2007. Finally, average 
underpricing from 2008 to 2011 decreases to less than 10%. 
 
The average number of shares offered per IPO is 7.04 million. During 1995±
1999, around 5 million shares were offered per IPO. Then, the number 
increases to 8.81 million in 2000 and stays around 10 million from 2001 to 
2007. The number of shares offered per IPO reaches its peak at 26.89 million 
in 2008. The number of shares offered per IPO then drops to 16.82 million, 
10.62 million and 11.89 million respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
 
VC-Backed IPOs is the percentage of firms that received financing from 
venture capitalists before the IPO over all the IPO issuers. This variable 
fluctuates around 50% from 1995 to 2011, with a peak of 68.98% in 2000. 
Firm Age (years) is the number of years (at the time of IPO) since the firm was 
founded. The average firm age is 12.51 years. However, during the 1999±2000 
internet bubble, average firm age is only 9.11 years. In 2005 and 2006, IPOs 
ZHUH QRUPDOO\ WULJJHUHG E\ µROGHU¶ ILUPV ZLWKPRUH WKDQ 15 years since the 
establishment. 
 
Price update is the absolute value of the percentage change between the middle 
of the range of prices in the initial registration statement and the offer price. 
According to Lowry et al. (2010), the price update can reflect the uncertainty 
of issuers. Firms presenting higher price updates normally have higher 
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uncertainty. The average price update fluctuates around 10% every year with 
little variation. 
 
Aver. Proceeds is the average proceeds of an IPO. Table 12 shows that the 
average proceeds of an IPO are normally between $100 miillion and $200 
million after 1999, although with two exceptions, in 2000 and 2001. In 2001, 
the average proceeds of an IPO was $237.68 million. The average proceeds of 
an IPO increased dramatically to $789.61 million in 2008, which suggests the 
popularity of giant IPOs during the 2008 financial crisis. I also investigate the 
total proceeds of IPOs each year. This total was bigger before 2001 and the 
IPOs market was less active thereafter. 
 
Table 13 reports the means and medians for the firm and offer characteristics 
of the 4953 SEOs in my final sample, sorted by year. NO. of SEOs is the 
number of SEOs each year. Before 1998, there are more than 400 SEOs per 
year. The number of deals then drops to less than 300 per year. The number of 
SEOs fluctuates between 200 and 300 from 1999 to 2007. Unlike the IPOs, the 
number of SEOs drops dramatically, to 157 in 2008. In 2009, the number of 
SEOs recovered to 384, but thereafter fell again, to 272 in 2010 and 177 in 
2011. 
 
The average underpricing of SEOs is 3.57%, which is similar to previous 
reports (e.g. Corwin, 2003). Obviously, the underpricing of SEOs is larger than 
that of IPOs. The underpricing of SEOs reaches its peak at 4.48% in 2000. The 
lowest value occurs in 2004, with 2.85%.  
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InstHolding (%) is the most recent institutional ownership before the offer. 
Before 2001, the institutional ownership generally varies between 35% and 40% 
but then increases sharply to 64.19% in 2001. After 2001, the average 
institutional ownership before the SEO is mostly no less than 50% and it reach 
67.18% in 2008. 
 
Volatility is calculated as the square root of 252 times the standard deviation of 
daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days before the 
offer. The average volatility of stock return before the offer is 0.59. The 
volatility was higher during internet bubble (1999±2000) and financial crisis 
(2008±2009). From 2002 to 2007, the volatility is lower and relatively stable, 
at no more than 0.5 per year. 
 
Relative Size (%) is the number of shares offered over the total number of 
shares outstanding before the offer. The average relative size is 21.40%. In 
general, the relative size is larger before 1999, reaching 29.84% in 1996. The 
lowest relative size occurs in 2000, at only 14.86%.  
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Table 12 Summary Statistics for IPOs 
Table 12 reports the statistics for IPO issuers and offer characteristics of IPOs by year. No. of IPOs is the number of IPOs. Underpricing (%) is defined as the return from 
WKHRIIHUSULFHWRRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHPXOWLSOLHGE\,IWKHRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHLVQRWDYDLODEOHWKHFORVLQg price of the day following offer day is employed. 
Shares Offered (millions) is the number of shares offered (in millions) in the IPO. VC-Backed IPOs (%) is the percentage of firms received financing from venture 
capitalists before IPOs over all IPO firms. Firm Age (years) is the number of years since the firm founded at the time of IPO. Price Update (percentage) is the absolute 
value of the percentage change between the middle of the range of prices in the initial registration statement and the offer price. Aver. Proceeds (millions of dollars) is 
the average proceeds for an IPO. Total Proceeds (billions of dollars) is the total proceeds (in constant 2004 $millions) of all the IPOs. 
Year No. of IPOs Underpricing (%) 
Shares Offered 
(millions) 
VC-Backed 
IPOs (%) Firm Age (years) 
Price Update 
(decimal) 
Aver. Proceeds 
(millions 
of dollars) 
Total Proceeds 
(billions 
of dollars) 
1995 376 21.02 4.21 46.54 13.76 0.11 79.25 29.80 
1996 588 15.03 3.87 41.50 11.84 0.10 69.91 41.11 
1997 409 14.38 4.61 30.56 12.13 0.10 85.03 34.78 
1998 248 22.15 5.04 28.63 11.77 0.09 82.59 20.48 
1999 428 73.66 6.24 61.45 9.11 0.12 125.70 53.80 
2000 332 57.89 8.81 68.98 9.11 0.12 147.87 49.09 
2001 66 14.12 13.59 56.06 13.18 0.08 237.68 15.69 
2002 61 9.33 9.83 34.43 19.10 0.08 172.74 10.54 
2003 62 13.02 8.66 41.94 12.52 0.09 142.63 8.84 
2004 178 11.99 9.13 51.69 14.32 0.09 141.21 25.13 
2005 146 10.03 10.39 28.08 18.12 0.09 158.36 23.12 
2006 150 11.84 10.70 38.00 16.17 0.11 166.67 25.00 
2007 149 13.45 10.89 48.99 13.70 0.10 149.63 22.30 
2008 25 6.29 26.89 36.00 12.18 0.09 789.61 19.74 
2009 30 9.85 16.82 26.67 14.12 0.12 195.89 5.88 
2010 95 7.00 10.62 43.16 12.26 0.12 117.80 11.19 
2011 70 14.39 11.89 44.29 11.81 0.12 150.13 10.51 
Total 3413 - - 
 
- -  
 Mean - 26.57 7.04 42.76 12.51 0.10 119.25 23.94 
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Market Capital (millions of dollars) is the pre-issue market capitalization, 
which is measured in constant 2004 $million. The average market 
capitalization of each SEO is $2,005.49 million. Before 1998, the average 
market capitalization of each issuer is less than $1,000 million. After 1998, the 
market capitalization soars to more than $1,500 million. The market 
capitalization reaches its peak ($8,556.17 million per issuer) in 2008. The 
reason is that several giant companies issued SEOs in 2008.  
 
Pre-offer Price is the closing price on the day before the offer. The average 
pre-offer price is $26.01. The pre-offer prices of issuers in most of the years 
are near the mean value. The only exceptions are during the internet bubble 
(1999±2000) and from 2009 to 2011. The pre-offer prices in 1999 and 2000 
are much higher than average ($37.36 and $50.58 respectively), while from 
2009 to 2011 they are much lower than average (less than $18 dollars). 
 
Acc.Deals is the number of accelerated SEOs in the year. Obviously, there is a 
steady increase in the number of accelerated SEOs. For comparison, Acc (%), 
the percentage of total SEOs that are accelerated SEOs, also shows an 
increasing trend. The peaks in both number and percentage occur in 2009 (176 
and 45.83%, respectively). This agrees with previous reports (e.g. Bortolotti et 
al., 2008) of a boom in accelerated SEOs in recent years. 
 
I also employ the two variables, Aver Proceeds (millions of dollars) and Total 
Proceeds (billions of dollars), to investigate how active the SEO market was. 
The average proceeds per SEO are $189.14 million, which is 50% more than 
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the average proceeds ($119.25 million) per IPO. The mean of total proceeds of 
all SEOs per year is $55.11 billion, which is more than double of that of all 
IPOs per year. As with IPOs, the peak of Aver Proceeds (millions of dollars) 
occurs in 2008, at $688.58 million, while the total proceeds of all SEOs per 
year reaches its peak ($126.73 billion) in 2009.  
 
Meanwhile, comparing Table 12 with Table 13, we could find an interesting 
phenomenon that during the stock crash of 2001-2003 (after Dot-com Bubble) 
and 2008-2010 (Financial Crisis), the number of IPOs is considerable 
decreased, while the number of SEOs is not affected too much. One 
explanation is that poor market condition making IPOs undervalued, which 
decrease the willingness of IPO issuers, while according to DeAngelo et al. 
(2010), a near-term cash need is the primary SEO motivation. 
 
Table 14 reports the statistics relating to investors in IPOs and SEOs, as well as 
other equities, by year. No. of Investors per Deal is the average number of 
investors participating in a deal. No. of Deals per Investor is the average number 
of deals each investor participates in. No. of Investors is the total number of 
investors that have participated in any deal in a given year. No. of Investors in 
Both is the total number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs (and 
not just one or the other). NO. Both/No.IPO is the percentage of the total 
number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number of 
investors participating in IPOs. NO. Both/No.SEO is the percentage of the total 
number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number of 
investors participating in SEOs. 
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Table 14 presents some interesting results. First, the number of total investors 
participating in IPOs does not show a significant change each year, but the 
number of total investors participating in SEOs shows an increasing trend 
from 1995 to 2011. Second, the peak of the number of investors per deal 
(SEOs) occurs during 2008±2009, when the average proceeds per SEO also 
reaches its peak. The reason for this phenomenon may be that higher proceeds 
per deal require more investors to participate, to share and reduce the risk of 
each investor. IPOs show a similar phenomenon. Third, the ratio (average 0.92) 
of the number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the 
number of investors participating in IPOs is much higher than the ratio 
(average 0.43) of the number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs 
over the number of investors participating in SEOs. In other words, most 
investors who participate in IPOs will participate in SEOs as well, while fewer 
than half the investors who participate in SEOs will also participate in IPOs. 
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Table 13 Summary Statistics for SEOs 
Table 13 reports the statistics for SEO issuers and offer characteristics of SEOs by year. No. of SEOs is the number of SEOs. Underpricing (%) is defined as the return 
IURPWKHRIIHUSULFHWRRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHPXOWLSOLHGE\,IWKHRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHLVQRWDYDLODEOHWKHFORVLQJSULFHRIWKHGD\IROORZLQJRIIHUGD\LV
employed. InstHolding (%) is the most recent institutional ownership before the offer. Volatility (decimals) is the square root of 252 multiplied by the standard deviation 
of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days before the offer. Relative Size (%) is the number of shares offered over the total number of shares 
outstanding before the offer. Market Capital (millions of dollars) is the pre-issue market capitalization (in constant 2004 $millions). Pre-offer Price is the closing price 
on the day before the offer. Acc. Deals is the number of accelerated SEOs in the year. Total Proceeds (millions of dollars) is the total proceeds (in constant 2004 
$millions) of the SEOs. 
Year No. of SEOs 
Underpricing 
 (%) 
InstHolding  
(%) 
Volatility  
(decimals) 
Relative  
Size (%) 
Market Capital 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Pre-offer 
Price 
Acc. 
 Deals ACC(%) 
Aver. 
Proceeds 
(millions 
of dollars) 
Total Proceeds 
(billions of  
dollars) 
1995 402 2.96 36.81 0.53 23.86 755.18 24.14 3 0.75  94.13 37.84 
1996 497 4.16 35.74 0.63 29.84 590.78 23.77 1 0.20  104.29 51.83 
1997 403 3.34 38.31 0.54 25.66 853.56 25.71 6 1.49  117.28 47.26 
1998 276 2.99 38.42 0.52 22.72 1637.50 29.31 6 2.17  158.53 43.75 
1999 316 4.20 42.34 0.78 20.55 2581.23 37.36 11 3.48  225.62 71.29 
2000 314 4.48 40.49 1.02 14.86 3224.65 50.58 12 3.82  270.44 84.92 
2001 254 4.25 64.19 0.63 22.16 2801.47 28.66 38 14.96  223.20 56.69 
2002 237 3.36 53.45 0.50 19.96 2003.39 22.43 46 19.41  179.41 42.52 
2003 269 4.03 51.86 0.46 16.95 1807.74 21.93 49 18.22  147.45 39.66 
2004 304 2.85 51.07 0.42 20.69 2438.66 22.77 56 18.42  146.37 44.50 
2005 246 3.03 52.55 0.47 19.40 1358.02 23.64 36 14.63  154.50 38.01 
2006 229 3.36 60.10 0.41 19.82 1471.34 24.06 40 17.47  139.97 32.05 
2007 216 2.40 58.33 0.46 20.50 1674.58 25.52 21 9.72  161.00 34.78 
2008 157 2.91 67.18 0.68 16.58 8556.17 29.59 61 38.85  688.58 108.11 
2009 384 4.22 57.90 0.73 20.54 3150.33 16.46 176 45.83  330.04 126.73 
2010 272 3.41 49.26 0.52 18.06 1416.79 17.58 120 44.12  144.90 39.41 
2011 177 3.77 50.71 0.56 19.57 1845.93 17.84 67 37.85  211.42 37.42 
Total 4953 - - - - - - 749  - 
 Mean - 3.57 47.97 0.59 21.40 2005.49 26.01 - 17.14 189.14 55.11 
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Table 14 Summary Statistics for Investors 
Table 14 reports the statistics for investors in the markets of IPOs, SEOs and other equities, by year. No. of Investors per Deal is the average number of investors 
participating in a deal. No. of Deals per Investor is the average number of deals participated by an investor. No. of Investors is the total number of investors that have 
participated in any deal of a given year. No. of Investors in Both is the total number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs. NO. Both/No.IPO is the percentage 
of the total number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number of investors participating in IPOs. NO. Both/No.SEO is the percentage of the total 
number of investors participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number of investors participating in SEOs. 
  IPOs   SEOs   Equities     
Year 
No. of 
Investors 
per Deal 
No. of 
Deals per 
Investor 
No. of 
Investors 
No. of 
Investors 
per Deal 
No. of 
Deals per 
Investor 
No. of 
Investors 
No. of 
Investors 
per Deal 
No. of 
Deals per 
Investor 
No. of 
Investors 
No. of 
Investors 
in Both 
No.Both/
No.IPO 
No.Both/
No.SEO 
1995 21.78 12.43 659 41.35 16.08 1057 32.00 22.98 1096 620 0.94 0.59 
1996 18.99 15.27 736 36.47 18.34 1002 27.03 27.53 1076 662 0.90 0.66 
1997 20.58 10.73 790 43.84 14.71 1222 32.18 20.63 1282 730 0.92 0.60 
1998 20.66 7.93 651 53.52 11.40 1333 38.14 14.91 1366 618 0.95 0.46 
1999 36.84 17.03 928 72.55 16.07 1454 52.15 25.78 1519 863 0.93 0.59 
2000 34.57 12.62 923 85.01 17.47 1538 58.98 23.91 1611 850 0.92 0.55 
2001 46.59 4.49 705 93.22 13.86 1715 83.40 15.40 1749 671 0.95 0.39 
2002 47.23 5.38 544 89.84 13.51 1576 81.00 15.02 1612 508 0.93 0.32 
2003 39.15 4.86 499 96.49 15.02 1734 85.78 16.23 1755 478 0.96 0.28 
2004 41.15 8.29 894 83.46 13.69 1872 67.82 17.16 1925 841 0.94 0.45 
2005 40.65 6.60 899 74.15 11.27 1645 61.80 14.12 1733 811 0.90 0.49 
2006 15.84 4.44 546 53.84 8.49 1458 38.66 9.63 1537 467 0.86 0.32 
2007 41.82 6.69 956 81.60 9.22 1965 65.37 11.81 2076 845 0.88 0.43 
2008 48.96 2.13 621 136.59 9.22 2325 123.73 9.61 2369 577 0.93 0.25 
2009 57.90 3.49 498 114.42 18.00 2454 110.34 18.49 2483 469 0.94 0.19 
2010 43.40 5.67 727 78.20 10.61 2012 69.22 12.17 2093 646 0.89 0.32 
2011 52.34 5.19 706 79.94 8.08 1762 72.15 9.64 1856 612 0.87 0.35 
Mean 36.97 7.84 722.47 77.32 13.24 1654.35 64.69 16.77 1714.00 662.82 0.92 0.43 
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5.4. Underwriter±Investor Relationships and Investor Participation 
As has been noted by Huang and Zhang (2011) and Huang et al. (2008), 
investment banks establish relationships with investors through trading, 
research coverage, and investment banking services. Investment banks 
develop their investor networks through their relationship with investors, and 
their investor networks then become their important assets in distributing 
securities (Huang and Zhang, 2011). This section conducts several tests to 
provide evidence for the influence of underwriter±investor relationships on 
investor participation, firstly in IPOs and then in SEOs. 
 
5.4.1. Underwriter±Investor Relationships and Investor Participation in 
IPOs 
This section tests how the underwriter±investor relationships built in previous 
deals affects investor participation in a current IPO. To implement the tests, I 
employ a probit model: 
 ࡼࢇ࢚࢏ࢉ࢏࢖ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ = Ƚ ൅ ߚଵܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ ൅ ߚଶܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ ൅ ߚଷܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை ൅ߚସܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ ൅ ߚହܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ ൅ ߚ଺ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ ൅ ߚ଻ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ ൅ߚ଼ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ ൅ ߚଽܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵ଴݄ܶ݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵଵܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵଶܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 
(Model 5.1) 
 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊ , equals 1 if an eligible investor 
participates in an IPO, and is 0 otherwise. Here, retail investors are ignored 
because the share allocation information is proprietary. Only institutional 
investors are considered. µ(OLJLEOHLQYHVWRUV¶DUHGHILQHGDVLQYHVWRUVWKDWKDYH
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participated in at least 0.5% of all IPOs during the year of the current IPO and 
that participated in at least 10 IPOs during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. 
An investor is defined as participating in an IPO if the number of shares of the 
stock owned by the institutional investor increases from the quarter 
immediately prior to the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO. The 
participation decision concerns every IPO in my sample, and I include 1 
observation for every eligible investor for each IPO.  
 
The variables implemented in this test to capture underwriter±investor 
relationships are ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . The variable ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is 
the proportion of IPOs that an eligible investor participated in in the 5 years 
prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at least 1 of the current 
,32¶VOHDGXQGHUZULWHUV,WFDSWXUHVWKHLQIOXHQFe of the lead underwriter(s) on 
investor participation. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of IPOs that an eligible 
investor participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were 
XQGHUZULWWHQ E\ DW OHDVW  RI WKH FXUUHQW ,32¶V FR-managers. This variable 
captures the influence of the co-manager(s) on investor participation. The 
other variables are as defined in Section 5.2.2.2.  
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Table 15 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in IPOs (Non-binary 
Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all IPOs during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 IPOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of IPOs that the eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of IPOs that the 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the 
number of IPOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. 
Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their 
coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 54.79a 2.03 0.006 15.07a 10.46 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.877 50.36a 3.05 0.434 10.63a 2.50 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.559 39.27a 2.10 0.271 6.48a 1.69 ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை 0.525 260.13a 11.56 0.756 89.03a 26.69 ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.274 62.41a 4.05 0.326 24.21a 7.95 ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.042 8.72a 0.45 0.077 4.17a 1.38 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.017 10.33a 0.47 0.011 1.65 0.53 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.064 2.81b 0.22 -0.073 -0.94 -0.41 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.051 -7.96a -0.54 -0.003 -0.19 -0.06 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.023 -1.11 -0.25 -0.054 -0.75 -0.93 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.015 -3.01b -0.16 -0.012 -0.65 -0.21 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.076 -8.55a -0.78 -0.233 -7.05a -3.85 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -4.422 -267.94a N/A -4.952 -94.81a N/A ܰ 1,076,530 52,548 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.189 0.248 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 15 reports the regression results of the influences of the two non-binary 
variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ , on the likelihood of investor 
participations in IPOs. The results are shown for two sample periods, 1995 to 
2007 and 2008 to 2011. In the regression for both sample periods, the 
coefficients for both ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that prior relationships established between a potential 
LQYHVWRUDQGDQ,32¶VOHDGPDQDJHUVRUFR-managers increase the likelihood of 
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WKHLQYHVWRU¶Vparticipation in the IPO. The coefficients for ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ in 
both sample periods are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The results agree with those of Binay et al. (2007), who confirm that an 
increasing in underpricing will encourage more investors to participate in the 
IPOs. The coefficients of ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை  are both positive and statistically 
significant, which suggests that the more active IPO investors are more likely 
to participate in a new IPO. ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ is also significantly positively related 
to the likelihood of investor participation, suggesting that investors are more 
likely to participate in those IPOs in which more shares offered. The 
coefficients of ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ for both sample periods are positive and statistically 
significant, which indicates that the IPOs of firms that receive financing from 
venture capitalists are more popular with investors.  
 
Among the other variables, ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁, which is the nature logarithm of 1 
plus firm age when the IPO happens, is positively related to the likelihood of 
investor participation for the period 1995±2007, and this is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In other words, during this period, investors were 
more willing to participate in the IPOs whose issuers have relatively long 
history. However, ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ does not show any significant influence on 
the likelihood of investor participation during the latter period, 2008±2011. ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ  shows a negative effect on the likelihood of investor 
participation at the 1% level during 1995±2007, denoting that NYSE- or 
Amex-listed issuers are less attractive for investors. Nevertheless, ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ GRHVQRWKDYHDVLJQLILFDQW LQIOXHQFHRQ LQYHVWRUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
for the period 2008±2011. 
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To examine whether the likelihood of participation increases if an eligible 
investor has relationships with multiple managing underwriters of an IPO, I 
replace the relationship variables measured by fractions with three dummy 
variables, namely ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ. 
The first dummy variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ, equals 1 if the eligible investor is a 
relationship investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. The second 
dummy variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , equals 1 if the eligible investor is a relationship 
investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 otherwise. Following Huang and 
Zhang (2011), an investor is viewed as a relationship investor of a bank if the 
investor participated in at least 10 deals for which the bank was a lead or 
co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. After defining the three 
relationship variables, I implement the following regression model: 
 ࡼࢇ࢚࢏ࢉ࢏࢖ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ = Ƚ ൅ ߚଵܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ ൅ ߚଶܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ ൅ ߚଷܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ ൅ ߚସܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை ൅ ߚହܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ ൅ ߚ଺ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ ൅ ߚ଻ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ ൅ߚ଼ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ ൅ ߚଽܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵଵ݄ܶ݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵଶܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ ൅ߚଵଷܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 
(Model 5.2) 
 
The regression results are shown in Table 16. The coefficients for both ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವand ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ  are positive and significant at the 1% level for 
the period 1995±2007. This result suggests that an investor is more likely to 
participate in an IPO if the investor is a relationship investor of at least one 
lead or one co-manager. The coefficient for the interaction variable 
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ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ  is also positively significantly related to the 
likelihood of investor participation from 1995 to 2007 at the 1% level, 
suggesting the increasing of the likelihood of investor participation if an 
investor is an relationship investor of at least one lead manager and one 
co-manager. Economically, during the sample period from 1995 to 2007, if we 
vary both ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವand ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವfrom 0 to 1, on average the likelihood 
of investor participation increases by 1.73% and 1.33%, and the coefficient of 
the economy effect of the interaction between ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವand ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವis 
0.99%. 
 
For the sample period from 2008 to 2011, however, neither ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವnor ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ  have a significant influence on the likelihood of investor 
participation. On the other hand, the interaction between ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವand ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ is positively related to the likelihood of investor participation, at 
the 5% level. This result suggests that the investor is more likely to participate 
in an IPO if it is a relationship investor of at least one lead manager and one 
co-manager. Economically, if we vary the interaction from 0 to 1, on average 
the likelihood of investor participation increases by 3.24%. 
 
Table 17 reports the regression results for the influences of the two non-binary 
variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ , on the likelihood of investor 
participations in IPOs. Unlike Table 15, Table 17 focuses on the underwriter±
investor relationship in all equities (including both IPOs and SEOs) instead of 
the relationship established purely in IPOs. The results for the sample period 
from 1995 to 2007 are similar to those for the same sample period in Table 15. 
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In general, the coefficients for variables ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are both 
positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a prior underwriter±
investor relationship, whatever established purely in IPOs or in equities more 
generally (including both IPOs and SEOs), increases investor participation in 
the current IPO. Economically, if we vary ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ from 
1 standard deviation below to 1 standard deviation above their respective 
actual values , on average the likelihood of investor participation increases by 
0.89% and 1.06%, respectively. The coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ for the sample 
period from 2008 to 2011 is also positively related to the likelihood of investor 
participation and is significant at the 1% level. However, during 2008 to 2011, 
the coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is negatively related to the likelihood of 
investor participation and is significant at the 1% level.  
 
Due to the conflict results of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  between the two subgroups, I 
further implement a regression for each year. The results are shown in 
Appendix 5. The results show that after 2009, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 
is significantly negative, while before 2009, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 
are mostly significantly positive. The reasons may be related to the limited 
number of IPOs after 2008 and the rising role of co-managers in underwriting 
syndicates.
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Table 16 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in IPOs (Binary 
Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all IPOs during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 IPOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ equals 1 if the eligible investor is a relationship 
investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ equals 1 if the eligible 
investor is a relationship investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 otherwise. A relationship 
investor of a bank is an investor who participated in at least 10 deals for which the bank 
was a lead or co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை is the natural 
logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior 
to the current IPO. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both 
regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-stat 
Econ.Eff 
(%) Coeff. z-stat 
Econ.Eff 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 57.56a 2.20 0.006 16.14a 11.93 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ 0.151 21.53a 1.73 -0.022 -0.96 -0.41 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ 0.116 13.89a 1.33 0.020 0.39 0.39 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವכ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ 0.086 8.35a 0.99 0.161 2.92b 3.24 ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை 0.412 153.32a 9.27 0.694 56.74a 26.18 ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.353 88.79a 5.42 0.403 34.18a 10.55 ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.043 8.87a 0.48 0.109 5.91a 2.08 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.018 10.95a 0.51 0.006 0.92 0.31 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.077 3.42a 0.27 0.016 0.21 0.10 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.009 -1.47 -0.10 0.042 2.39c 0.81 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.034 1.66 0.39 -0.047 -0.65 -0.87 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.009 -1.83 -0.10 0.002 0.12 0.04 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.091 -10.27a -0.96 -0.275 -8.39a -4.82 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -3.867 -222.59a N/A -4.702 -77.57a N/A ܰ 1,076,530 52,548 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.185 0.246 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 17 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in Equities 
(Non-binary Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equities during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 equities 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of equity issues the eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of equity issues 
the eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + 
the number of equities in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current 
IPO. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their 
coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 58.80a 1.00 0.005 18.23a 3.84 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.406 25.66a 0.89 -0.181 -5.49a -0.52 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.499 38.10a 1.06 0.406 10.45a 1.12 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.529 331.51a 7.80 0.654 130.01a 12.43 ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.272 69.97a 2.29 0.346 37.12a 3.81 ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.048 11.05a 0.28 0.110 7.88a 0.85 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.015 10.57a 0.23 0.005 1.05 0.10 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.058 2.89b 0.12 -0.072 -1.24 -0.19 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.035 -6.38a -0.20 0.039 2.89b 0.30 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.000 -0.02 -0.00 0.051 1.00 0.40 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.017 -3.95a -0.10 0.019 1.42 0.14 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.070 -8.91a -0.39 -0.237 -9.29a -1.61 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.090 -351.47a N/A -5.670 -147.22a N/A ܰ 2,312,686 259,573 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.227 0.309 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 18 investigates whether the investor who has a relationship (established 
in previous equity deals) with either the lead manager(s) or the co-manager(s) 
of an IPO is more likely to participate in the IPO. The coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವand ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವare both insignificant. Nevertheless, the coefficients 
of the interaction between the two relationship dummy variables are both 
positive and significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively, suggesting that the 
likelihood of participation is much higher if an investor has relationship with 
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both the lead manager(s) and the co-manager(s). Economically, if we vary the 
interaction from 0 to 1, the likelihood of investor participation increases by 
1.17% and 1.10%. 
 
Table 18 Underwriter±investor Relationships Established in Equities (Binary 
Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equity issues during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 
equity issues during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as 
participating in an IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter 
immediately prior to the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f 
database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ equals 1 if the eligible investor is 
a relationship investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ equals 1 if 
the eligible investor is a relationship investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 otherwise. A 
relationship investor of a bank is an investor who participated in at least 10 equity deals 
for which the bank was a lead or co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in which the 
investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. Year dummy variables 
(ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 61.86a 1.06 0.005 18.76a 3.91 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ -0.012 -1.86 -0.07 -0.249 -13.01a -1.93 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ -0.020 -2.53c -0.12 -0.080 -1.74 -0.60 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವכ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ 0.192 19.80a 1.17 0.142 2.99b 1.10 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.479 245.14a 7.05 0.680 106.29a 12.99 ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.345 100.01a 2.97 0.377 47.39a 4.13 ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.049 11.28a 0.29 0.111 8.11a 0.85 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.015 10.84a 0.24 0.005 0.97 0.10 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.057 2.84b 0.12 -0.037 -0.65 -0.10 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.001 0.18 0.01 0.073 5.61a 0.56 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.038 2.17c 0.23 0.109 2.18c 0.88 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.011 -2.61b -0.07 0.029 2.19c 0.22 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.076 -9.77a -0.43 -0.237 -9.37a -1.60 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -4.873 -323.74a N/A -5.724 -139.43a N/A ܰ 2,312,686 259,573 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.225 0.310 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉ݕ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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5.4.2. Underwriter±Investor Relationships and Investor Participation in 
SEOs 
The aim of this section is to investigate how underwriter±investor 
relationships established in previous deals affect the likelihood of investor 
participation in a current SEO. I employ two models to implement the 
investigation. 
 
The first model is as follows. The purpose of this model is to capture the 
influences of lead managers and co-managers on investor participation. 
 ࡼࢇ࢚࢏ࢉ࢏࢖ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ = Ƚ ൅ ߚଵܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ ൅ ߚଶܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ ൅ ߚଷܮ݊ ௌܰாை ൅ߚସܮ݊ܰܵܧܱܵܣܯܫܷܵܵ ൅ ߚହܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ ൅ ߚ଺ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ ൅ ߚ଻ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ߚ଼ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଽܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ ൅ ߚଵଵܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵଶ݄ܶ݁ܿ ൅ߚଵଷܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵସܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ ൅ ߚଵହܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 
(Model 5.3) 
 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊ , equals 1 if an eligible investor 
participates in an SEO, and 0 otherwise. Here again, retail investors are 
ignored because the share allocation information is proprietary. Only 
institutional investors are considered. µ(OLJLEOHLQYHVWRUV¶DUHGHILQHGDVWKRVH
that have participated in at least 0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the 
current SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs during the 5 years prior 
to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an SEO if the 
number of shares of the stock owned by the institutional investor increases 
from the quarter immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after 
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the SEO. The participation decision concerns every SEO in my sample, and I 
include 1 observation for every eligible investor for each SEO.  
 
The variables implemented in this test to capture underwriter±investor 
relationships are ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . The variable ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is 
the proportion of SEOs an eligible investor participated in in the 5 years prior 
WR WKHFXUUHQW6(2WKDWZHUHXQGHUZULWWHQE\DW OHDVWRI WKHFXUUHQW6(2¶V
lead underwriters. It captures the influence of the lead underwriter(s) on 
investor participation. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the proportion of SEOs an eligible 
investor participated in in the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were 
underwritten by at least 1 of the current 6(2¶V co-managers. This variable 
captures the influence of the co-manager(s) on investor participation. The 
other variables are as defined in Section 5.2.2.2. 
 
Table 19 shows the regression results. As with the research on IPOs, the whole 
sample is further divided into two periods, 1995±2007 and 2008±2011. The 
coefficients of Underpricing for the two subgroups are both positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients for ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 
are both positive and significant at the 1% level in each sample period as well, 
suggesting that prior underwriter±investor relationships established in SEOs 
increase the likelihood of investor participation in a current SEO. 
 
Table 19 also suggests that an active investor, as measured by ܮ݊ ௌܰாை, is 
more likely to participate in a current SEO. The coefficients of ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎, which is used to control for the issuer±investor relationship, 
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are both positive and significant at the 1% level for both sample periods. 
Moreover, the results suggest that investors are more willing to participate in 
an SEO if the issuer has higher institutional ownership before the offering, 
higher market capital before the offering and when the offering technique is 
accelerated. In contrast, higher relative size reduces the likelihood of investor 
participation. In addition, the results of the influences of ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ are mixed. 
The coefficient of ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ is significantly positive for the sample period 
1995±2007 but is significantly negative thereafter.  
 
Table 19 reports the coefficients of the economy effects of variables as well. 
The coefficients of economy effects of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ are 1.28% and 0.62% for 
1995±2007 and for 2008±2011, respectively. If we vary ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ from 1 
standard deviation below to 1 standard deviation above its actual values, the 
likelihood of investor participation increases by 0.86% and 0.52% for the two 
sample periods (1995±2007 and 2008±2011) respectively. 
 
To examine whether the likelihood of participation increases if an eligible 
investor has relationships with multiple managing underwriters of an SEO, I 
replace the relationship variables measured by fractions with three dummy 
variables, namely ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ. 
The first dummy variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ, equals 1 if the eligible investor is a 
relationship investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. The second 
dummy variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , equals 1 if the eligible investor is a relationship 
investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 otherwise. Following Huang and 
Zhang (2011)DQLQYHVWRULVYLHZHGDVDµUHODWLRQVKLSLQYHVWRU¶RIDEDQNLIWKH
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investor participated in at least 10 deals for which the bank was a lead or 
co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. After defining the three 
relationship variables, I implement the following regression model. 
 ࡼࢇ࢚࢏ࢉ࢏࢖ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ = Ƚ ൅ ߚଵܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ ൅ ߚଶܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ ൅ ߚଷܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ ൅ ߚସܮ݊ ௌܰாை ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܰܵܧܱܵܣܯܫܷܵܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ ൅ߚ଻ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ ൅ ߚ଼ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଽܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚଵଵܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ ൅ ߚଵଶܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵଷ݄ܶ݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵସܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ ൅ ߚଵହܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ ൅ߚଵ଺ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 
(Model 5.4) 
 
Table 20 reports the regression results for above equation. The coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ in both sample periods are negative and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting an investor will be less likely to participate in an SEO if the 
SEO includes at least one lead manager that has a relationship with the 
investor. The coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವin the sample period 1995±2007 is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, while that in the sample period 2008±
2011 shows no significant effect on the likelihood of investor participation. In 
contrast, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , which is the 
interaction between ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ, is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. This result provides a hint that an investor will be more likely 
to participate in an SEO if the SEO includes at least one lead manager and one 
co-manager that have a relationship with the investor. In other words, an 
investor views the marketing of an SEO by two or moUH RI LWV µUHODWLRQVKLS
EDQNV¶ DV EHLQJ PXFK PRUH FRQYLQFLQJ WKDQ WKH PDUNHWLQJ E\ RQO\ RQH
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relationship bank. 
 
Compared with ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ , the interaction variable ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ shows larger absolute values of the coefficients of 
economy effects, at 1.75% and 0.82% respectively in the two sample periods. 
This result is evidence that multiple relationship managers have more impact 
on the likelihood of investor participation than any single relationship 
manager. 
 
Like Table 19, Table 21 illustrates how the two non-binary variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ, affect the likelihood of investor participation. 
The two variables are calculated through both IPO and SEO samples in Table 
21, while the two variables in Table 19 are calculated only for the pure SEO 
sample. In other words, Table 21 shows the influence on investor participation 
of underwriter±investor relationships established in both IPOs and SEOs. The 
coefficients of both variables are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
providing evidence for the hypothesis that previously established underwriter±
investor relationships increase the likelihood of investor participation. For the 
other variables, as with Table 19, the coefficients for ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, an active investor is more 
likely to participate in an SEO. Table 21 suggests that the issuer±investor 
relationship is an important factor that increases the likelihood of investor 
participation. Moreover, higher institutional ownership, higher market capital 
and accelerated SEOs are the three factors that increase the likelihood of 
investor participation.  
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Table 19 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in SEOs (Non-binary 
Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior 
to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 13f database. For 
the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of SEOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of SEOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the 
number of SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ LVWKHQDWXUDOORJDULWKPRIWKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶V6(2V
in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. Year dummy 
variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not 
reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 38.53a 0.98 0.005 16.55a 0.64 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.321 34.18a 1.28 0.164 14.42a 0.62 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.210 30.51a 0.86 0.134 13.06a 0.52 ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 0.538 479.90a 12.12 0.591 308.52a 12.72 ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.621 120.76a 1.87 0.633 78.69a 1.80 ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.068 28.23a 0.76 0.245 28.10a 2.63 ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.009 2.83b 0.10 0.084 16.32a 0.92 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.019 -2.49c -0.11 0.303 22.18a 1.68 ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.211 132.81a 6.10 0.250 125.88a 6.89 ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.027 10.62a 0.39 -0.039 -11.28a -0.54 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.037 11.80a 0.38 -0.027 -4.96a -0.26 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.002 -0.33 -0.02 0.032 3.45a 0.31 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.008 2.45c 0.08 0.015 2.15c 0.15 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.036 -8.11a -0.36 -0.126 -16.81a -1.15 ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.023 5.35a 0.23 0.033 7.53a 0.33 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.480 -452.59a N/A -5.948 -339.52a N/A ܰ 3,125,783 1,250,157 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.246 0.291 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 20 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in SEOs (Binary 
Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior 
to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 13f database. For 
the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ equals 1 if the eligible investor is a relationship 
investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ equals 1 if the eligible 
investor is a relationship investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 otherwise. A relationship 
investor of a bank is an investor who participated in at least 10 SEOs for which the bank 
was a lead or co-manager in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural 
logarithm of 1 + the number of SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years 
prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number RI WKH VDPH LVVXHU¶V6(2V LQZKLFK WKH LQYHVWRUSDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH\HDUVSULRU WR WKH
current SEO. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, 
but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 36.40a 0.93 0.004 15.13a 0.60 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ -0.042 -10.69a -0.43 -0.039 -6.77a -0.39 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ -0.036 -6.72a -0.36 0.001 0.12 0.01 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ 0.164 26.94a 1.75 0.082 6.27a 0.82 ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 0.511 346.63a 11.48 0.577 242.11a 12.64 ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.625 121.39a 1.88 0.640 79.62a 1.86 ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.063 26.83a 0.71 0.280 32.18a 3.07 ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.007 2.28c 0.08 0.082 15.93a 0.91 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.010 1.34 0.06 0.325 24.17a 1.85 ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.236 158.49a 6.86 0.263 137.87a 7.41 ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.020 8.08a 0.29 -0.042 -12.01a -0.59 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.044 14.03a 0.45 -0.011 -2.12c -0.11 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.009 1.86 0.09 0.059 6.50a 0.60 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.005 1.60 0.05 0.019 2.62b 0.18 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.036 -8.06a -0.35 -0.127 -16.85a -1.17 ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.014 3.21b 0.14 0.030 6.77a 0.30 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.401 -421.32a N/A -5.915 -316.31a N/A ܰ 3,125,783 1,250,157 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.246 0.291 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 21 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in All Equity Deals 
(Non-binary Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equity deals during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 
equity deals during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as 
participating in an SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter 
immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 
13f database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of equity 
deals an eligible investor participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that 
were underwritten by at least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the 
proportion of equity deals an eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were 
underwritten by at least 1 co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the 
natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in which the investor participated in 
the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ is the natural logarithm of 1 WKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶VHTXLW\GHDOVLQZKLFKWKHLQYHVWRUSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH
years prior to the current SEO. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in 
both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent 
Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 39.61a 1.00 0.005 16.93a 0.70 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.412 43.72a 1.63 0.204 18.05a 0.83 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.217 31.59a 0.87 0.111 11.03a 0.46 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.484 457.27a 11.61 0.553 301.32a 13.74 ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.715 153.14a 2.33 0.673 86.90a 2.26 ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.072 29.98a 0.82 0.243 28.08a 2.86 ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.007 2.26c 0.08 0.078 15.22a 0.91 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.044 -5.51a -0.25 0.303 22.32a 1.81 ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.196 124.65a 5.63 0.247 125.65a 7.35 ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.025 9.95a 0.36 -0.041 -11.93a -0.61 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.047 15.04a 0.48 -0.031 -5.73a -0.32 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.000 0.05 0.00 0.026 2.82b 0.27 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.007 2.03c 0.07 0.011 1.49 0.11 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.029 -6.68a -0.29 -0.126 -16.84a -1.24 ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.026 6.19a 0.26 0.035 7.85a 0.36 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.275 -441.27a N/A -5.801 -334.22a N/A ܰ 3,178,758 1,256,406 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.245 0.287 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 22 Underwriter±Investor Relationships Established in Equity Deals 
(Binary Relationship Variables) and Investor Participation in SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equity deals during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 
equity deals during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as 
participating in an SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter 
immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 
13f database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽  equals 1 if the eligible 
investor is a relationship investor of at least 1 lead manager, and 0 otherwise. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ 
equals 1 if the eligible investor is a relationship investor of at least 1 co-manager, and 0 
otherwise. A relationship investor of a bank is an investor who participated in at least 10 
equity deals for which the bank was a lead or co-manager in the 5 years prior to the 
current SEO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in 
which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. Year dummy 
variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not 
reported. 
Independent Variable 
Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 
Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) Coeff. z-Stat 
Econ.Eff. 
(%) ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 37.10a 0.94 0.004 15.06a 0.64 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ -0.027 -6.67a -0.27 -0.039 -6.77a -0.42 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ -0.039 -7.24a -0.39 -0.002 -0.17 -0.02 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ 0.158 25.74a 1.66 0.067 5.15a 0.73 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.454 337.26a 10.89 0.542 241.63a 13.80 ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.722 154.66a 2.36 0.682 88.16a 2.36 ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.066 28.10a 0.76 0.287 33.39a 3.48 ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.006 1.78 0.06 0.076 14.86a 0.91 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.006 -0.84 -0.04 0.329 24.72a 2.03 ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.225 152.79a 6.52 0.262 138.71a 8.01 ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.017 6.92a 0.25 -0.044 -12.80a -0.67 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.056 17.81a 0.57 -0.012 -2.27c -0.13 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.012 2.57c 0.12 0.059 6.59a 0.65 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.004 1.30 0.04 0.016 2.31c 0.18 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.028 -6.39a -0.28 -0.127 -16.95a -1.28 ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.014 3.39a 0.14 0.029 6.66a 0.32 ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.183 -416.07a N/A -5.784 -315.56a N/A ܰ 3,178,758 1,256,406 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.243 0.286 ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 22 shows the effects of having multiple managing banks on investor 
participation. The coefficients of both ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽  are 
negative and significant at the 1% level during the sample period from 1995 to 
2007. From 2008 to 2011, though ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ shows no significant influence 
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on investor participation, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽  is still negatively related to the 
likelihood of investor participation and is significant at the 1% level. 
 
In contrast, the coefficients of the interaction variable, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽ כܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽, are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the 
likelihood of participation is much higher if an investor has a relationship with 
both the lead manager(s) and the co-manager(s). 
 
Moreover, the absolute values for the economy effects of the interaction 
variable are higher than those for both ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽஽  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ஽ , 
suggesting that an investor consider the marketing of an SEO is more 
FRQYLQFHGLIWKH6(2LQYROYHVPRUHWKDQRQHµUHODWLRQVKLSXQGHUZULWHU¶RIWKDW
investor. 
 
5.4.3. Underwriter±Investor Relationships and Investor Participation in 
Different Situations 
The previous sections have investigated the influence of underwriter±investor 
relationships on investor participation. The empirical results have provided 
evidence that underwriter±investor relationships increase the likelihood of 
participation.  
 
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on this by investigating whether 
underwriter±investor relationships increase the likelihood of investor 
participation in different circumstances, to provide a deeper understanding of 
the effects of underwriter±investor relationships. 
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Three specific conditions have been set up to implement this research, namely 
high asset holding, high total proceeds and high relative size. High asset 
holding equals 1 if the investor holds the highest quartile of the total value of 
stocks among all investors in the quarter prior to the current offering. High 
total proceeds equals 1 if the total proceeds of the offering belong to the top 
quartile of all offerings in the quarter when the offering happens. High relative 
size equals 1 if the relative size of the offering belongs to the top quartile of all 
offerings in the quarter when the offering happens.  
 
5.4.3.1. Investor Participation, Investor Network and Assets Holdings of 
the Investor 
To investigate how underwriter±investor relationships influence the likelihood 
of investor participation when the asset holdings of the investor are high 
before the deal, I employ three more variables, namely ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃, ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ 
equals 1 if the investor holds the highest quartile of the total value of stocks 
among all investors in the quarter prior to the current offering. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . 
Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ 
and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . After controlling for the other variables, I expect ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  to capture the 
influence of underwriter±investor relationships on the likelihood of investor 
participation when the asset holdings of the investor are high before the deal. 
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Table 23 reports the influence on investor participation of underwriter±
investor relationships established in IPOs. As with Table 15 and later tables, 
Table 23 shows the results in subgroups divided by sample periods (1995±
2007 and 2008±2011). The coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are 
both positive and significant at the 1% level, which is similar to the results 
reported in Table 15. The coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ is positive and significant 
at the 1% level for the subsample 1995±2007, suggesting that investors with 
high asset holdings are more likely to participate in the current IPO. However, 
the coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ is negative and significant at the 10% level for 
the sample period 2008±2011. The coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ 
and ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  are both positive and significant for the two 
sample periods respectively, suggesting that underwriter±investor relationships 
increase the likelihood of investor participation when the asset holdings of the 
investor are high before the IPO.  
 
Table 24 reports the influence on investor participation of underwriter±
investor relationships established in all equity deals. The results are again 
reported for two sample periods, 1995±2007 and 2008±2011. The coefficients 
of ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are both positive and significant at the 1% level. However, as 
with Table 17, the coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ is significantly positive during 
1995±2007 while it is significantly negative during 2008±2011. The 
coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽are both positive and significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting a lead manager±investor relationship can increase 
investor participation if the investor holds a high total value of stocks before 
the deal. The coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is positive and 
Chapter 5   The Underwriter Winvestor Relationships and Investor Participation in Equity Offerings 
169 
 
significant at the 1% level from 1995 to 2007, suggesting a co-manager±
investor relationship can increase investor participation if the investor holds a 
high total value of stocks before the deal. However, the coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ shows no significant relationship with the likelihood 
of investor participation from 2008 to 2011.  
 
The influence on investor participation of underwriter±investor relationships 
established in SEOs is shown in Table 25. The coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is negative and significant at the 1% level for the sample period 
from 1995 to 2007. This result provides evidence that the lead manager±
investor relationship decreases the likelihood of investor participation in an 
SEO if the investor holds a high total value of stocks before the SEO. In other 
words, an investor with high assets holding treats the relationship with any 
lead managers of an SEO as a negative factor. The coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ for the sample from 2008 to 2011 is also negative and 
significant at the 10% level. For the sample period from 1995 to 2007, ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is positively related to the likelihood of investor 
participation and the coefficient is significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
co-manager±investor relationships increase investor participation if the 
investor holds a high total value of stocks before the SEO. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is negative and significant at the 5% 
level for the sample period from 2008 to 2011. In contrast, the coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃  are both positive and significant at the 1% level, 
showing that investors with high assets holdings are more likely to participate 
in a current SEO.  
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Table 23 Investor Participation in IPOs, Investor Network Established in IPOs 
and Asset Holdings of Investors 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all IPOs during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 IPOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the proportion of IPOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of IPOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃  equals 1 if the 
investor holds the highest quartile of the total value of stocks among all investors in the 
quarter prior to current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs 
in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. Year dummy 
variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not 
reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 54.83a 0.006 15.05a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.764 31.61a 0.267 4.56a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.345 17.38a 0.248 4.09a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ 0.044 6.27a -0.084 -2.14c ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.114 3.75a 0.260 3.60a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.365 15.07a 0.034 0.44 ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை 0.492 209.41a 0.743 76.61a ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.276 62.46a 0.326 24.20a ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.043 8.80a 0.077 4.12a ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.017 10.41a 0.011 1.65 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.065 2.85b -0.070 -0.90 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.051 -7.94a -0.003 -0.18 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.021 -1.01 -0.056 -0.79 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.014 -2.82b -0.011 -0.61 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.075 -8.46a -0.231 -6.99a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -4.314 -256.90a -4.852 -86.71a ܰ 1,076,530 52,548 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.192 0.249 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 24 Investor Participation in IPOs, Investor Network Established in All 
Equity Deals  and Asset Holdings of Investors 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equities during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 equities 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of equity deals an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of equity deals 
an eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃  equals 1 if the 
investor holds the highest quartile of the total value of stocks among all investors in the 
quarter prior to current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of 
equity deals in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. Year 
dummy variables ( ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their 
coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 58.58a 0.005 18.15a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.334 15.04a -0.310 -6.85a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.329 17.59a 0.433 8.05a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ 0.004 0.56 -0.066 -2.43c ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.115 4.15a 0.229 4.05a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.284 12.83a -0.048 -0.71 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.508 259.05a 0.649 107.24a ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.271 69.33a 0.345 36.80a ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.047 10.81a 0.108 7.73a ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.015 10.52a 0.006 1.10 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.057 2.82b -0.073 -1.26 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.037 -6.59a 0.037 2.77b ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.001 0.06 0.049 0.97 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.017 -3.91a 0.019 1.44 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.069 -8.81a -0.235 -9.21a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -4.986 -332.79a -5.605 -135.81a ܰ 2,312,686 259,573 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.228 0.309 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 25 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Network Established in SEOs 
and Assets Holdings of Investors 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior 
to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 13f database. For 
the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of SEOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of SEOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the 
number of SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ LVWKHQDWXUDOORJDULWKPRIWKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶V6(2V
in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ equals 1 if the investor holds the highest quartile of the total value 
of stocks among all investors in the quarter prior to current SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. Year dummy variables 
(ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 38.39a 0.005 16.46a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.368 30.90a 0.180 12.24a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.194 20.98a 0.157 11.51a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ 0.146 31.45a 0.110 13.75a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.133 -8.23a -0.046 -2.29c ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.028 2.26c -0.050 -2.61b ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 0.506 366.18a 0.570 249.46a ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.624 121.15a 0.635 78.92a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.068 28.26a 0.247 28.27a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.009 2.81b 0.083 16.11a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.018 -2.36c 0.305 22.31a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.212 133.36a 0.250 125.99a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.027 10.59a -0.040 -11.36a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.038 11.97a -0.026 -4.81a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.001 -0.20 0.033 3.54a ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.008 2.56c 0.016 2.26c ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.035 -8.00a -0.126 -16.77a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.021 4.98a 0.033 7.33a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.420 -437.01a -5.909 -327.03a ܰ 3,125,783 1,250,157 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.247 0.291 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 26 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Network Established in All 
Equity Deals, and Assets Holdings of Investors 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
equity offering. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates 
in at least 0.5% of all equity deals during the year of the SEO and that participated in at 
least 10 equity deals during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as 
participating in an SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter 
immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 
13f database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the fraction of equity deals 
participated in by the eligible investor during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that 
were underwritten by at least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the 
fraction of equity deals participated in by the eligible investor within 5 years that were 
underwritten by at least 1 comanaging underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the 
natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in which the investor participated in 
the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ is the natural logarithm of 1 WKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶VHTXLWLHVLQZKLFKWKHLQYHVWRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH\HDUV
prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ equals 1 if the investor holds the highest 
quartile of the total value of stocks among all investors in the quarter prior to current 
SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but 
their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 39.47a 0.005 16.81a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.436 36.35a 0.234 15.89a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.218 23.52a 0.132 9.82a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ 0.169 36.71a 0.123 15.30a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.104 -6.47a -0.079 -3.99a ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.010 -0.77 -0.047 -2.49c ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.448 346.33a 0.532 243.75a ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.718 153.64a 0.675 87.20a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.072 29.93a 0.246 28.38a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.007 2.25c 0.077 15.06a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.042 -5.23a 0.305 22.50a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.198 125.57a 0.248 125.88a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.025 9.88a -0.041 -12.00a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.048 15.21a -0.030 -5.50a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.001 0.18 0.027 2.99b ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.007 2.17c 0.012 1.64 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.029 -6.55a -0.126 -16.80a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.024 5.69a 0.034 7.59a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.212 -426.13a -5.771 -322.20a ܰ 3,178,758 1,256,406 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.246 0.288 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 26 illustrates how investor network established in all equity deals affect 
the participation in SEOs of investors with a high assets holding. The results 
are again reported for two sample periods, 1995±2007 and 2008±2011. As in 
Table 25, the coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃  are both positive and 
significant at the 1% level. However, the interaction variable ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of investor 
participation in the SEO, suggesting investors with high assets holdings are 
less likely to participate in SEOs that have lead managers with whom they 
have an established relationship. Another interaction variable, ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ ǡ shows no significant effect on investor participation for the sample 
period from 1995 to 2007. The coefficient of ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is 
negative and significant at the 10% level for the sample period from 2008 to 
2011. 
 
5.4.3.2. Investor Participation, Investor Network and Total Proceeds of 
Offerings 
To investigate how underwriter±investor relationships influence the likelihood 
of investor participation if the total proceeds of a deal are high, I employ three 
additional variables, namely ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ , ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ equals 1 if the total proceeds of the offer 
belongs to the highest quartile of all offers in the same year. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . 
Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . After controlling for other variables, I expect ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  to capture the influence of 
Chapter 5   The Underwriter Winvestor Relationships and Investor Participation in Equity Offerings 
175 
 
underwriter±investor relationships on the likelihood of investor participation 
in the deals with high total proceeds. 
 
Table 27 illustrates the influence of underwriter±investor relationships 
established in IPOs on investor participation in IPOs with high total proceeds. 
The results are again divided by the sample period. As in Table 15, the 
coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are positive and significant at the 
1% level. The coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ in both sample periods are positive 
and significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively, which indicates that IPOs 
with high total proceeds are more attractive for investors. However, for these 
IPOs with high total proceeds, underwriter±investor relationships reduce the 
likelihood of investor participation. In other words, investors avoid 
participating in these IPOs if the underwriter syndicate includes a bank with 
which the investor has an established relationship. 
 
According to Table 28, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  in the two sample 
periods are positive and significant at the 1% level, which is similar to the 
results shown in previous tables. The coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ is positive 
and significant at the 1% level for the sample period from 1995 to 2007, while 
the coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ for the sample period from 2008 to 2011 is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. In Table 28, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ is positively 
related to the likelihood of investor participation in both sample periods and 
the coefficients are both significant. During 1995±2007, the coefficients of 
both ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting the underwriter±investor relationships 
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established in all equity deals have a negative impact on investor participation 
in an IPO if the IPO belongs to the highest quartile of total proceeds in the IPO 
year. 
 
Table 29 and Table 30 show the impact of the investor network of underwriters 
on investor participation in SEOs if the SEOs are categorized into the group of 
the highest quartile of total proceeds in the offering year. In line with the 
above analyses, the results are divided by sample period, 1995±2007 and 
2008±2011.  
 
Table 29 focuses on investor networks established purely in SEOs. The 
coefficient of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ is positive and significant at the 1% level during 
the sample period 1995 to 2007. However, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅௘௔ௗ  has significantly 
negative influence on the likelihood of investor participation from 2008 to 
2011, which is different from the results reported in the previous tables such as 
Table 19. As with previous regressions, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ in both 
sample periods are positive and significant at the 1% level. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ has a 
significantly negative influence on investor participation, suggesting SEOs 
with high total proceeds are not popular with investors. In contrast, the 
coefficients of ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ in both sample periods are positive 
and significant at the 1% level. In other words, lead manager±investor 
UHODWLRQVKLSVFKDQJHLQYHVWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGPRWLYDWHWKHPWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQ
SEOs that have high proceeds. However, co-manager±investor relationships 
do not have a similar influence.  
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Table 30 illustrates the influence of underwriter±investor relationships 
established in all equity deals (both IPOs and SEOs) on the likelihood of 
investor participation in high-proceeds SEOs. Nevertheless, table 30 provide a 
similar conclusion with table 29. 
 
5.4.3.3. Investor Participation, Investor Network and Relative Size 
This section advances previous studies on underwriter±investor relationships 
and investor participation in SEOs by considering investor participation in 
SEOs via investor participation in the SEOs with high relative size. To 
implement this, I employ three more additional variables based on the 
equations investigating the effects of underwriter-investor relationships on 
investor participation in SEOs, namely ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ , ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  and ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁  equals 1 if, by 
relative size, the SEO belongs to the highest quartile of all SEOs in the current 
year of the SEO. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the 
interaction between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. I expect the influence of 
underwriter±investor relationships on the likelihood of investor participation 
in SEOs with high relative size to be captured by ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 
and ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. 
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Table 27 Investor Participation in IPOs, Investor Network Established in IPOs 
and High-Proceeds IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all IPOs during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 IPOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the proportion of IPOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of IPOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ equals 1 if the total proceeds of 
the offer belongs to the highest quartile of all offers in the same year. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை 
is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs in which the investor participated in 
the 5 years prior to the current IPO. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are 
included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 51.12a 0.006 15.36a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 1.074 49.91a 0.605 11.82a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.731 38.88a 0.342 6.19a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ 0.216 25.42a 0.136 2.64b ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.474 -15.62a -0.384 -4.83a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.319 -12.36a -0.178 -2.16c ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை 0.526 260.16a 0.758 89.09a ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.246 45.66a 0.377 22.85a ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.033 6.81a 0.053 2.83b ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.016 9.62a 0.009 1.23 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.040 1.77 -0.166 -2.07c ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.047 -7.33a -0.001 -0.06 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.035 1.64 -0.047 -0.66 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.009 -1.89 -0.007 -0.37 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.072 -8.02a -0.213 -6.30a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -4.431 -249.76a -5.122 -90.30a ܰ 1,076,530 52,548 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.191 0.250 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 28 Investor Participation In IPOs, Investor Network Established in 
Equities and High-Proceeds IPOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
IPO. An eligible investor for an IPO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equities during the year of the IPO and that participated in at least 10 equities 
during the 5 years prior to the current IPO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
IPO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior to 
the IPO to the quarter immediately after the IPO according to the 13f database. For the 
independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the proportion of IPOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current IPO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current IPO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of IPOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current IPO. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ equals 1 if the total proceeds of 
the offer belongs to the highest quartile of all offers in the same year. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equities in which the investor 
participated in the 5 years prior to the current IPO. Year dummy variables 
(ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.002 55.06a 0.005 18.39a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.659 33.16a -0.142 -3.27b ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.690 39.39a 0.766 14.35a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ 0.226 29.76a 0.099 2.92b ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.585 -21.17a -0.051 -0.84 ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.335 -14.19a -0.676 -9.28a ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.529 331.17a 0.654 129.81a ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.256 54.48a 0.382 34.25a ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.037 8.42a 0.087 6.12a ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ 0.014 9.79a 0.003 0.58 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ 0.027 1.34 -0.166 -2.79b ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.030 -5.46a 0.039 2.84b ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.066 3.69a 0.129 2.52c ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.011 -2.58b 0.036 2.63b ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.066 -8.35a -0.196 -7.49a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.124 -329.78a -5.803 -140.07a ܰ 2,312,686 259,573 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.229 0.311 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 29 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Network Established in SEOs, 
and High-Proceeds SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior 
to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 13f database. For 
the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of SEOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of SEOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the 
number of SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ LVWKHQDWXUDOORJDULWKPRIWKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶V6(2V
in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ 
equals 1 if the total proceeds of the offer belongs to the highest quartile of all offers in the 
same year. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ 
and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ . Year dummy variables ( ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both 
regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 37.99a 0.005 15.20a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.177 14.62a -0.078 -4.99a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.271 26.01a 0.255 14.55a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ -0.037 -6.50a -0.167 -14.68a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.317 19.15a 0.523 23.32a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.125 -9.39a -0.195 -9.18a ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 0.539 479.91a 0.593 308.71a ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.622 120.77a 0.635 78.67a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.071 28.78a 0.276 30.67a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.010 3.17b 0.082 15.87a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.029 -3.58a 0.305 21.07a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.210 114.07a 0.256 98.78a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.028 10.88a -0.041 -11.81a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.036 11.29a -0.027 -4.88a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.002 -0.48 0.019 2.07c ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.008 2.60b 0.015 2.14c ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.034 -7.76a -0.125 -16.61a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.018 4.33a 0.030 6.75a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.462 -399.68a -5.961 -298.27a ܰ 3,125,783 1,250,157 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.247 0.292 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 30 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Network Established in All 
Equity Deals and High-Proceeds SEOs 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in 
an SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in 
at least 0.5% of all equity deals during the year of the SEO and that participated in at 
least 10 equity deals during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is 
defined as participating in an SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock 
from the quarter immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the 
SEO according to the 13f database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the 
proportion of equity deals an eligible investor participated in during the 5 years prior 
to the current SEO that were underwritten by at least 1 lead underwriter of the current 
SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of equity deals an eligible investor participated in 
within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 co-managing underwriter of the 
current SEO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in 
which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ LVWKHQDWXUDOORJDULWKPRIWKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶V
equities in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ equals 1 if the total proceeds of the offer belongs to the highest quartile of 
all offers in the same year. ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is the interaction 
between ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are 
included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 39.10a 0.005 15.59a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.272 22.61a -0.037 -2.42c ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.274 26.33a 0.235 13.76a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ -0.043 -7.69a -0.173 -15.05a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.311 18.92a 0.528 23.69a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.116 -8.70a -0.200 -9.60a ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.485 457.31a 0.554 301.54a ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.715 153.19a 0.675 86.95a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.075 30.28a 0.273 30.67a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.008 2.68b 0.075 14.72a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.051 -6.08a 0.305 21.17a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.196 107.57a 0.253 98.50a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.026 10.35a -0.043 -12.48a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.046 14.57a -0.031 -5.67a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ -0.000 -0.10 0.013 1.40 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.007 2.15c 0.011 1.52 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.028 -6.35a -0.126 -16.72a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.022 5.17a 0.032 7.08a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.266 -389.15a -5.814 -293.29a ܰ 3,178,758 1,256,406 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.245 0.288 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 31 shows the influence of underwriter±investor relationships established 
in SEOs on investor participation in SEOs with high relative size. In line with 
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previous tables, Table 31 also divides the results into two sample periods. In 
the sample period from 1995 to 2007, the coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that SEOs 
with high relative size are more popular among investors. The interaction 
variable ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is negatively related to the likelihood of 
investor participation in the sample period 1995±2007. On the other hand, the 
interaction variable ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is positively and significantly 
related to the likelihood of investor participation in the same period. The 
difference between the coefficients of the two interaction variables suggests 
that lead manager±investor relationships deter investors from participating in 
SEOs with high relative size, while the co-manager±investor relationships 
motivate investors to participate in SEOs with high relative size in the sample 
period from 1995 to 2007. 
 
The variables in the second sample period in Table 31 show a similar pattern 
of results to those in the first sample period. The coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 
and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
PHPEHUVKLSRIWKHXQGHUZULWHU¶VQHWZRUNPRWLYDWHVLQYHVWRUVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQ
SEOs. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ also shows a significantly positive influence on investor 
participation. The coefficient of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is still negative 
and significant at the 1% level. However, ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ reveals a 
negative and significant impact on investor participation, which is different 
from the results for the first sample period. 
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To further illustrate how ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ affects the likelihood of 
investor participation, I implement a regression for each year. The results are 
reported in Appendix 6. The coefficient of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  is 
significantly negative in 2009, while it is significantly positive in 2008. 
However, as there are much more observations in 2009, the coefficient of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is negative and significant at 1% level. The results 
could be treated as the implication of the increasing power of investors and the 
relatively poorer quality of SEOs after financial crisis. 
 
Table 32 shows the influence of underwriter±investor relationships established 
in all equity deals (rather than in just SEOs) on investor participation in SEOs 
with high relative size. The results in Table 32 are again presented for two 
separate sample periods. The results are similar to those reported in Table 31. 
The coefficients of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ , ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ  and ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ in 
the two sample periods are negative and significant at the 1% level. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ shows a positive effect on investor participation 
and is significant at the 10% level in the period 1995±2007 while it is 
negatively related to investor participation in period 2008±2011. 
 
Similar with Table 31, I implement a regression for each year to illustrate how ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ affects investor participation in Appendix 7. The 
results come out to be the similar pattern with those of Appendix 6. The results 
also suggest institutional investors may have more power in investment 
banking industry and the relatively poorer quality of SEOs after financial 
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crisis. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Huang and Zhang (2011) use a sample that includes traditional book-building 
US SEOs from 1995 to 2004 to examine the effects of underwriter±investor 
relationships on investor participation and offer price discount. Their results 
indicate that previously established underwriter±investor relationships increase 
the likelihood of investor participation in traditional book-building SEOs and 
reduce the offer price discount. Huang and Zhang (2011) claim this is proof of 
the marketing function of investor networks. In other words, the investor 
networks of underwriters should be effective only for traditional book-building 
equity offerings, but should be useless for those types of offering (e.g. 
accelerated SEOs) that do not involve any marketing function.  
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Table 31 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Networks Established in SEOs 
and SEOs with High Relative Size 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all SEOs during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 SEOs 
during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as participating in an 
SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter immediately prior 
to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 13f database. For 
the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of SEOs an eligible investor 
participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that were underwritten by at 
least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the proportion of SEOs an 
eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were underwritten by at least 1 
co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ௌܰாை is the natural logarithm of 1 + the 
number of SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ LVWKHQDWXUDOORJDULWKPRIWKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶V6(2V
in which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 
equals 1 if, by relative size, the SEO belongs to the highest quartile of all SEOs in the 
current year of the SEO. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽. Similarly, ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the interaction 
between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. Year dummy variables (ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are 
included in both regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 36.27a 0.005 15.46a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.364 36.15a 0.190 15.32a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.193 26.22a 0.150 13.43a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.138 24.97a 0.140 14.81a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.260 -11.36a -0.127 -5.09a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.064 3.51a -0.111 -4.17a ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 0.539 479.96a 0.592 308.54a ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.621 120.60a 0.635 78.89a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.096 33.73a 0.260 29.50a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.009 2.97b 0.086 16.45a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.134 -13.50a 0.177 10.09a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.217 133.31a 0.251 125.72a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.023 8.90a -0.041 -11.71a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.035 10.94a -0.030 -5.42a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.002 0.48 0.034 3.70a ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.011 3.37a 0.023 3.27b ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.027 -6.05a -0.122 -16.23a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.020 4.62a 0.034 7.59a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.536 -445.96a -5.975 -336.85a ܰ 3,125,783 1,250,157 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.247 0.291 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 32 Investor Participation in SEOs, Investor Network Established in All 
Equity Deals and SEOs with High Relative Size 
The dependent variable, ܲܽݐ݅ܿ݅݌ܽݐ݅݋݊, equals 1 if an eligible investor participated in an 
SEO. An eligible investor for an SEO is defined as an investor that participates in at least 
0.5% of all equity deals during the year of the SEO and that participated in at least 10 
equity deals during the 5 years prior to the current SEO. An investor is defined as 
participating in an SEO if the investor increases its holding of the stock from the quarter 
immediately prior to the SEO to the quarter immediately after the SEO according to the 
13f database. For the independent variables, ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ is the proportion of equity 
deals an eligible investor participated in during the 5 years prior to the current SEO that 
were underwritten by at least 1 lead underwriter of the current SEO. ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the 
proportion of equity deals an eligible investor participated in within 5 years that were 
underwritten by at least 1 co-managing underwriter of the current SEO. ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ is the 
natural logarithm of 1 + the number of equity deals in which the investor participated in 
the 5 years prior to the current SEO. ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ாோ is the natural logarithm of 1 WKHQXPEHURIWKHVDPHLVVXHU¶VHTXLW\GHDOVLQZKLFKWKHLQYHVWRUSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH
years prior to the current SEO. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ equals 1 if, by relative size, the SEO 
belongs to the highest quartile of all SEOs in the current year of the SEO. ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽  is the interaction between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁  and ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ . Similarly, ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ is the interaction between ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ and ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ. Year 
dummy variables ( ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) are included in both regressions, but their 
coefficients are not reported. 
Independent Variable Year 1995-2007 Year 2008-2011 Coeff. z-Stat Coeff. z-Stat ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.007 37.35a 0.005 15.89a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.455 45.04a 0.227 18.38a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.204 27.84a 0.126 11.55a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.140 25.38a 0.132 13.90a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.256 -11.31a -0.109 -4.40a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.038 2.08c -0.106 -4.09a ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 0.485 457.35a 0.553 301.33a ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.715 153.02a 0.674 87.05a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.101 35.47a 0.257 29.36a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.008 2.43c 0.079 15.26a ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ -0.160 -16.03a 0.181 10.40a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.202 125.25a 0.249 125.48a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.021 8.32a -0.043 -12.33a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.045 14.18a -0.034 -6.23a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.004 0.82 0.028 3.07b ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.009 2.87b 0.018 2.58b ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.021 -4.69a -0.123 -16.30a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ 0.023 5.48a 0.036 7.99a ܫܰܶܧܴܥܧܲܶ -5.329 -435.39a -5.827 -331.48a ܰ 3,178,758 1,256,406 ܲݏ݁ݑ݀݋ܴଶ 0.245 0.287 ܻ݁ܽݎ ?ܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ Included Included 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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However, according to Huang et al. (2008), investment banks develop 
relationships with investors through repeat business in securities offerings, 
brokerage services, and analyst research. In other words, the underwriter±
investor relationship cannot be simply treated as a marketing component and it 
would exist even in the absence of marketing activity. Therefore, given that the 
underwriter±investor relationship is not only derived from marketing activities 
but also from the repeat dealings in the process of securities offerings, I 
K\SRWKHVL]HWKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSLQIOXHQFHVLQYHVWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVRQZKHWKHURU
not to participate not only in traditional book-building SEOs but also in 
accelerated SEOs, which have been booming during recent years and with 
little marketing effort. Additionally, as many underwriters and investors deal 
with both IPOs and SEOs, the relationships established during IPOs should 
also be effective in SEOs, and vice versa. 
 
To implement this research, I choose to sample all equity offerings from 1990 
to 2011 and to apply selection criteria used in similar studies. Thus, 
underwriter±investor networks are evaluated according to the method 
proposed by Huang and Zhang (2011). There are two types of relationship 
variables employed in this research, namely fractional variables and binary 
variables. The tests are mainly run on three categories of relationship: those 
based purely on previous IPOs, those based purely on previous SEOs and 
those based on all equity deals (a mixed group). The regression results support 
my hypothesis that underwriter±investor relationships increase the likelihood 
of investor participation in equity offerings. Such underwriter±investor 
relationships can be established in both IPOs and SEOs and are effective 
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interactively. Finally, I extend the tests in different circumstance and study 
how underwriter±investors relationships affect the likelihood of investor 
participation in these conditions. 
 
The contributions of this study are threefold. Firstly, to the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to show that underwriter±investor networks 
increase the likelihood of investor participation and such influence is separate 
from the marketing function of the underwriters; secondly, it shows that 
underwriter±investor relationships are effective not only in pure IPOs or pure 
SEOs but also interactively; finally, it is not just the relationships established 
by lead managers that are effective, but also those established by co-managers. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
There were two chief motivations for the present research. Firstly, commercial 
bank co-managers are becoming more and more popular in SEO underwriting, 
but a deeper and more detailed understanding of their effects on SEO flotation 
costs is lacking, and empirical studies in this field have hitherto failed to 
distinguish market perceptions of the involvement of commercial banks in 
underwriting in different conditions. Secondly, though investment banking is a 
relationship-based rather transaction-based business, few previous studies 
focus on whether the underwriter±LQYHVWRU QHWZRUN DIIHFWV LQYHVWRUV¶
participation in equity offerings. This thesis aims to contribute to the literature 
by finding that commercial bank co-managers do not always benefit SEO 
issuers by reducing flotation costs, and the underwriter±investor network 
PRVWO\SRVLWLYHO\DIIHFWHGLQYHVWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQHTXLW\RIIHULQJV
from 1995 to 2011. 
 
Chapter 4 investigated whether having commercial banks act as co-managers 
always works to the benefit of issuers by reducing flotation costs. I 
hypothesize that SEOs with commercial bank co-managers who acted as 
opportunists in their last deal and who may play the same role in the current 
underwriting would experience higher flotation costs. The category 
(commercial bank versus investment bank) of each underwriter is determined 
by the characteristic of its holding company when the SEO occurs. A 
co-manager is identified as a potential opportunist if the leverage of the issuer 
of the SEO underwritten by the co-manager is higher than the industry average 
before the issue and lower thereafter. The potential opportunists will be 
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suspected to act as opportunists again if the leverage of the issuers is higher 
than the industry average before the SEO. The other control variables selected 
are mainly based on the previous literature. Additionally, considering the boom 
in accelerated offerings and overnight offerings after 2007, I include two 
dummy variables to control the effects. The multivariate results provide 
evidence for my hypothesis in terms of SEO discount while commercial bank 
co-managers show no statistically significant influence on SEO announcement 
returns for the sample from 1995 to 2011. Moreover, the involvement of 
commercial bank co-managers increases the underwriting spread and 
commercial bank co-managers will ask for more underwriting spread if the 
leverage of the issuers is higher than the industry average. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of underwriter±investor relationships on 
LQYHVWRUV¶ SDUWLcipation in equity offerings. Before implementing the 
regressions, I firstly identify the group of eligible investors. An investor is 
considered an eligible investor if it participates in at least 0.5% of all equity 
offerings during the year of the current deal and participated in at least 10 
equity offerings during the 5 years prior to the current deal. I expect such an 
eligible investor group to capture the investors that are activated during the 
year of the current deal and have the possibility of participation in the current 
deal. The underwriter±investor relationships include the relationships between 
investors and both lead managers and co-managers. According to the previous 
literature, the underwriter±investor relationships in equity offerings are 
established through previous transactions. Consequently, I quantify these 
relationships by calculating the number of deals involving the same investors 
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and underwriters of the current deal during the 5 years prior to the current deal. 
Then, to capture the influence of the managing underwriter(s) on investor 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ , HPSOR\ WZR YDULDEOHV FDOFXODWHG DV WKH LQYHVWRUV¶ SHUFHQWDJH
participation in deals with lead manager(s) and co-manager(s) respectively 
over all deals the investors participated in previous five years. Further, to 
capture how multiple managing underwriters of a deal will influence the 
likelihood of participation of eligible investors, I employ three dummy 
variables. The other variables are chosen based on Huang and Zhang (2011) 
and Binay et al. (2007). 
 
Since Huang et al. (2008) point out that underwriter±investor network are 
established through previous deals, I derive the network from not only pure 
IPO or SEO samples but also from a sample of all IPOs and SEOs. The sample 
period I choose is from 1995 to 2011. Given that, in 2008, the financial crisis 
eliminated several big names in the investment banking industry, I merge the 
network built by the eliminated banks with their successors or acquirers and, 
further, divide the sample into two periods, 1995±2007 and 2008±2011. The 
results of all the regressions concerning pure IPO or SEO samples and 
utilizing fractional variables to measure underwriter±investor relationships 
support my hypothesis. The two single dummy variables show mixed results, 
but the interaction of the two dummy variables again provides support for my 
hypothesis. Most of the results of the multivariate tests for all the equity deals 
are similar to those based purely on IPOs or SEOs, though the network 
established from all previous equity offerings shows a significantly negative 
influence on investor participation in current IPOs during 2008 to 2011. To 
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summarize, the empirical results provide strong evidence for my hypothesis 
that underwriter±investor relationships increase the likelihood of investor 
participation in current equity offerings. 
 
I further extend the tests by adding three dummy variables, namely 
HighInvHolding, HighProceeds and HighRelSizeWKDWHTXDOLIWKHLQYHVWRU¶V
total stock holding, the total proceeds of the offering, and the relative size of 
SEO is high, respectively. I also employ interactions between fractional 
relationship variables and the three dummy variables to investigate how 
underwriter±LQYHVWRU UHODWLRQVKLSV DIIHFW LQYHVWRUV¶ SDrticipation in different 
situations. The results suggest that the underwriter±investor network will 
LQFUHDVH WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI LQYHVWRUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ ,32V IRU LQYHVWRUV ZLWK
high stock holdings. However, the same situation will decrease the likelihood 
RI LQYHVWRUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ 6(2V 7KH ,32V ZLWK KLJK WRWDO SURFHHGV DUH
more attractive for investors. Nevertheless, underwriter±investor relationships 
then decrease the likelihood of investor participation. On the other hand, SEOs 
with high total proceeds are less attractive for investors while the relationships 
between lead managers and investors encourage the participation of investors. 
Thirdly, investors prefer SEOs with high relative size. However, the 
relationships between lead managers and investors deter investors from 
participating in these SEOs with high relative size. 
 
The results presented in this thesis have two main implications. Firstly, the 
involvement of commercial banks as co-managers may increase the SEO 
discount instead of always reducing it. This result supports the concern about a 
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conflict of interest for commercial banks in the underwriting business. 
Secondly, underwriter±investor relationships, established previously purely in 
IPOs or in SEOs, or in all equity offerings, increase the likelihood of investor 
participation in current equity offerings. 
 
However, there are several limitations to this research. One is the fact that the 
HPSLULFDOUHVXOWVGRFXPHQWWKDWWKHOHDGPDQDJHUVDQGLQYHVWRUV¶UHODWLRQVKLSV
established in all equity RIIHULQJVVHHPHGWRUHGXFHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRILQYHVWRUV¶
participation in IPOs for the sample period from 2008 to 2011. Although all 
the results derived from the earlier sample period support my hypothesis, this 
issue cannot be easily explained. One suggestion is that there were changes in 
IPO offerings. For instance, the number of deals decreased dramatically. 
Moreover, the financial crisis is likely to have overturned the normal rules and 
even players in equity offerings and to have led to some influential changes in 
the investment banking industry, such as the boom in accelerated SEOs. 
7KHUHIRUH WKH OHDG PDQDJHUV DQG LQYHVWRUV¶ UHODWLRQVKLSV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ DOO
previous equity deals show a negative effecW RQ LQYHVWRUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
Another limitation is the lack of a ready explanation for the mixed results of 
the tests, including several dummy variables in the analysis of investors with 
high total stock holdings, of deals with high total proceeds and SEOs with 
high relative size. In particular, some analyses produce contrasting results for 
IPOs and SEOs. The reason may be related to the different underlying 
mechanics and characteristics of IPOs and SEOs. To solve these problems, 
further work is necessary. 
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Appendix 1. List of Variables in Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 4 
This section is to give a list of variables that are used in the descriptive 
statistics of Chapter 4. 
Variables name Definition 
ANN RET Announcement returns; cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement day; is normally calculated over 
the three-day [-1,1] or five-day [-2,2] window. 
CB Proc. Ratio SEOs proceeds underwritten by commercial bank 
divided by total SEO proceeds. 
CB Ratio The number of commercial bank underwritten deals 
divided by total number of SEOs deals. 
CMCB Proc. Ratio SEOs proceeds underwritten by commercial bank 
co-managers divided by total SEO proceeds. 
CMCB Ratio The number of deals with commercial bank 
co-managers divided by total number of SEO deals. 
Discount The return from the offer price to pre-RIIHU GD\¶V
closing price. 
DR&CB Ratio The number of deals with commercial bank 
underwriters and used to reduce debt divided by total 
SEO number. 
DR&IB Ratio The number of SEOs deals with pure investment bank 
syndicate and used to reduce debt divided by total SEO 
number. 
Gross Spread The percent of underwriter gross spread in offer size. 
HL Ratio The number of SEOs with high leveraged issuer 
divided by total SEO number. 
HL&CB Ratio The number of SEOs with high leveraged issuer and 
commercial bank underwriters divided by total SEO 
number. 
HL&IB Ratio The number of SEOs with high leveraged issuer and 
pure investment bank syndicate divided by total SEO 
number. 
NO. of COM The number of co-managers. 
NO. of Deals The number of SEO deals. 
NO. of Lead The number of book managers. 
NO. of Mgr The number of all the underwriters. 
Proc. Avg Average proceeds of SEO deals. 
Proc. Sum Total proceeds of SEO deals. 
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Appendix 2. List of Variables in Regressions of Chapter 4 
This section is to give a list of variables that are used in the regression of 
Chapter 4. 
Variables Name Definition 
Accelerate  Dummy variable; equals one if an offer is accelerated 
SEO. 
ACTMAR  Dummy variable; represents Active-Market; denotes 
whether SEOs frequently happen in current market. 
Announcement returns Cumulative abnormal returns around announcement 
day; is normally calculated over the three-day [-1,1] or 
five-day [-2,2] window. 
CB-COM Dummy variable; equals one if underwriter syndicate 
includes at least one commercial bank co-manager. 
CB-Lead Dummy variable; equals one if underwriter syndicate 
includes at least one commercial bank book manager. 
CMCB-HL Dummy variable; equals one if underwriter syndicate 
includes at least one commercial bank co-manager and 
LVVXHU¶VOHYHUDJHLVKLJKHUWKDQLQGXVWU\DYHUDJH 
CMCB-Susp Dummy variable; equals one if underwriter syndicate 
includes at least one commercial bank co-manager and 
this commercial bank co-manager reflect potential 
conflict of interest in its last underwriting deal, that is, 
it helped a high leverage issuer obtain money from 
equity market to reduced debt in its last deal. 
CMCB-Susp&HL Dummy variable; equals one if underwriter syndicate 
includes at least one commercial bank co-manager and 
this commercial bank co-manager reflect potential 
conflict of interest in its last underwriting deal. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ FXUUHQW LVVXHU¶V OHYHUDJH LVKLJKHU WKDQ
industry average. 
Discount The return from the offer price to pre-RIIHU GD\¶V
closing price. 
Integer Dummy variable; equals one if an offer is priced at an 
integer. 
Lead rank Dummy variable; equals one if a syndicate include 
reputable book managers whose Carter-Manaster rank 
is greater than 8. 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
LnAnalyst  The natural logarithm of analyst recommendations 
REWDLQHG IURP ,QVWLWXWLRQDO %URNHUV¶ (VWLPDWLRQ
System (I/B/E/S). 
Lnassets The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Lnproceeds The natural logarithm of the number of shares issued 
multiplied by offer price. 
Market to book The sum of total assets and market value of equity 
minus book value of equity divided by total assets. 
Multi-book Dummy variable; equals one if a syndicate includes 
more than one book manager. 
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List of Variables in Regressions of Chapter 4 (Continued) 
NASDAQ Dummy variable; equals one if an offer is issued by a 
NASDAQ-listed firm. 
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Appendix 3. List of Variables in Descriptive Statistics of Chapter 5 
This section is to give a list of variables that are used in the descriptive 
statistics of Chapter 5. 
Variables Name Definition 
ACC(%) The percent of the number of accelerated SEOs over 
the number of total SEOs 
Acc.Deals The number of accelerated SEOs 
Aver.Proceeds The average proceeds per deal in a given year 
Firm Age The number of years since the firm founded at the time 
of IPO 
InstHolding the most recent institutional ownership before the 
offer 
Market Capital  the pre-issue market capitalization (in constant 2004 
$millions) 
No. Both / No.IPO The percent of the total number of investors 
participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number 
of investors participating in IPOs 
No. of Deals per 
Investor 
the average number of deals participated by an 
investor 
No. of Investors the total number of investors that have participated in 
any deal of a given year 
No. of Investors in 
Both 
the total number of investors participating in both 
IPOs and SEOs 
No. of Investors per 
Deal 
the average number of investors participating in a deal 
No. of IPOs  the number of shares offered (in millions) in the IPO 
No. of SEOs the number of SEOs 
No.Both / No.SEO the percent of the total number of investors 
participating in both IPOs and SEOs over the number 
of investors participating in SEOs 
Pre-offer Price the closing price on the day before the offer 
Price Update the absolute value of the percentage change between 
the middle of the range of prices in the initial 
registration statement and the offer price 
Relative Size the number of shares offered over the total number of 
shares outstanding before the offer 
Shares Offered the number of shares offered (in millions) in the IPO 
Total Proceeds the total proceeds (in constant 2004 $millions) of all 
the deals 
Underpricing  WKH UHWXUQ IURP WKHRIIHUSULFH WRRIIHUGD\¶VFORVLQJ
price multiplied by 100 
VC-Backed IPOs the percentage of firms received financing from 
venture capitalists before IPOs over all IPO firms 
Volatility the square root of 252 multiplied by the standard 
deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 
trading days ending 11days before the offer 
 
 
  
203 
 
Appendix 4. List of Variables in Regressions of Chapter 5 
This section is to give a list of variables that are used in the regression of 
Chapter 5. 
Variables Name Definition ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ WKH UHWXUQ IURP WKHRIIHUSULFH WRRIIHUGD\¶VFORsing 
price multiplied by 100 ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ the fraction of equities participated in by the eligible 
investor during the 5 years prior to the current deal that 
were underwritten by at least 1 lead underwriter of the 
current deal ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ the fraction of equities participated in by the eligible 
investor during the 5 years prior to the current deal that 
were underwritten by at least 1 co-manager of the 
current deal ܮ݊ ூܰ௉ை The natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs in 
which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to 
the current IPO, is used to control for how active the 
investor has been regarding with considering the IPO 
sample ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ The logarithm of the number of shares issued for 
current IPO ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ Dummy variable that equals one if the firm received 
financing from venture capitalists prior to the IPO (as 
defined by SDC), and zero otherwise ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ The logarithm of (one plus) the number of years since 
the firm was founded, measured at the time of the IPO. 
I use the Field-Ritter data set of founding dates ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ The absolute value of the percentage change between 
the offer price and the middle of the range of prices in 
the prospectus ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer is listed on 
the NYSE or AMEX, and 0 otherwise ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ Dummy variable that equals 1 for issuing firms that 
are utility firms ݄ܶ݁ܿ Dummy variable that equals 1 for issuing firms that 
are tech firms ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ Dummy variable that equals 1 for issuing firms that 
are biotech firms ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ವ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the eligible investor is 
a relationship investor of at least 1 lead manager ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெವ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the eligible investor is 
a relationship investor of at least 1 co-manager ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ The natural logarithm of 1 + the number of IPOs and 
SEOs in which the investor participated in the 5 years 
prior to the current offering, is used to control for how 
active the investor has been regarding with the IPO 
and SEO sample 
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List of Variables in Regressions of Chapter 5 (Continued) ܮ݊ ௌܰாை The natural logarithm of 1 + the number of SEOs in 
which the investor participated in the 5 years prior to 
the current SEO, is used to control for how active the 
investor has been regarding with considering the SEO 
sample ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎ The natural logarithm of 1 + the number of the same LVVXHU¶V6(2VSDUWLFLSDWHGLQE\WKHLQYHVWRULQWKH
years prior to the current SEO, is used to control for 
the issuer-investor relationship ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ The most recent institutional ownership before the 
offer, measured in decimals ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ The standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns 
over the 30 trading days ending 11 days before the 
offer, measured in decimals ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ The number of shares offered over the total number of 
shares outstanding before the offer, measured in 
decimals ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ The logged pre-issue market capitalization (in 
constant 2004 $millions), measured as the price 
multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at 
the market close before the offer ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ The logarithm of the closing price on the day before 
the offer ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the SEO is an 
accelerated offer ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ The natural logarithm of 1 + the number of the same LVVXHU¶VGHDOVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQE\WKHLQYHVWRU LQ WKH
years prior to the current deal, is used to control for the 
issuer-investor relationship ܪ݄݅݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the investor holds the 
highest quartile of the total value of stocks among all 
investors in the quarter prior to current deal ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the total proceeds of 
the offer belongs to the highest quartile of all offers in 
the same year ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ Dummy variable that equals 1 if the relative size of the 
SEO belongs to the highest quartile of all SEOs in the 
current year of the SEO 
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Appendix 5. Further Regression for Table 17 for Each Year 
 
This table is the further regression for Table 17 for each year as the results of ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ are inconsistent in splitting period into two. The definitions of all independent variables are the same with those of all 
independent variables in Table 17. 
Independent 
Variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.410a 0.459a 0.501a 0.420a 0.508a 0.765a 0.618a 0.828a 0.370a 0.524a 0.552a 0.952a 0.662a 1.293a 0.720a 0.174b 0.587a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.511a 0.544a 0.571a 0.895a 0.713a 0.601a -0.004 -0.255b -0.032 0.295a 0.226a -0.378a 0.191a 1.052a -0.332c -0.469a -0.265a ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.271a 0.424a 0.310a 0.641a 0.685a 0.813a 0.755a 0.517a 0.183 0.414a 0.236a 0.156 0.575a 0.584a -0.178 0.640a 0.502a ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 2.826a 2.890a 3.002a 3.576a 3.413a 3.670a 3.231a 3.361a 3.503a 3.478a 3.198a 3.958a 3.304a 3.465a 3.770a 3.802a 3.359a ܮ݄݊ܵܽݎ݁ݏ 0.856a 0.783a 1.037a 0.896a 0.592a 0.497a 1.087a 0.882a 0.939a 0.832a 0.939a 1.221a 0.663a 2.704a 1.407a 0.979a 0.968a ܸܥܨ݈ܽ݃ 0.249a -0.015 -0.005 0.129b 0.163a -0.102a 0.234b 0.105 0.302a 0.147b 0.065 -0.236c -0.069 -0.242 0.294c 0.540a 0.055 ܮ݊ܨ݅ݎ݉ܣ݃݁ -0.017 0.069b 0.008 0.058 0.173a 0.140a -0.101 -0.225a 0.115 0.149a 0.226a 0.364a 0.089c -0.531a 0.151 -0.009 -0.065 ܲݎܷ݅ܿ݁݌݀ܽݐ݁ -0.007 0.050 0.056 0.082 0.152a 0.013 -0.160b -0.012 0.077 -0.112b -0.100c -0.296a -0.135a -0.917b 0.103 -0.145b -0.040 ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ 0.115b -0.189a -0.067 -0.188a -0.051c 0.058 -0.093 0.113 -0.170c -0.118b -0.180a 0.046 -0.175a -1.335a 0.447a 0.291a -0.010 ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.000 -0.022 0.016 -0.009 -0.067b 0.050c 0.170a 0.000 0.000 -0.119a 0.092b 0.118 0.026 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.000 ݄ܶ݁ܿ -0.052 -0.074c -0.213a -0.072 0.284a 0.056 -0.364a 0.106 -0.320a 0.002 -0.170a -0.274b -0.102c 0.864a 0.192 -0.138b 0.313a ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ -0.021 -0.155a -0.184a -0.160b 0.056c 0.306a -0.137c 0.192b -0.522a -0.245a -0.042 -0.176 -0.365a 0.981c -0.062 -0.536a -0.349a ܰ 213251 298931 240271 168598 327960 271762 66037 59757 69193 189909 141087 130571 155549 29881 39152 119864 71806 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 6. Further Regression for Table 31 for Each Year 
 
This table is the further regression for Table 31 for each year as the results of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are inconsistent in splitting period into two. The definitions of all independent variables are the same with those 
of all independent variables in Table 31. 
Independent 
Variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.195a 0.231a 0.167a 0.151a 0.235a 0.177a 0.185a 0.154a 0.161a 0.136a 0.165a 0.089b 0.159a 0.107a 0.107a 0.305a 0.124a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.258a 0.358a 0.366a 0.369a 0.376a 0.394a 0.293a 0.203a 0.189a 0.238a 0.052c 0.020 -0.018 0.227a 0.268a 0.169a -0.034 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.320a 0.290a 0.176a 0.444a 0.252a 0.247a -0.160a 0.095a 0.019 0.082a 0.157a 0.134a 0.178a 0.032 0.105a 0.124a 0.413a ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.047 0.283a 0.143a 0.231a 0.127a 0.159a 0.267a 0.229a 0.139a 0.204a 0.119b 0.064 -0.003 0.189a 0.333a 0.069c 0.133b ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁כ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.024 -0.151a -0.015 0.017 -0.226a -0.035 -0.300a -0.149a -0.232a -0.162a -0.160a -0.167a -0.085c -0.272a -0.125a 0.056 0.016 ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.073b 0.001 -0.083b -0.175a 0.007 -0.129a 0.112a 0.048 0.059c 0.130a 0.118a 0.059 -0.039 0.157a -0.188a -0.002 0.015 ܮ݊ ௌܰாை 2.079a 2.241a 2.239a 2.295a 2.260a 2.376a 2.213a 2.170a 2.269a 2.420a 2.069a 2.316a 1.995a 1.816a 2.381a 2.463a 2.429a ܮ݊ܰܵܧ ௌܱ஺ெூௌௌ௎  0.352a 0.347a 0.350a 0.313a 0.222a 0.310a 0.288a 0.267a 0.393a 0.394a 0.473a 0.641a 0.487a 0.357a 0.351a 0.462a 0.518a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.277a 0.240a 0.263a 0.282a 0.511a 0.477a 0.176c 0.288a 0.349a 0.332a 0.460a 0.389a 0.353a 0.175a 0.258a 0.303a 0.367a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.049c 0.059a 0.006 0.229a 0.061a -0.012 0.043c 0.057a 0.168a 0.095a 0.131a 0.146a -0.027 0.077a 0.199a 0.020 0.031 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.243a -0.037 0.205a 0.020 0.117a 0.067b 0.002 0.111a 0.207a 0.080a 0.062 0.086 0.221a 0.104a 0.088a 0.315a 0.187a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.915a 0.712a 1.189a 0.980a 0.920a 0.924a 1.336a 0.943a 1.139a 1.076a 0.817a 1.121a 1.112a 1.108a 1.486a 1.579a 1.296a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.155a 0.246a 0.031 0.172a -0.127a 0.049c 0.092a 0.100a -0.015 -0.029 0.081b -0.036 0.032 -0.068b -0.132a -0.096a -0.138a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.064b 0.106a 0.045c 0.032 0.053b 0.180a 0.133a 0.010 0.030 0.071a -0.022 -0.108a 0.053c -0.064b -0.035c -0.049c -0.092a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.005 -0.007 -0.089a 0.121a 0.006 0.027 0.099a 0.116a 0.034c 0.072a 0.043c 0.085a -0.126a -0.033 0.038b -0.021 -0.014 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.029 -0.040c -0.056b 0.001 0.228a -0.063a 0.036c 0.043c 0.004 -0.034 0.104a 0.153a 0.113a 0.041c -0.003 0.115a 0.065b ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ 0.022 -0.063b -0.093a -0.020 0.072a -0.001 -0.022 -0.077a -0.033 -0.100a -0.034 -0.103a -0.004 -0.112a -0.203a -0.029 -0.191a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ -0.046b 0.035c 0.047b 0.035 0.163a 0.023 -0.215a -0.021 0.071a 0.031 0.058b 0.059c 0.008 0.151a 0.007 0.051c 0.186a ܰ 235550 275908 251468 185463 241881 257089 240769 217515 282157 329337 226176 180259 202211 179546 519208 328570 222833 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 7. Further Regression for Table 32 for Each Year 
 
This table is the further regression for Table 32 for each year as the results of ܪ݄ܴ݈݅݃݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ are inconsistent in splitting period into two. The definitions of all independent variables are the same with those 
of all independent variables in Table 32. 
Independent 
Variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ 0.212a 0.231a 0.160a 0.156a 0.247a 0.177a 0.189a 0.154a 0.169a 0.138a 0.180a 0.066c 0.186a 0.109a 0.108a 0.306a 0.124a ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ 0.360a 0.412a 0.420a 0.420a 0.438a 0.445a 0.391a 0.264a 0.227a 0.269a 0.121a 0.074c 0.098a 0.251a 0.303a 0.199a 0.028 ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ 0.324a 0.286a 0.229a 0.442a 0.289a 0.276a -0.151a 0.117a 0.016 0.078a 0.148a 0.145a 0.185a 0.015 0.095a 0.106a 0.352a ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ 0.089c 0.276a 0.151a 0.263a 0.138a 0.184a 0.316a 0.245a 0.137a 0.173a 0.128b 0.069 0.030 0.187a 0.330a 0.053 0.101c ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿכ ܮܱܻܣܮ௅ா஺஽ -0.049 -0.137a -0.005 0.003 -0.242a -0.053c -0.313a -0.151a -0.232a -0.133a -0.168a -0.194a -0.098c -0.265a -0.129a 0.076c 0.048 ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݋ܿ כ ܮܱܻܣܮ஼ெ -0.075b -0.017 -0.110a -0.164a -0.010 -0.148a 0.079b 0.037 0.045 0.127a 0.116a 0.055 -0.053 0.149a -0.177a -0.004 0.006 ܮ݊ ாܰ௤௨௜௧௬ 2.005a 2.008a 2.045a 2.180a 2.108a 2.203a 2.209a 2.147a 2.220a 2.293a 2.090a 2.327a 2.070a 1.789a 2.338a 2.489a 2.160a ܮ݊ܰܧݍݑ݅ݐݕௌ஺ெூௌௌ௎ 0.521a 0.543a 0.492a 0.495a 0.397a 0.465a 0.331a 0.307a 0.450a 0.436a 0.563a 0.758a 0.542a 0.418a 0.377a 0.493a 0.584a ܫ݊ݏݐǤ ܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌ 0.269a 0.231a 0.260a 0.264a 0.518a 0.500a 0.252b 0.288a 0.350a 0.319a 0.488a 0.407a 0.383a 0.207a 0.236a 0.322a 0.359a ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅ݐ݅ݕ 0.055b 0.074a 0.018 0.223a 0.049b -0.030c 0.028 0.047b 0.173a 0.089a 0.138a 0.156a -0.036 0.072a 0.180a 0.013 0.034 ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ 0.205a -0.070c 0.176a -0.031 0.106a 0.048 -0.084 0.106a 0.204a 0.060b 0.027 0.068 0.193a 0.112a 0.089a 0.319a 0.165a ܮ݊ܯ݇ݐܥܽ݌ 0.833a 0.611a 1.064a 0.942a 0.816a 0.807a 1.316a 0.913a 1.101a 0.988a 0.760a 1.046a 1.059a 1.128a 1.478a 1.600a 1.192a ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ 0.151a 0.198a 0.028 0.150a -0.160a 0.034 0.083a 0.094a 0.004 -0.012 0.073b -0.043 0.040 -0.076a -0.133a -0.116a -0.152a ܻܰܵܧܣ݉݁ݔ -0.041 0.140a 0.067a 0.033 0.079a 0.199a 0.152a 0.019 0.046c 0.076a -0.003 -0.076b 0.059b -0.069b -0.044b -0.058b -0.092a ܷݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ 0.002 -0.011 -0.087a 0.122a -0.025 0.029c 0.098a 0.115a 0.031c 0.075a 0.032 0.097a -0.128a -0.023 0.020 -0.016 -0.017 ݄ܶ݁ܿ 0.040 -0.040c -0.077a -0.022 0.238a -0.056b 0.024 0.047b 0.000 -0.038c 0.105a 0.174a 0.109a 0.041c -0.006 0.108a 0.037 ܤ݅݋ݐ݄݁ܿ 0.037 -0.048c -0.095a -0.020 0.069a 0.046c -0.028 -0.079a -0.029 -0.101a -0.049c -0.074c 0.003 -0.121a -0.199a -0.035 -0.191a ܣ݈ܿܿ݁݁ݎܽݐ݁݀ -0.056b 0.032c 0.054a 0.027 0.183a 0.033c -0.195a -0.012 0.072a 0.038c 0.068a 0.081b 0.029 0.151a 0.010 0.057b 0.185a ܰ 237080 251327 241588 189090 238448 253041 257926 231112 294873 319705 244672 195653 224243 192809 526701 345153 191743 
a
 Statistical significance at the 1% level.  
b
 Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c
 Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
